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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Aid and Peace: A Critique of Foreign Assistance, Conflict 
and Development. (December 2011) 
Shahriar Rahman Kibriya, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Edwin Price 
 
  In 2000, the World Bank estimated that 2.8 billion people lived on incomes of 
less than $2.00 a day. Meanwhile about forty percent of the world’s population endured 
conflict, most of them from the same subset. The implementation of foreign assistance to 
mitigate poverty and conflict is a key focus of politicians, bureaucrats and social 
scientists. The goal of this research is to discover relationships among foreign aid, 
conflict, and socio-economic development, and assess the implications.      
Other evaluations either approach this issue from a hedonistic, theoretical 
standpoint, or follow a stylized project evaluation method. This research is intended to 
create a bridge between the two approaches by: 1) proposing theoretical models of 
assistance and conflict accounting for current status quo, and 2) introducing novel 
empirical methods to analyze the causes and effects of development, intervention and 
conflict.  
The research begins with a comparative analysis of different schools of thought 
concerning foreign intervention, conflict and development.  Contemporary philosophies 
  
iv
and policies provide the basis for assumptions and enquiries addressed in the latter part 
of this dissertation.  The review is followed by a critique of relevant data and their 
sources. A theoretical model of foreign assistance allocation and its possible impacts on 
conflict is proposed. The theoretical model is verified through an empirical examination 
using inductive casual inference methods. It is concluded that under current mandates 
and policies, aggregate foreign assistance has no effect on conflict and development in 
poor countries.   
Research is then directed toward analyzing the effect of foreign assistance on 
conflict, disaggregated by sector. Agricultural and food security assistance were 
identified as the most effective method of mitigating conflict. The next segments of 
research concentrate on agricultural development. A model of agricultural development 
is proposed that will promote food security and mitigate conflict. In the last analysis, a 
direct causal relationship is found between commodity prices and conflict. Findings are 
summarized in the conclusion, and recommendations are provided for policy re-
evaluations.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
“We must embark on a bold new program for … the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery…” 
January 20, 1949, President Truman 
The inter-relationships among foreign aid, poverty and conflict, and their 
implications for poor and rich countries, are an emerging area of research in economic 
sciences. Contemporary economists 1 have studied poverty, inequality and development 
and their causes and consequences for many years. Collier (2000), Keen (2000), 
Goodhand (2001,1999), Baulch (2000), Bhalla (1997), Nelson (1998), Blomberg et al. 
(2004), Luckham et al. (2001), Waal (1989)2 and many other prominent social scientists 
connect poverty with conflict. Yet, even after several Bank of Sweden prizes3, a number 
of John Bates Clark medals4, establishment of many poverty research centers, along with 
publications in high profile journals on foreign assistance, causes and consequences of 
conflict and development, remain a subject of debate. To eradicate poverty and conflict, 
international organizations, such as the World Bank, International Fund For Agricultural 
Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations and countries including the    
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  
 
1 Germane works and views discussed in Chapter II. 
2 Elaborate discussion in Chapter II about the works of these philosophers. 
3 Nobel Prize in economics. 
4 Most prestigious prize in economics for below forty economists. 
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United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and France, have devoted billions of 
dollars worth of donations, aid, loans, food support and military intervention. Burnside 
and Dollar(2000), Sach (2005) Goodhand(2001), Easterly(2007), Collier (2001,2008) et 
al. have asserted and demonstrated that the above entities, with their policies and 
interventions, have been unsuccessful in eradicating global poverty and conflict. 
Through this dissertation, the relation between conflict, development, aid and related 
variables, will be explored and assessed. 
1.2 Scope of Research and Questions  
Scholars generally agree that foreign assistance, poverty and conflict have a high 
correlation with conflict but fail to reach a unanimous consensus on the underlying 
causalities. The ineffectiveness of foreign aid, conflict reduction strategies and poverty 
eradication strategies can largely be attributed to a failed understanding of the causal 
relationships and consequences among these variables. Contemporary research is based 
on qualitative and quantitative analyses from different countries and regions. However, 
many researchers do not create the theoretical and empirical bridge between foreign 
assistance, conflict and development. Possible scopes of contribution to contemporary 
literature dealing with these variables are described below. 
1.2.1 Need for Integration 
There have been numerous studies concerning foreign aid, poverty inequality and 
conflict, but unfortunately, none of them consider all of these variables together in a 
theoretical and empirical model. The first initiative of foreign development via 
assistance was the Marshall Plan. This plan was partly enacted to assist countries that 
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were plagued by conflict and poverty due to the struggle and hegemony of Communism. 
Currently, countries that obtain the highest amount of foreign assistance and attention, 
such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, are also marred by conflict, political instability and 
poverty. It appears that the intention and goals of foreign development have remained 
consistent through time. Yet most of the contemporary models that analyze the effects of 
foreign and socio-economic development do not consider conflict as a variable. The 
models that do consider conflict and foreign aid omit inequality or other germane socio-
economic indicators. To explore the mechanics of conflict, poverty, development and 
foreign assistance, an integrative model is required. 
1.2.2 The Necessity of Applied Theoretical Models 
The seminal theoretical models of conflict are perhaps too abstract to be 
implemented in pragmatic settings of international development. There exists a scope of 
more applied mathematical models with simpler and practical assumptions. Models are 
needed that explore both developed and underdeveloped economic views and incentives 
with assumptions that mimic real world scenarios. Such propositions can build empirical 
notions that can successfully contribute towards eradicating conflict and enhancing 
living conditions. 
1.2.3 Collection of Data and Calibration 
Data are available through national and international organizations on conflict, 
violence, foreign assistance and socio-economic indicators. However, it is a challenge to 
collect data from the diverse sources in a manner that would enable quantitative analysis. 
The data also needs to be calibrated and categorized across time and expressed in 
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appropriate units. Further, it is also important to recognize the inconsistencies and 
shortcomings of particular data sets and adjust them according to the needs of research. 
1.2.4 Causal Inferences and Latent Variables 
Poverty and conflict indexes are usually numbers derived from only one or two 
social phenomena and are therefore too simplistic to reach conclusive policy 
recommendations. To analyze socio-economic conditions, one needs to consider an array 
of socio-economic and political variables that affect poverty. For example, if the poverty 
index is derived from calorie intake per day, the researcher might also want to consider 
literacy rate, life expectancy, per capita income, income inequality, etc. The empirical 
quantitative analysis concerning poverty, conflict or even foreign aid often times does 
not encompass all the relevant socio-economic and political variables. These 
“observable” unobserved variables may create spurious regression analyses. Recent 
researchers (Collier 2000, Keen 1998) have claimed that poverty and conflict are often 
times driven by latent unobservable variables, such as greed and/or grievances. 
However, since these variables cannot be measured, there is no empirical evidence 
whether greed and grievances actually move poverty towards conflict or vice versa. 
Foreign assistance for agriculture and food security have been criticized (Barret 
2001) by contemporary policy makers and researchers. Causality notions can also be 
used to analyze commodity prices and conflict in developing countries. The positive 
relationship between commodity prices and unrest in a country is fairly unanimous. 
However, the exact causal relationship between different commodities and violence may 
provide important information flow for specific agricultural policies, which would 
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enable donors to implement and undertake successful policies. There is an underlying 
need of causal inference and probabilistic calibration. Most economic research in related 
areas estimates only the effects of explanatory variables; it does not discover causal 
trends. Although some socio-political research attempts to discover causal trends, it does 
so by using grounded theory, critical realism or case studies. An inductive probabilistic 
causal method to discovering the relationship of poverty, conflict and aid has not been 
developed and utilized. 
1.2.5 Sectorial Development and Assistance 
While evaluating and criticizing foreign assistance projects, current studies only 
consider aggregate assistance when examining the impact of development. However, in 
order to appropriately allocate resources and reform development policies, it is essential 
to study individual aid programs and sectoral assistance. The examination of the sectoral 
assistance data can reveal the allocation and impact of assistance on government 
administration, civil society, agricultural and food security, education, economic 
development and health care. 
1.2.6 Regional Separation and Stylized Models of the Cost of Conflict 
Most relevant research consists of models deduced from specific parts of the 
world. A “one-size fits all” approach is often recommended as a conclusion and as 
policy recommendations. However, poverty and conflict in Sri Lanka (with a 100% 
literacy rate and a relatively high per-capita income) cannot be compared with the 
poverty and conflict in Sudan (with low literacy rates and a relatively low per-capita 
income). Theoretical models, which takes into consideration the current and specific 
 
6 
 
 
 
tumultuous situations of particular regions, can be incorporated into differential policies. 
Although a notion of rational opportunity cost has recently been mentioned by Collier 
(2001), most researchers view wars or conflict as irrational behavior (Keen 1998). In a 
conflict-prone society, violence may not be such an irrational or awkward option. A 
rational agent may also engage in conflict if his utility from engaging in violent activities 
is higher than joining the labor force.   An economic analysis that considers conflict as 
rational behavior of the underprivileged will be effective in designing appropriate 
incentive-based models for the underprivileged of conflict-prone nations. 
1.2.7 Choice of Appropriate Development Policies 
One of the most important decisions made by the donor entities is determining 
subsidies, food aid and technology implementation in conflict prone nations. Suggested 
policies which result from conventional hypothesis testing, more often than not relies on 
rejecting false nulls. However, in a real the world scenario where decisions have to be 
made to save the lives of the impoverished and hungry, a “type 1 error” may cause 
detrimental effects. A novel approach to developing decision-making using probabilistic 
inference scenario analysis should be more appropriate, especially in conflict zones. 
1.2.8 The Relationship Between Commodity Prices and Conflict 
Rising food prices has been identified as both the cause and effect of radical 
violence in African countries. Despite the inception of food aid programs, most African 
countries still have dire shortages of food and experience increasing food prices. 
Although food and agricultural aid has been advocated to increase lately, critics claim 
that agricultural aid has inefficient policies and, thus, is ineffective. Perhaps policy 
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makers and donors are not focusing on appropriate commodities. If causality paths can 
be established between conflict and specific commodity prices, then policy makers and 
donor entities would be able to find solutions to food shortages and mitigate conflict. A 
probabilistic causal analysis would provide appropriate insights into conflict and its 
relationship with different commodity prices. 
1.3 Document Structure and Research Approach 
 
Chapter I explores the scope and purpose of the study. Research questions and 
important hypotheses are depicted in this chapter. 
Chapter II begins with comprehensive literature about foreign aid, conflict and 
socio-economic development. Contemporary scholars are divided into three schools of 
thought. Each school of thought and prognosis of its proponents is discussed to provide a 
better understanding of foreign assistance implementation and policies. Conflict, 
collective actions and regional differences are explored in this chapter, as well. The 
chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the explored relationship between 
conflict, socio-economic development and foreign intervention. 
Chapter III gives a brief explanation and critique of the data available on foreign 
aid, conflict and socio-economic development. Both the criteria and mechanism for 
receiving aid from the donor entities is explored. The discussions are initiated with an 
empirical investigation of disbursement of foreign aid. The examination continues with 
an expansive study and comparison of per-capita aid disbursed to developed nations. A 
brief description of conflict data and its calibration are provided through the following 
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sections. The socio-economic indicators are listed and described along with the 
respective data sources. 
Chapter IV concentrates on developing a theoretical model of foreign aid and 
conflict, considering recipient and donor entities. The theoretical model is followed by 
an empirical validation using time series causality analysis. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations and suggestions that would create more efficient foreign aid policies. 
Chapter V examines the effectiveness of different sectorial foreign aid in 
mitigating conflict. It commences with an exploration of sectoral aid disbursed to all 
countries and to conflict-prone nations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The analyses 
reveal different aid strategies by donors. A panel data analysis is constructed, which 
shows the influence of the different types of foreign aid in conflict and violence. 
Chapter VI includes a theoretical model of conflict in the context of Sudan. The 
theoretical model is based upon the strategies of the World Food Program, designed to 
elevate food security and thereby eradicate conflict. 
Chapter VII proposes efficient causal algorithms to predict and design policies 
for developing nations with small numbers of data points. The empirical explorations of 
this study consider commodity prices and violent act data from Sudan. Through a 
bootstrapping Bayesian network approach, a causal relationship of essential commodity 
prices and conflict is discovered. 
Chapter VIII evaluates the whole document and provides conclusions and 
recommendations. The dissertation considers almost all the facets of international 
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foreign assistance that deals with conflict prone impoverished regions. The chief 
contribution of this research lies in the following seven points: 
1.  Summarizes and compares all the existing theories, policies and literature. 
2. Critiques the germane socio-economic and conflict data available to examine 
foreign aid efficacy in conflict-prone regions. 
3. Proposes an applied theoretical model of donor and receiver behaviors in 
conflict-prone nations. 
4. Examines the causal relationships of foreign assistance, violence and other socio-
economic indicators for all the donor and receiver countries. 
5. Thoroughly discusses the allocation and implications of assistance provided in 
the most important sectors. Analyzes the need and effect of agricultural and food 
security assistance during mitigating conflict. 
6. Designs an efficient model of mitigating conflict through incentive-based 
agricultural development in conflict-prone Sudan. 
7. Proposes a Bayesian bootstrap method to explore commodity price relationships 
with conflict; thereby, devising efficient mechanisms of agricultural and food 
security aid in conflict-prone regions. 
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CHAPTER II 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN AID, CONFLICT AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
“... the unjust is what violates the proportion; for the proportional is intermediate 
and the just is proportional.” 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
Post-Socratic philosophers were the first to incorporate both philosophical and 
practical aspects of justice, law and resource allocation. The idea of deprivation and just 
division of resources is the most important attribute of Plato’s Republic. However, even 
after 2,500 years of deliberation, philosophers and scholars still have different 
perspectives on poverty, deprivation, (un)just demands of citizens and proper 
benevolence of social planners. Foreign development policies, practices of disbursement 
of resources and their implementations are controversial, yet intricate. Although the 
intention to eradicate poverty and mitigating conflict in the developing world remains 
constant, plans and scope keep changing. Contemporary thoughts and actions related to 
foreign assistance (intervention), conflict and development are evaluated and discussed 
in this chapter. 
2.2 Foreign Assistance and International Development 
The post Marshall Plan, foreign development literature and practices all have an 
influenced and are dominated by three schools of thought and action. They may be 
categorized as optimistic, realistic and pessimistic critiques. 
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2.2.1 The Optimists 
Optimists propose new reform policies, provide accounts of successful 
development agendas and work tirelessly with development agencies to implement new 
foreign development programs. This group consists of academics, policy makers, 
politicians, development organizations and even rock stars, actors and actresses. An 
example proponent of this faction is Jeffrey Sachs of Earth Institute, Columbia 
University. Sachs, through his publications and policies, has envisioned and proposed 
the “end of poverty.” In his book, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our 
Time (2005), he claims that developed countries should increase their combined annual 
foreign aid budgets to between $135 billion and $195 billion for the next decade. 
Although differing in his execution style and plans, Nobel Laureate and former World 
Bank President Stiglitz (2002) also advocates for increases in aid levels. According to 
Sachs, with appropriate allocation of the increased money, extreme global poverty of 
under a dollar a day could be eliminated by 2025. Jeffrey Sachs claims that select 
country-wise planning would be in order as a means to alleviate poverty. He identifies 
the common factors that affect a nation’s ability to enter the world market. The factors 
are: corruption; legal and social disparities based on gender, ethnicity or caste; diseases 
and epidemics, such as AIDS and malaria; lack of infrastructure, such as but not limited 
to transportation, communications, health and trade; unstable political landscapes; trade 
and political protectionism; and geographic barriers. Sachs discusses each of these issues 
and offers feasible solutions to each. He also proposes specific, short-term solutions, 
such as increasing the availability of anti-mosquito (anti-malarial) bed nets in Sub-
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Saharan Africa and encourages debt cancellation for the world’s poorest economies. 
Sachs concurs with the UN’s calculation that 0.7% of the GNP of first world countries 
would be enough to eliminate hunger and endemic disease if devoted to the poor of the 
world. 
The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been 
designed as the first step towards eliminating extreme poverty, affecting 1.1 billion 
people worldwide. The MDG comprises eight international development goals that all 
United Nations member countries and 23 international organizations agreed to 
accomplish by the year 2015. These goals are: eradicate extreme poverty; achieve 
universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; fight 
disease epidemics, such as AIDS; reduce child mortality rates; improve maternal health 
and ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for 
development. 
 Several scholars have supported the MDG. Grown (2005) states that increasing 
reproductive health rights, improving infrastructure to augment women’s time concerns, 
ensuring property entitlement for women, having girls complete secondary school, 
reducing gender inequalities in employment, increasing positions held by women in 
government and combating violence against women would accomplish the MDG. She 
encouraged donor countries to spend more resources on these issues. Heyzer (2005) 
asserts that more emphasis should be provided in establishing gender equality in order to 
eradicate poverty in developing countries. Kabeer (2003) claims that if women can 
increase their bargaining power within the family, it would enable to access enhanced 
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health care and nutrition. This approach will ensure better health for expectant mothers 
and healthier babies. She along with Noeleen (2005) affirms that empowerment of 
women and access to jobs will facilitate a reduction in child mortality. She further claims 
that empowering women by creating economic opportunities will reduce their active 
participation in prostitution, thereby decreasing the spread of disease. The United 
Nations’ claims that few countries’ MDG programs have been successful in moving 
these countries towards these goals (UN Development Report 2006). In support of this 
claim, the World Bank poverty database shows poverty rates have decreased in India and 
China; however, according to the same source, a significant reduction in poverty has yet 
to be achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Another recent model for foreign development is the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC). MCC, created by former President George W. Bush, takes a 
businesslike approach to development assistance. Countries that receive assistance are 
selected on a competitive basis through a set of 17 indicators intended to evaluate a 
nation’s efficiency at ruling justly, investing in people and fostering enterprise and 
entrepreneurship. The Bush Administration rationalized this approach by stating that 
development assistance is more efficient in countries with good economic policies, such 
as free markets, low corruption and good governance (MCC Report 2007). 
  Although Jeffrey Sachs, MCA and MDG all lead the cavalcade of optimists, it 
was Rostow and Norman Borlaug who understood the importance of foreign 
development and proposed and/or implemented most of these ideas. In his famous 
publication, Stages of Growth, Rostow claimed that “an increase of $4 billion in external 
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aid would be required to lift all of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America into 
regular growth, at an increase of per capita income of say, 1.5% per annum” (Rostow 
1960). He further stated that the precondition of development depends on social 
overhead capital, such as railways, ports and roads; designing an economic mechanism 
to move to manufacturing from agriculture and trade. Borlaug was the primary change 
agent of the Green Revolution in India through technology transfer and policy reform. In 
his testimony in front of Indian politicians and policy makers, he stated that the farmers 
need “Fertilizer, fertilizer, fertilizer, credit, credit, credit, subsidy, subsidy, and subsidy.” 
Additionally, Borlaug spoke for enhanced transportation, communication and 
infrastructure (Hesser 2006). Even before Rostow and Borlaug, the initial UN expert 
group proposed to increase foreign assistance similar to what Sachs is proposing in 
present times. The UN group was even more precise, stating that “a two percent increase 
in the per capita national incomes cannot be brought about without … a sum of money 
…of about $3 billion a year” (UN Expert Group 1951, from Easterly 2007). The United 
Nations reforms have been a yearly scenario since 1951. Along with current MDGs, 
some recent reorganization includes the Monterrey Conference on Financing for 
Development (2002), the Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003), the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Ghana (2008). 
  Similar to the UN, the World Bank is trying to increase selectivity, involve host 
governments in the projects and enhance the amount of pecuniary assistance or loans 
provided. Former World Bank President Wolfensohn (2001) stated, “If we are serious 
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about...meeting multilateral development goals we have all signed on to, we must double 
ODA (overseas development assistance) from its current level of about $50 billion a 
year.” After its inception in 1946, the World Bank had its first reorganization in 1952. 
Further reforms came in 1972, 1981, 1987, 1991 and 1993 (Kapur et al. 1997). The 
United States foreign aid effort commenced from 1948 through the Marshall Plan. It was 
reorganized in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1960. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was officially created on 1961. Further changes in USAID 
occurred in 1973, 1979, 1985, 1989, 1992 and 2000. In 1999, USAID was moved back 
into the State Department (Easterly 2007). 
2.2.2 The Realists 
The “realists,” consisting mostly of academics, acknowledge and critique the 
shortcomings of foreign assistance and make suggestions to create a more efficient aid 
market. Collier, Dollar and his World Bank colleagues are the main proponents of this 
faction. In influential research funded and promoted by the World Bank, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) discovered that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing 
countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. While in the presence of poor 
policies, aid has no positive effect on growth; Dollar and Kraay (2001) claim that growth 
in aggregate per capita income is typically accompanied by enhanced income of the 
poor. Furthermore, they discovered that policies that induce growth also enhance the 
livelihoods of the impoverished. Dollar et al.’s insight is clear; the effect of aid on 
poverty reduction is maximized when assistance is allocated to countries that have large 
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amounts of poverty in the presence of good policy. In fact, the World Bank (1998) 
stated, “There is no value in providing large amounts of money to a country with poor 
policies.” However, no evidence was discovered that bilateral or multilateral aid 
disproportionally goes to less corrupt governments with good policies (Alesena et al. 
2008). On the contrary, Alesena et al. (2008) discovered that higher levels of foreign aid 
increases corruption. 
However, the question remains that if aid is provided only to the governments 
that have “good policies,” then impoverished people of poor, corrupted countries would 
always be deprived. The World Bank’s juxtaposition of a “poor country with a good 
policy” appears to be paradoxical. There are no poor countries with immaculate policies. 
The proposed strategy can be even more dangerous for conflict-prone poor nations, as 
the standard measurement always seems to characterize these areas as having “fragile 
governance.” Thus, aid in conflict zones initiates a bigger dilemma as conflict arises 
from failing governance and governments. The absence of a free market and a lack of 
food productivity in conflict zones increases the need for agricultural import and food 
aid. However, poor governance makes foreign aid prone to failure. Unfortunately, most 
of the donor countries or agencies do not take appropriate steps to protect these fragile 
governances and economies (Stewart 2000). 
Organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) tend be blind to horizontal inequities and conflict issues (Klugman 1999). Both 
the World Bank and the IMF are limited by their mandates to addressing issues of 
economic governance. Economic conditionality can undermine the capacity and 
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legitimacy of the state, which is forced to cut back on social services. Moreover, aid 
often fails to ‘trickle down’ and reach the chronically poor—a problem experienced in 
stable contexts but accentuated in areas of conflict. The lack of security, access and 
voice magnify this problem even more. Research also points to the potential for aid to 
undermine social contracts between states and citizens or to inadvertently “do harm” by 
fuelling the war economy (Anderson 1999). In Liberia, warlords practiced “people 
farming” to loot food aid (Atkinson 1997). From the existing literature and case studies, 
it is evident that the perceived stratagem of the world organizations and governments is 
to provide aid to corrupted, conflict-prone nations only in extreme circumstances. These 
nations are often neglected when conflict and/or poverty is brewing. Along these lines, 
Kanbur (2005) proposed a new formula to allocate aid for the developing world, which 
will disburse aid solely on the outcome resulting from previous aid allocation. Donors 
mostly choose to avoid conflict zones altogether, implying that they prefer not to work 
“in” conflict (Goodhand 2000). Very few policies have been designed up to now to work 
“on” conflict in a conflict-ridden society. Putzel (1999) questions the ‘“gloomy science” 
view of politics, in which all political processes are viewed as a zero sum game. “The 
real world of politics is rarely a crude struggle of rich against poor; it is also about 
accommodation, compromise and joint gains” (Moore 2000). Critics argue that in 
practice, to be “coherent” means that development and humanitarian objectives are 
subsumed by the political and economic interests of Western powers. In other words, 
they must be “coherent” with the prevailing political logic of the “liberal peace” 
(Duffield 2001). 
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Philosopher Collier is the most cited author among the conflict zone development 
professionals. He claims that, while most of the five billion people in the “developing 
world” are prospering, a certain group of impoverished people (mostly in Africa and 
Central Asia) are trapped. Collier proposes that development assistance should be 
focused heavily on these unfortunate citizens. According to Collier, the traps consist of: 
• The Conflict Trap—Civil wars with an estimated average cost of $64 billion each 
or coups. 
• Bad Governance in Small Countries–Unfortunately, Collier et al. (2008) 
discovered that promoting democracy may not be a feasible solution for 
development in conflict-prone nations. Knack (2000) agrees with Collier, 
claiming that foreign aid does not promote democracy. Based on world data, they 
show that democracy constrains government repression, which may entice 
rebellion. They conclude that nations with higher income can use democracy for 
peace; however, for nations with lower incomes, democracy may not be 
conducive to peace. Collier agrees with Dollar et al. that bad governance and 
policies can destroy an economy. 
• The Natural Resource Trap–Collier et al. (2000) states that a higher amount of 
natural resources in a developing nation may increase the possibilities of civil 
war. He further suggests that having to rely on natural resources can stifle other 
economic activity and lead to bad governance, coups and conflict. 
•  Bad Neighbors—African and Asian countries with impoverished and conflict-
prone neighbors find it almost impossible to tap into world economic growth. 
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Collier proposes the following strategies to eradicate conflict and improve the socio-
economic conditions in conflict-prone nations (Collier 2000). 
• Aid agencies and international organizations have to be able to work in conflict 
zones, accepting more risk. 
• Ordinary citizens should not support poorly informed lobbies whose efforts 
hinder the progress of the aid agencies. 
• Appropriate military interventions, such as Great Britain’s intervention in Sierra 
Leone, should be encouraged in order to guarantee democratic regimes. 
• International charters are needed to encourage good governance and enhance 
democratic governance. 
• Trade policy needs to be reformed and support the establishment of free trade to 
provide preferential access to Bottom Billion exports. 
2.2.3 The Pessimists 
The pessimists group believes that reformation and the execution of aid is futile and 
corrupted. A leading scholar among the pessimists is New York University Professor 
William Easterly. In his book, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid 
the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Easterly raises questions about 
whether the aid money is actually reaching the poor. He claims that the West has a 
pressing, paternalistic and almost racist attitude towards underdeveloped economies. 
Easterly’s condemnation of foreign aid is that the chief reason for lack of development 
progress in modern times is not the lack of aid; instead, he feels it is non-democratic 
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governance and corrupt politics and administration in countries receiving this aid. 
Easterly opposes the views of Western philosophers and policy makers regarding 
planning poverty eradication programs for developing countries (Easterly 2006). He 
labels the international development policy makers who propose strategies and allocate 
resources as “planners/” The planners are castigated because of their lack of 
accountability and bureaucratic endeavors. On the contrary, Easterly states that 
development occurs through “homegrown” actors, termed “searchers,” who have the 
incentive to work in the field and are not driven by seeking grants. “Planners” believe 
that they already have appropriate solutions for development, while “searchers” seek 
answers by evaluating the society. Easterly criticizes programs such as Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) and claims that the perfect plan for international 
development would be “no plan at all.” Easterly denounces planners for being more 
interested in increasing money devoted to aid, rather than concentrating on increasing 
the efficiency of aid policies. Easterly’s thoughts are supported by contemporary 
economists and policy makers, such as Sen (2006), Bannerjee (2007), Lavergne (2006), 
M Prokopijevic (2006), Bonne (1996) and Svensson (2000, 2003). 
Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (2006) has praised Easterly’s efforts to identify the 
shortcomings of foreign aid implementation policies. Sen also points out the impotency 
of the imperialistic behavior of guardians from the developed world, citing the Bengal 
famine. He showcases the disastrous consequences of the famine, brought on by the 
short sightedness of the British Raj. He further states his admiration for the “searchers,” 
such as Bangladeshi development activists Mohamed Yunus and Fazle Hassan Abed. 
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While praising Easterly’s perspective, he also criticizes Easterly’s negligence of the 
diverse economic problems and uncertainties of the developed world. Banerjee (2007) 
provides an account of disappointing foreign development projects and cites an 
abundance of evidence showing that aid cannot assist in the progress of underdeveloped 
nations, but at best, it can only assist people survive. Their hypothesis is strongly 
supported by empirical estimations that reveal no relationship between aid and growth 
(Boone 1996). Banerjee (2007) further states that the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA) has been created to make financial aid more efficient. However, most 
impoverished, conflict-prone countries do not qualify for that aid. This is may be another 
instance where the West, through its strong paternalism, is unable to help the neediest of 
the world. 
A more interesting thought of aid strategy (compared to MCA) has been recently 
introduced by Svensson (2000). He proposes a model that would direct more aid to 
countries by using an ex-post evaluation of the existing foreign development projects. 
Svensson (2000, 1999) also admits skepticism towards the existing foreign aid reward 
policies. Through empirical analysis, he fails to discover any evidence that foreign aid 
brings development. Easterly et al. (2004) uses more data to analyze the Burnside 
research (discussed in the “realist” section) and discovered that foreign assistance has no 
effect whatsoever on the growth of the developing world. So, the pessimists’ envision 
that foreign assistance is provided only to spread the hegemony of the ruling world and 
does very little to enhance the growth of developing nations. Griffin and Enos (1970) 
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found a negative association between aid and growth, and attributes it to a negative 
relationship between aid and savings, which had also been found in other studies. 
 The monitoring, reform and implementation systems of foreign assistance have 
been criticized by the “pessimists.” Easterly (2007) discoverered that to provide 3.65 
USD to an impoverished person, donor nations/agencies have to spend 3521 USD on 
average. In his book, he also questions the true motives of donor entities and their 
possible liaisons with the elite agencies of an impoverished nation. He also criticizes the 
elite agencies of having an inefficient, yet expensive bureaucratic chain. Wehrmeyer et 
al. (2002) supports this claim by showing that the World Bank’s staff recruitment 
increased from 657 to 7,106 in only 33 years between 1960 and 1993. During the same 
period, the World Bank’s administrative expenses went from $81 million in 1959-60 to 
$1.5 billion in 1993-94 (in constant fy1993 dollars). The problem of expensive and 
intricate bureaucratic chains persists in almost every international aid organization. 
  Historian Basil Davidson in his book, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the 
Curse of the Nation State (1992) blames the legacy of imperialism and the failures of the 
nation-states of Africa after independence as the prime reasons for lack of progress in 
Africa. He points to the Economic Community for West African and South African 
States and writes that the Imperialist framework, along with gross negligence of the 
basic needs, is dismantling the economies of impoverished nations. Easterly and Levine 
(1997) stress the influence of ethnic fragmentation as a way to explain Africa’s below 
par performance. Moyo (2009), in her popular book, Dead Aid, criticizes aid practices in 
Africa and claims that foreign assistance has only crippled the region socially and 
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economically. Moyo (2009) claims that aid is a mere “cultural moral.” Foreign 
assistance consisting of grants and loans has fostered aid dependency and driven African 
countries into the debt trap. She proposes a variety of solutions, complete with an 
economic plan to reduce aid within the next ten years and to end Africa’s dependence on 
foreign assistance. Moyo encourages business owners and banks to increase foreign 
direct investment and micro finance in African countries. She asks for fewer subsidies 
for farmers and supports regional trade agreements. Her ideas also stress the 
enhancement of good governance as a way to make Africa prosperous. Kanbur echoes 
Moyo, claiming that aid has been futile in Africa. He asserts that the reason for this 
failure is aid conditionality, and without institutional alteration, a recovery might be 
impossible (Kanbur 2000). His main propositions include simultaneous heavy debt relief 
and a domestic institutional reforms program to reduce African aid dependence, which 
would create an accountability measure for African performance. 
2.3 Conflict Theory, Collective Action and Foreign Intervention 
2.3.1 Conflict Definition and Thought 
“When, in the course of human events...a decent respect to the opinions of mankind 
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation… that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights….That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is 
the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form…while evils are 
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are 
accustomed.” 
United States Declaration of Independence 
The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America alludes to 
rational conflict in order to restore social justice, prosperity and equality. According to 
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Karl Marx (1971), conflict in society is inevitable. It is related to an eternal class 
struggle and is a harbinger of change or even prosperity. Conflict theory in social science 
emphasizes a person’s or group’s ability to exercise influence and control over others, 
thereby affecting social order. It posits that individuals and groups struggle and compete 
to maximize their benefits, inevitably contributing to social changes, such as innovations 
in politics and outright revolutions. However, the modern world is not as holistic as 
Rawls’s (1971) puzzle, where every person benevolently chooses the same consumption 
function. Since there will be inequality in modern society, conflict becomes the dynamic 
process in which structure, attitudes and behaviors are constantly changing and 
influencing one another (Galtung 1996). Weber’s theory appears a little different, as he 
bases his approach on social, rather than individual action. Weber stressed the ability of 
individuals to affect their social relationship through conflict (Livesay 2010). In modern 
times, conflict theory and its applications have been influenced by Mill’s work (Knapp 
1994). Individuals and resources are moved by social structures and through the 
“unequal distribution of power and resources.” Social systems (structures) are created by 
these conflicting preferences, interests and uneven resource accumulation (Knapp 1994, 
Kpuasinaski 2001). Contemporary authors concur with these thoughts and have 
connected conflict with inequality in society (Sears 2008, Kalyvas 2000). 
Just as the definition of poverty arises from inequality and the dispossession of 
assets and rights, conflict projects a similar perspective related to the images of social 
processes and social structures within a society. This view reveals a link between 
poverty and conflict. The peasantry in Marxist ideology provides a fertile ground for 
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social revolution (Castells 1996). Conflict is a struggle between individuals or 
collectivities over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources wherein the aim 
of the conflicting parties is to assert their respective values or claims over those of others 
(Goodhand and Hulme 1999). In wars, we see the creation of a new type of political 
economy, not simply a destruction of the old one (Keen 1998). Thus, internal wars may 
now be better understood as the continuation of economics by other means. According to 
Marshall, social rights will counterbalance economic inequality. In his seminal essay, he 
implied that development of a “welfare state” will counterbalance economic inequality 
by providing basic social rights, such as education (Marshall 1950). 
The value of the political economy perspectives of conflict is it highlights that 
violence may serve important functions and confers benefits on certain groups and 
individuals. In most conflicts today, it may not be as much about winning the war as 
maintaining one’s sphere of influence. Through a political economy approach, the 
production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution during violent conflict can 
be explored in order to discover the motives and responsibilities of those involved (Le 
Billon 2000). To quantify conflict and relate it with poverty, foreign aid and other 
development indicators, one needs to consider violent conflict with dormant and/or 
active economic motives. Walker Connor (1994) claims conflict arises from “the 
seductive lure of economic explanations.” John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (1995) 
use “Mammon and Utility: Liberal Economic Reasoning” to label their perspective on 
the conflicts of Northern Ireland. Esman (1994) accepted the economic motif behind 
conflict; however, he also thought it may be difficult to identify the effect of economic 
 
26 
 
 
 
cycles on conflict. He also claims that the consequence of economic growth on conflict 
is ambiguous. Although he studies developed nations and an economic upturn, Esman 
(1994) discovered that the strong economic expansion of Canada in the 1960s aroused 
high expectations from the people of Quebec; thereby exacerbating conflict. He also 
noted that two decades of accelerated growth in Malaysia did not decrease ethnic 
conflict in the region. In an effort to draw inference between poverty and conflict, 
Cramer (2003) relates pecuniary incentives associated with conflict. Cramer works with 
income and Gini coefficients, along with civil war data, to study conflict and poverty 
discovering statistically significant results. 
2.3.2 Collective Action and Civil War 
The evolution of literature in collective action is strongly reflective of the 
historical phenomenon of past decades. A logical approach to understanding conflicts or 
divisions in political society would characterize most conflicts in past decades as 
emanating from differences in political, economic and social or cultural interests. 
McAdam (2001), Doug et al (2001) characterize theories of social movements and 
revolutions as having evolved from the structuralist to rationalist, and finally cultural. 
Most of the literature explaining collective action falls into one of these three categories. 
Collective action refers to a vast array of concepts and debates, emerging from problems 
of organized interest and political parties, to debates surrounding identity, citizenship 
and revolution. However, the one element all these phenomena have in common is 
organization. Mancur Olson(1965) characterized the concept of organizations by stating 
that, for the most part, organizations are concerned with furthering the interests of their 
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members. Olson associates organizations with common interests, and hence, the personal 
interests of its individual members. One can therefore assume that individuals 
participating in most forms of collective action aim to achieve some desired objective. 
Olson distinguishes between market and non-market groups. He reflects on 
collective action in terms of public goods and rights. In market situations, the collective 
good is fixed in supply, while non-market groups do not pursue interests, which are 
limited in supply. In market situations, organizations are interested in exclusive 
collective goods and therefore seek a reduction in group size in order to make the market 
price increase. In non-market situations, inclusive goods are pursued, which is not 
limited in supply, and therefore, groups are encouraged to increase in size. Olson also 
discusses interactions in the group, more specifically, strategic interactions that refer to 
the concerns of members over the reaction of others to their actions. It also shows 
dependency within the group. Individual rational choice may lead to situations where 
those with more resources can carry a higher burden in the provision of a public good 
compared to those who are underprivileged. Impoverished individuals will attempt to 
benefit from the public good without contributing (free rider strategy) to its provision 
(Olson 1965). 
Lavergne and Wood (2006) and Wood (2003) offers an opposing view relative to 
Olson. He argues that collective action can be dominated by emotions, rather than 
rational actions. In a case study by El Salvador, Wood observes that in times of labor 
oppression, the peasants would take high risks and protest with a low probability of 
success. Wood also claims that emotional rebellions can be rational but should not be 
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confused with rationality of the type offered by Olson. Olson’s rational rebellions come 
from dependency, whereas Wood’s come from need. From a purely economic point of 
view, the cause of civil war appears to be very simple. A utility maximization model can 
be established with rebels and a ruling party. Rebels will engage in conflict if the 
expected benefits outweigh the expected costs of organizing and carrying-out the 
rebellion (Collier et al. 1998). Collier et al. (1998) tested this theoretical hypothesis and 
discovered that income, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, natural resources and 
population size determine the duration and probability of civil wars. 
Popkin (1979) opposes the moral economists’ idea of defining protest as the 
defensive reactions of a dying class. Rather, he states that crisis is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for protests. Popkin defines protests as “collective actions” that are contingent 
on the ability of a group or class to organize and make demands. Many movements are a 
reflection of the peasants’ growing ability to organize them and fight for rights once 
denied, and they are more often battles to tame markets and bureaucracies, not fights to 
bring back traditional systems. The transition to open villages is assumed to entail loss of 
protection, and therefore change in peasant mentality from collective orientation to 
individualistic, market orientation (Popkin 1979). Through his case studies of Vietnam, 
Popkin concludes that peasants want economic freedom and social mobility. He shows 
that government institutions receive input from their social environment and produce 
output that responds to that environment. Putnam (1993) shows that what people want is 
not as important as what is reflected in the local political culture in determining 
collective action. His comparison of Northern and Southern Italy reveals that old civic 
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traditions prevail. Bessinger (2002) argues that military coercion could not have 
repressed the nationalist movements that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Conflicts and violence within a group are often more related to local issues rather 
than a master cleavage that drives civil war at the national level. In the collective action 
literature, violence is often portrayed as a resource for mobilization at the national level. 
The transactions between supra-local and local agents are interesting. As the former 
supply the latter with external muscle, this allows them to win local advantage in 
exchange for the supra-local actors recruiting and motivating supporters for their cause 
at the local level. Violence is a selective benefit that produces collective action and 
support on the ground. Civil war privatizes politics. It transforms local and personal 
grievances into lethal violence; once it occurs, violence becomes endowed with a 
political meaning that may quickly be naturalized into new and enduring identities. 
Trivial sources of the new identities are lost in the new politics of the fog of war 
(Kalyuvas 2000, Regan 2002). 
 McAdam, Doug et al (2001) identify three main critiques within the existing 
body of collective action literature. First, scholars studying different kinds of contentious 
politics–social movements, industrial politics, wars, revolutions, riots, etc.–have 
modeled and examined their specific area of focus, in general distancing themselves 
from identifying commonalities among all types of contentious politics. Second, the 
literature is dominated by Western reform movements. Scholars focusing on movements 
outside this realm, such as China, Latin America, the Middle East and Western Europe, 
have been unable to establish an exchange of ideas and dialogue with the scholars who 
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draw upon the experience of Western Europe. The end product is an assumption of the 
universality of Western models, as opposed to a bridging of differences and drawing on 
commonalities and differences. Finally, social movement scholars who study the 
foundations, social bases and overall dynamics of these movements, overlook outcomes. 
Conversely, revolution analysts focus on origins and outcomes and ignore organization, 
dynamics and agency. As a result, the two distinct groups focus on different trends and 
ask different questions, resulting in little space to draw commonalities. It is important in 
to distinguish regional and communal attributes and affects when analyzing collective 
action. 
2.3.3 Democracy, Nationalism and Conflict 
A society with the propensity for ethnic conflict is a deeply divided one. Donald 
Horowitz defines ethnicity as “based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually 
carries with it traits believed to be innate,” giving rise to a group affinity (Horowitz, p. 
55, 1985). In this regard, ethnic differences are already deeply embedded in such 
societies. Nationalism is popularly viewed as a cause of ethnic conflict. Ironically, it is 
nationalism (i.e., we the people) that gave rise to movements for sovereignty in many 
Western nations and, hence, independence/liberal democracy. However, in much of the 
literature, nationalism is now viewed as a threat to democracy. It is clear that nationalism 
can give rise to both democracy and ethnic conflict on two ends of the spectrum, and 
therefore an answer is not particularly simple. 
Ted Gurr (1994) asserted that communal conflict has occurred in at least twenty 
new states that are experimenting with democratic institutions as a direct consequence of 
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the fact that institutional change has opened up opportunities by which communal 
groups can more openly pursue their objectives. Support for Gurr is evident among 
contemporary political scientists, as the general consensus is democracy, nationalism 
and ethnic conflicts are inextricably intertwined (Diamond et al. 1994). It therefore 
appears that there may be a causal relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict. 
  Horowitz (1994), through his studies of ethnically-divided societies in Asia, 
Africa and the Caribbean (new post WWII states), critiques Marxist class-specific 
explanations for ethnic conflict. He argues that it is not just a strategic calculation of 
cost-benefit, but there is a deeper cultural and psychological element. He argues against 
middleman theories that locate the source of ethnic conflict in those who control trade 
and rather claims that mutually complementary economic roles can in fact be beneficial. 
Working class job competition is also not a factor. Horowitz also argues against Richard 
Sklar’s idea that tribalism becomes a mask for class privilege. Horowitz argues that it is 
not class or economic elitism that underlies ethnicity, but rather real cultural and 
symbolic interests. He also uses psychological interpretations–anxiety reaction: anxiety 
produces extreme reactions to modest threats, and prejudice allows a discharge of 
hostility, thus reducing anxiety. This may explain incidents that are only otherwise 
explained through theories of elite control. It also explains a group’s desire to be in 
charge of policy, to be at one with their surroundings, to belong in a territory. 
Legitimacy gives ethnic claims to exclusive domination a moral basis.  
A case study from Nigeria concludes that the transfer of political power to the 
state level diminishes the focus on the political center (Horowitz, 1994). In Nigeria’s 
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second republic (1979-83), intra- or sub-ethnic conflict was encouraged at the state level. 
With the creation of 19 centers of power and resources, ethnic boundaries shifted 
onward and sub-ethnic identities became activated, mostly within the three largest 
groups. Each of these groups was split between two or more states and, therefore, state 
interests created new lines of cleavage and cut across ethnicity. Federalism created inter-
ethnic cooperation; built coalitions of states and ethnic groups, and fostered trans-ethnic 
political parties and alliances. By the 1983 elections, this had transformed Nigerian 
politics. 
Fukuyama, Nodia and Avineri (Diamond and Plattner eds. 1994) present a 
resurgent and ongoing process created and sustained by the existence of liberal 
democracy in a way that is incompatible with more stable identity formations elsewhere. 
Democracy in Africa may have brought freedom and rights on behalf of the 
impoverished but it also created mass corruption, instability and lawlessness in many 
countries (Zakaria, 2003). Chua (2002) claims that democracy can translate into a 
market dominant minority. She further asserts that democracy may also create 
instability, upheaval and ethnic conflagration. It appears the consensus of this modern 
school of thought is that democracy can give rise to ethnic conflict when political leaders 
seek opportunities to manipulate the conflict for popular support. 
2.3.4 Theory and the Economics of Foreign Aid in Conflict 
  Provided that aid agencies and donor nations agree on working “in” conflict-
prone countries to develop their socio-economic stability, the question still remains, 
what would be the ideal policies? In areas of extreme conflict, more resources are used 
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for military intervention than for foreign aid. The difference between military 
intervention money verses foreign development money in developing conflict zones 
needs to be explored. Azam et al. (2010) designed a theoretical model that claims an 
increase in foreign aid would reduce the supply of terrorist attacks from developing 
nations. U.S. military interventions, however, have caused the number of terrorist attacks 
to increase. The results of the empirical estimation suggest that developed nations should 
allocate more funds for foreign assistance than military intervention (Azam and Thelen 
2010). The authors assert that more aid should be specifically dedicated towards 
education. In previous research, Azam and Thelen (2003) argued that terrorism can be 
attributed to lack of education, because illiterate young men can be easily lured by 
terrorist groups into carrying out acts of violence. If the education system of a nation is 
good, then the probability of violence is reduced. Therefore Azam et al. (2003) claim 
that aid that increases literacy rates and levels or years of education (school attended) 
would reduce terrorism. 
Economists have found empirical evidence that economic factors influence civil 
wars (Murdoch and Sandler 2001, Collier 2001, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). Civil war 
and conflict are very dangerous for continents such as Africa, because of its spillover 
effects. Civil wars create spillover effects, enhancing the risk of conflict in the same 
region. Sources of finance have also been deemed to be as important in a civil war 
(Collier 1999). 
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2.4 Poverty 
A basic definition of poverty has been provided by Amartya Sen (1999) as the 
deprivation of basic capabilities. He asserted that the measures of human poverty should 
incorporate the dimensions of health and longevity, cognitive functioning, physical 
security and material well-being. From a quantitative research perspective, the World 
Bank’s definition of poverty as being $1 a day and $2 a day has been the most popular 
definition (World Bank 2002). This measurement is controversial, as a dollar a day goes 
much farther in rural India than it does in New York City. However, many contemporary 
researchers (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000, Pritchett et al. 2000, Chen and Ravallion 2004, 
Deaton 2000, Jalan and Ravallion, 2000, Ravallian 2003) have used this measure and 
have found significant and viable results both for industrial and third-world countries. 
For example, Baulch and Hoddinott reviewed the literature on poverty dynamics in 
developing countries using Bank measures to further explore this issue (Baulch and 
Hoddinott 2000). The studies used data from panel studies that by then had been 
conducted in several countries. The patterns are very similar to those found in studies of 
poverty dynamics in the US and other industrial countries. 
Nevertheless, Ravallion (2003) accepted that the dollar-a-day poverty measure 
has its “devil in the details.” Hence, to understand and analyze poverty-related measures 
and research, one needs to identify the philosophical and psychological aspects of 
poverty and the latent variables related to this issue. Although the popular view is to 
discern poverty applications (Ravallion 2003) through their absolute and relative 
measures, here, poverty is distinguished by six philosophical ideas discussed below. 
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Livelihoods approach: Poverty is viewed from a broader perspective, including 
the specific examination of livelihoods. The divisions of household assets into forms of 
human, social, natural, financial and physical capital may provide valuable insight into 
social oppression and conflict (Chambers 1995). This particular approach mainly 
considers living, however, it also takes into account social oppression and conflict. 
Exclusion and rights: The huge amount of literature on war and famine 
emphasizes the importance of political marginality and the systematic denial of human 
rights. The outright exclusion of any human rights can be considered a denial of rights or 
incomplete citizenship (Bhalla and Lapeyre 1997). Galtung (1990), in a similar vein, 
refers to “structural violence,” which manifests itself in structural inequity and the 
unequal distribution of power. The UNDP’s political freedom index, which incorporates 
personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality 
of opportunity—provides a proxy indicator for the political dimension of exclusion.  In 
the process it also highlights the link between politics and poverty. 
Human security: UNDP’s (2005) concept of human security and the political 
freedom index emphasizes personal security as a focus of the notion of wellbeing. 
Recent case studies also highlight the fact that poor people place a very high value on 
personal safety. Although, one of the basic needs of a citizen of an independent society 
is entitlement to property and security, often times, the citizens of third-world countries 
do not enjoy any of them. 
Poor people’s perceptions: Chambers (1995) stresses the importance of listening 
to poor people’s perspectives. In unstable contexts, people’s perceptions of well-being 
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and security can be critical in determining whether conflict becomes violent or remains 
latent. Although there is limited research in this area, in terms of triggers to violence, it 
appears that absolute measures of poverty are less significant than poor people’s 
expectations and a sense of grievance. The feeling of “need” arises from the idea of 
being deprived and being unequal. Hence, the perception of inequality is one of the 
cornerstones of poverty. 
Risks and vulnerability: Household vulnerability is defined as the capacity to 
manage shocks in poor households that have low vulnerability to risk. In most 
developing economies, the impoverished are exposed to the vulnerability of life and 
unsafe situations both economically and socially. It is often the lack of viable economic 
alternatives and vulnerability towards risk that drives poor people to engage in violence 
(Keen 1998). 
2.4.1 Relationship Between Conflict and Poverty  
There is substantial literature, both theoretical and empirical, explaining the 
complex relationship between poverty and conflict. Social scientists, mostly economists, 
have attributed frustration, greed and grievances as being the causes of conflict. The 
frustration aggression theory and the relative deprivation theory describe why and how 
individuals become aggressive when there are obstacles, both perceived and real, to their 
success in life (Van de Goor et al. 1996). The frustration of the impoverished instigates 
the aggressive behavior that always presupposes the existence of frustration and, 
contrawise, the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression (Dollard 
1939). The relative deprivation theory suggests that sometimes people perceive 
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themselves as being deprived relative to others. This perception creates a hostile 
atmosphere. Social psychologists divide the relative deprivation theory into two facets: 
fraternal deprivation and egoistic deprivation. Fraternal deprivation is the feeling that 
one’s group is deprived relative to another, while egoistic deprivation refers to the 
situation when one individual is deprived relative to another (Draman 2003). Fraternal 
deprivation may be linked with prejudice, social protest, social status and nationalism. 
 Conflict ensues from disagreement, inequality, failing markets and social status 
quo. Draman (2003, 1993) and Copson (1991) have discovered that conflict is highly 
correlated with poverty in Africa. Goodhand (2000) discovered, in his case study of 
Nepal, that poverty is both the cause and consequence of conflict. Moore (2000) deduces 
bad governance creates inequality, which translates into grievances and generates 
exclusion. In Sri Lanka, for example, Tamil farmers suffered from reduced government 
spending and reacted with violence. However, the government also claimed that since 
they were engaged in violence, they were compelled to slash their welfare and aid 
budgets. In Uzbekistan, social tensions increased due to bad governance in land reform 
rules, which in the essence of increased poverty. Financial constraints and rapid 
population increases can cause the deterioration of education standards and reduced 
access to technology. These problems reduce life expectancy and literacy rates, 
increased birth and mortality rates and higher unemployment rates. In Sierra Leone, 
higher unemployment rates and decreased opportunities for education and access to 
technology created a rebel youth group that engaged in violence to attain a short cut to 
wealth and status (Keen 1998). Goodhand (2000) supports this idea and claims many 
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modern day conflicts emanate from and are fought in border regions that have 
historically suffered from marginality, limited voice and hard core poverty. Conflicts in 
Nepal and Chiapas, Mexico, are clearly linked to differential development and patterns 
of exclusion (Goodhand 2000). Stewart et al. (1997) do not completely agree that 
poverty and grievance are the cause of conflict; rather, they assert that we may have a 
two-way causality structure between poverty and conflict. Moore and Collier do not 
reject the idea that conflict and violence are caused by poverty, but they introduce 
“greed” and “grievance” as variables in the theoretical notion. 
Many researchers agree that extreme horizontal inequalities bring about 
grievances, which enable leaders to mobilize followers to cause violence (Stewart 2000). 
However, Collier (2001) somewhat disagrees and claims that, behind the large disclosure 
of grievances is hidden the “silent voice” of greed. Keen (1998) argues that conflict is 
irrational and is manipulated by money and power hungry political entities. Moore 
(2000) also agrees with the Collier hypothesis; they both seem to claim that war is costly 
and is financed by sections of society that enrage and instigate a society’s impoverished 
as a way to gain the upper hand among the ruling class. 
Stewart et al. (2000) portray conflict as stymieing development and 
macroeconomic growth. During conflict, a society moves away from a free market 
system (Chingono 2000), which increases government intervention. And since most 
conflict-ridden economies do not have a democratic, corruption-free government, this 
system initiates severe nepotism and deprivation. Le Billion (2000) claimed a war 
economy shapes social processes where civilian expenditures decrease severely. And, as 
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is evident in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal and Sudan, the government effectively reduced 
food and necessary supplies to certain sections of the society. In Liberia, “he who had 
the weapon ate first” (Kapusckinski 2001). Globally, conflict decreased GDP per capita 
and food production, and made an economy dependent on imports and aid (Stewart 
2000). Moser (2000) directly relates decline of the state and democratic political 
processes with increased influence of military actors, decline in the rule of law and the 
targeting of politically excluded groups with conflict. Conflict also causes a breakdown 
of institutions, customary rights and rules of usage; all predatory behavior leading to 
resource depletion and environmental dilapidation and a lack of management and 
investment in natural resources. Deaths; disablement and displacement of populations; 
decline in capacity of the state to provide services, such as health and education, are all 
attributed to conflict in a society. Violence against women, the reemergence of slavery, 
declining literacy, life expectancy, increased infant mortality rates and higher levels of 
stunting have all been linked directly or indirectly to conflict in the developing world 
(Luckman et al. 2001). The long-term effects of conflict produce a poorly educated and 
skilled workforce with low productivity and a future generation that only knows one 
cure for disagreement, namely violence. 
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2.5 Discussion and Recent Revelations  
2.5.1 Foreign Assistance 
In reference to the reviewed literature, it can be concluded that foreign assistance 
is inefficient and needs a major reconsideration and revision of policies. The optimists 
approach is certainly commendable. However, allocating more money without accepting 
inconsistencies and failures may result in draconian consequences. Their popular notion 
of working around conflict and providing assistance only to the relatively progressive 
countries will no doubt increase the probabilities of project success. This approach will 
also deprive the conflict- and corruption-prone third-world countries, resulting in 
economies, such as Afghanistan and Sudan. It becomes extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to resurrect a country that has reached the status of a “failed” state. The 
optimist’s goals, such as MDG’s, may be insightful; however, these goals should be 
tailored and managed for particular regions. A more flexible zone-wise approach may be 
suggested. The reformation of development agencies has been a reoccurring 
phenomenon in recent times. Unfortunately, reforming is expensive, and even after 
reformations, the pessimists have demonstrated ineptness in the functioning of these 
agencies. 
Organizations such as MCC have been a welcome addition to the foreign 
development arena. New organization implies novel policies and less bureaucratic 
intricacies. However, MCC’s policy to bypass countries with corruption, conflict and 
instability, is perturbing. The pessimists who provide a bold depiction of the futilities of 
aid and assistance programs are informative. Their suggestion of “no plan for 
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development,” fewer resources for foreign development and a complete overhaul of 
existing agencies, appears impractical. Moyo’s (2009) recommendations of less aid for 
African countries and more opportunities for trade and business may be impractical, as 
well. African countries do not have the economic infrastructure and technology yet to be 
on equal terms of trade with Western nations. Without equal terms of trade, it would not 
be possible for third world countries to form effective business relationships with 
developed economies. Easterly’s portrayal of excessive paternalism in foreign 
development strategies demands more attention and suggests that greater responsibility 
be given to aid recipients. However, it would seem highly improbable that providing 
recipients with all the decision-making power over development aid would be successful 
approach, either. Especially, in politically volatile third world conflict-prone economies, 
a total absence of supervision and project management assistance from donors would 
likely introduce more abysmal results. Assisting “searchers,” such as Yunus, directly, 
may also have its own repercussions and could quite possibly hinder a donor’s 
diplomatic relationship with recipient governments. Donors can provide direct 
supervision and provide moral support to the “noble minds” referred to by Easterly as 
searchers. 
 The realists appear to have a more negotiating perspective about foreign 
development. Collier’s (2000) proposal of ensuring proper disbursement of aid, reform 
of trade policy and use of civil military partnerships, are pragmatic. Since defense 
spending is highest among foreign development projects, civil military partnerships may 
provide successful results. One of the main concerns of scholars is whether the 
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assistance provided is trickling down to the neediest or the most neglected tribes. 
Sometimes, domestic governments, policy makers or development specialists tend to be 
biased against certain factions of the population. For example, in countries such as 
Sudan and Iraq, underrepresented tribes are being neglected by domestic aid workers. 
Non-partisan hands-on involvement with donor nations will be beneficial in this regard. 
Organizational reforms are also needed in the recipient nations as well. As Kanbur 
(2000) proposes, recipient countries should undergo efficiency makeovers as well as 
debt release programs. 
From a foreign assistance perspective, scientists and policy makers deal with 
three facets of bureaucratic stages in an international development project.56 These are 
political bureaucracy, scientific bureaucracy and administrative bureaucracy. Political 
bureaucracy generally consists of elected and selected officials consisting of branches of 
government. It may appear counter-intuitive to label elected officials as bureaucrats, but 
essentially, politicians and bureaucrats are equally liable for executing and planning 
public policy, and both seek to maximize their own power and budget. The cardinal goal 
of a politician is to increase the probability of his/her being re-elected. Politicians intend 
to maximize their own discretionary budget to get re-elected and to maximize their own 
power. They may also sometimes intend to enact or implement policies that would 
provide them with a praiseworthy notation in history, even if it tarnishes their current 
image. In some cases, important bureaucratic positions are assigned through the 
                                                 
5This part of the document is based, in part, on informal remarks by Norman Borlaug 
and research by the author. 
6 Kibriya, S., Borlaug N. and Price E. Bureaucracy and Foreign Development. 2009. 
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advocacy of prominent politicians. Administrative bureaucracy can be the most fatal in 
foreign development projects. A stagnant bureaucratic procedure can hinder the progress 
of development. Scientific bureaucracies refer to the academics and the intellectuals of a 
developing nation. Often times, they do not welcome new methods and technologies. 
2.5.2 Poverty and Conflict 
The literature review suggests that there may be a relationship between conflict 
and poverty. Some recent literature (Krueger 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 
Goodhand 2001, Piazza 2004) has suggested that poverty may not be the root cause of 
violence. Synthesizing from the diverse definitions of poverty in the literature discussed, 
impoverished citizens are those deprived of property entitlement, basic food and 
housing, education, security and voice in society. It would be hard for citizens who are 
so neglected and deprived to amass resources to revolt against the status quo. Hence, 
violent activities may also engage greed, financial and intellectual resources of the elites. 
Impoverished people may actually be engaged in violence, but the catalyst for those acts 
of terror may come from other sources. Lack of knowledge (education), finance, shelter 
and food only makes manipulation of the impoverished easier. At this juncture, it should 
be noted that not all collective action in conflict should be categorized as acts of terror. 
Collective action or revolution is an essential facet of a nation’s development process 
and social mobility. So, from a philosophical standpoint, it is important to distinguish 
organized violence from collective action for rights and social mobilization. Poverty 
should be considered in a relative sense as well. As for a quantitative measure of 
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poverty, although it entails social, philosophical, psychological and economical aspects, 
a constant currency or goods value may be the best method of quantifying it. 
2.5.3 Assistance, Conflict and Development 
The unequivocal goal of foreign development is to assist the most impoverished 
and bring peace and stability to developing countries. The assessments of this chapter 
demonstrate that development policies have yet to achieve a formula to do both. Since, 
the spectrum of poverty and conflict is very broad, specific areas ought to be targeted 
with different philosophies. It is imperative to understand market mechanisms, 
individual rationality constraints and incentives, as well as to define the utilities and 
objectives of both the donor and recipients to design efficient foreign development 
policies. Identifying root causes and causal chains are also important in order to treat 
poverty and conflict. The MDG’s approach is novel in that regard. Working “in” conflict 
zones is necessary. Violence is an impediment towards development and cannot be 
mitigated by patience. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
A REVEIW OF THE DATA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The basis of sound empirical research depends on the underlying data. A 
comprehensive description of the data and its sources are provided in this chapter. This 
research utilizes secondary data on economic indicators, social indexes, international 
conflicts, inter-country violent events, commodity prices and primary data from field 
notes. Key analyses are based upon 60 years of quantitative data comprising 120,402 
data points. Qualitative data were taken in Iraq and Southern Sudan. In this chapter, the 
data have been divided into several categories to illuminate their attributes, before 
calibration. 
3.2 Official Development Assistance 
Foreign aid for developing countries given by the developed world came into 
prominence after the Second World War. President Harry Truman’s Point Four Program 
was the first time the leader of a nation openly advocated financial assistance for the 
developing world. Although the Truman program came into effect in the 1950s, the 
United Nations and other world organizations started providing official assistance and 
attention to developing countries beginning in the 1960s. The Solow (1957) and Rostow 
(1960) models of economic growth essentially recommended aid for the purpose of 
promoting economic growth, albeit on an interim basis. Foreign assistance as it is known 
today came into prominence in the 1960s and traces back to the time when the US 
Agency for International Development was established in 1961, which is the same year 
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that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was 
established. Foreign aid and development intervention can be categorized into two parts: 
military assistance and official nonmilitary development assistance. Following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the New York World Trade Center and other US sites, 
$751 billion has been spent in Iraq alone by the US Department of Defense. The funds 
were spent on war, medical costs, construction and the socio-economic development of 
Iraq. Data on spending by the US Department of Defense is problematic, because it is 
very difficult to differentiate between funds that are spent on socio-economic 
development and other uses. Furthermore, defense-spending data for all countries is not 
available for research purposes. For these reasons, civilian aid and assistance data is 
utilized for academic research and the evaluation of policies. 
 Development assistance data was acquired from the OECD database. According 
to OECD, “Official development assistance is defined as those flows to developing 
countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the 
following test, 1) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and  2) it is concessional in 
character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent” (OECD database 2010). 
The OECD data is supplemented by the World Bank dataset on foreign assistance. Both 
datasets comprise foreign aid data from 1960-2008. To obtain a better understanding of 
the foreign aid market, it was useful to divide the data in different categories and 
examine important characteristics of foreign assistance. Population could be a factor—
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the absolute amount of a nation’s receipt of foreign aid; therefore, a per capita foreign 
assistance (the amount of foreign assistance given, divided by the population of recipient 
countries) was computed in order to account for this possible bias. 
3.2.1 Donor Assistance 
 The discussion about the data is initiated from the perspective of sources of 
foreign assistance. Though some financial assistance is disbursed by bilateral and 
multilateral agencies and banks, most pecuniary assistance is derived from 23 developed 
countries and is mostly distributed to about 80 developing countries. Although only 
designed for underprivileged European countries, planning of the allocation of resources 
for foreign development programs in developing nations commenced only after the 
Truman Point Four Program. The trends depicted in Figure 3.1 show that per capita 
financial aid increased from near zero to nearly $20 between 1960 and 2008. The trend   
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Time trend analysis of per capita aid disbursed for the whole world. 
Source: World Bank.  
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Table 3.1: Total Aggregate Aid Provided by All the Donor Nations From 1960 to 
2007.  Source: World Bank, OECD.  
 
 Country  Total Aid USD Billion 
1 United States 454148 
2 Japan 280277 
3 France 216723 
4 Germany 211650 
5 United Kingdom 150082 
6 Netherlands 99900 
7 Italy 77138 
8 Canada 76676 
9 Sweden 66651 
10 Spain 49623 
11 Norway 47250 
12 Denmark 44498 
13 Australia 41174 
14 Belgium 35132 
15 Switzerland 29355 
16 Austria 17251 
17 Finland 16114 
18 Ireland 9164 
19 Portugal 7328 
20 Korea 6565 
21 Greece 4735 
22 New Zealand 4619 
23 Luxembourg 3372 
 
has generally been upward from the 1960s to the early 1980s. During the ’80s through 
the mid-to-late ’90s, financial assistance from the developed world decreased. 
 This reduction can be partly attributed to the “Cold War” and disagreements in 
philosophy among the more affluent nations. Due to a lack of attention towards the 
developing countries, conflict and poverty significantly rose in and around the late 
1990s, which was followed by an increase in foreign assistance. From 1999 to 2008, 
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foreign assistance per capita has increased approximately 10 USD per capita. This two-
fold increase reflects the Western philosophy and urgency of international development. 
The available aid data is scaled for current USD and consists of 23 donor countries 
through 38 years. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of aid provided by the major developed nations from 1960 
to 2008. Source: OECD.  
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 Table 3.1 shows the total aid provided by all donor nations between 1960 and 
2010. The United States provided the highest amount of aid among all countries, with an 
average of $12 billion per year. Apart from US, Canada, Korea and Japan, all the other 
donor countries were from Europe. Interestingly, Korea, until recently, was a major aid 
recipient country, as well. Figure 3.2 illustrates the total share of aid provided by the 
different countries. Since Luxemburg, Greece, Korea and New Zealand did not even 
provide .5% of the total aid, they have been excluded from the chart. The United States 
leads the group of foreign assistance donors by providing 24% of total aid. Japan is 
second with 15% of the total aid. France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Canada and 
Netherlands also provide significant amounts of foreign aid each year. 
3.2.2 Division of States and Areas 
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations classifies the socio-
economic stability of a nation through the following three criteria (United Nations 
Report 2007). 
• Income: Based on average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita estimated for 
three consecutive years. For example, according to the United Nations, the least 
developed countries have a per capita income lower than $700 US. 
• Human resource weakness: The Human Assets Index (HAI) is based on indices 
of: (I) nutrition; (II) health; (III) education and (IV) adult literacy. 
• Economic vulnerability: Economic vulnerability is based on indices of the 
instability of agricultural production, the dearth of the export of goods and 
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services, the economic importance of non-traditional activities, merchandise 
export concentration and the handicap of a small economy. 
 Judging by these criteria, the UN classifies four groups of countries that have not 
graduated to become “developed” countries: they are (United Nations 2007): 
• Least developed countries 
• Low income countries 
• Middle low-income countries 
• Upper middle-income countries 
 Along with these countries, foreign assistance is also provided to some high 
income countries, such as: Brunei, Bahrain, and even the United Arab Emirates. For 
time-trend representations, the countries were distinguished in five categories (United 
Nations 2007). They are: 
• High income: Per capita income of $12,196 or higher. 
•  Low Income: Per capita income of $996 or less. 
•  Lower Middle Income: Per capita income of $996 to $2500. 
•  Middle Income: Per capita income of $2500 to $3946. 
•  Upper Middle Income: Per capita income of $3946 to $12,195. 
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Figure 3.3: Time trend of total foreign aid disbursed in various groups of countries. 
Source: World Bank, OECD.   
  
 Figure 3.3 shows that historically middle income countries have obtained the 
highest amount of total foreign assistance. Over the course of the last thirty years, 
middle-income countries consisted of Brazil, India, China, Korea, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. These economies attracted huge amounts of foreign assistance as 
underdeveloped countries. Part of the reason for the higher foreign assistance may be 
that the donor community intended these countries to improve and attain a level of equal 
“terms of trade” with the developed world. The rest of the figure shows that high and 
upper middle-income countries obtained the lowest amount of aid. The second and third 
places were occupied by the lower middle-income and low-income countries, 
respectively. This recent trend illustrates that aid for low-income countries has been 
increasing and aid for lower middle-income countries has been decreasing. 
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To examine the situation further, the aid trends of middle income countries and 
several extreme-conflict prone poor countries were compared. Twelve nations that are 
consistently plagued by chronic poverty, international conflict and violence were 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: An aid comparison of the poorest conflict-prone nations with middle 
income nations from 1960 to 2000. Source: World Bank, OECD.  
 
indentified for this comparison. These nations are: Burundi, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, Haiti, Kenya, Sierra Leon, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda, Myanmar and the Central 
African Republic. 
Figure 3.4 shows that from 1965 to 2000, countries such as Korea, Indonesia, 
Brazil and the Philippines have historically received a much higher level of aid than the 
total aid obtained by all of these conflict-prone nations. Since 2000, all twelve states 
have been categorized as “failed states” by political scientists and journalists. However, 
since these middle-income progressive nations, such as India, China, Brazil, Philippines, 
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Korea and Indonesia have relatively higher population levels, the per capita income in 
these countries still remained low. Figure 3.5 depicts the per capita aid trends in different 
clusters of countries. It has been discovered that low-income countries have consistently 
obtained a higher per capita level of foreign aid than all other countries. The per capita 
aid allocated to developing nations is about $46, which is $23 more than the second 
place low-middle income countries. However, there was a period of 10 years from the 
late ’80s when foreign assistance for lower-income nations did not rise. It also revealed 
that high-income countries obtained the lowest per capita income, followed by the 
upper-middle income and middle-income countries. This trend shows that only high-
income countries had their per capita aid decreased in recent years. 
  
 
Figure 3.5: Per capita aid trends of various clusters of countries from 1960 to 2008. 
Source: OECD, World Bank.  
 
 
3.2.3 Per Capita Aid by Country 
 Per capita aid disbursed to a particular country would provide general insight of 
donor perceptions and intentions. The per capita aid for all aid-receiving countries has 
been provided in the appendix. An abridged version of the table is provided as Table 3.2. 
To make the discussion more relevant and consistent, countries that have a total 
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population less than 2 million were omitted. For example, Northern Mariana Islands has 
obtained the highest per capita aid since 1960, with an average per year per capita aid of 
over $3,200. This benevolence of the donors can be attributed to the very small      
 
Table: 3.2 Top Per Capita Aid Receiving Economies (Population of at Least 2 
Million) From 1960 to 2008. Source: OECD, World Bank.  
 
Country Name 
Per Capita USD from 
1960 
West Bank and 
Gaza 297 
Israel 179 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 166 
Montenegro 164 
Jordan 161 
Tonga 155 
Djibouti 148 
Bahrain 125 
Serbia 112 
Suriname 111 
Albania 82 
Namibia 70 
Nicaragua 66 
Armenia 65 
Papua New Guinea 65 
Gabon 59 
Malta 58 
Georgia 57 
Lebanon 50 
Zambia 48 
Eritrea 48 
Congo, Rep. 47 
Gambia, The 47 
Mongolia 46 
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Table 3.3: Top Per Capita Aid Receiving Economies (Population of at Least 2 
Million) From 1999 to 2008. Source: OECD, World Bank.  
 
Country  
Average Per Capita USD Aid 
1999-2008. 
Liberia 323 
Serbia 313 
Oman 301 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 241 
Chile 204 
Israel 200 
Slovenia 198 
Uruguay 192 
Azerbaijan 164 
Albania 164 
Kazakhstan 159 
Iraq 159 
Macedonia, FYR 155 
Georgia 140 
Jordan 135 
El Salvador 134 
Mongolia 133 
South Africa 133 
Nicaragua 133 
Turkey 124 
Lebanon 116 
Malaysia 115 
Congo, Rep. 115 
Armenia 111 
Mexico 110 
Afghanistan 94 
Mauritania 89 
Brazil 85 
Honduras 80 
Venezuela, R.B. de 76 
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population of the island. The average per capita aid analysis suggests that Israel,  
Palestine and the West Bank Gaza strip have obtained the highest amount from 1960-
2008. In general, European conflict-prone impoverished nations acquired a higher 
amount of per capita foreign aid, indicating that the donor countries are more concerned 
with the economies of their close neighbors. Affluent Middle Eastern nations, such as 
Lebanon and Bahrain, also made the list of top aid-receiving economies. There is only 
one nation from Sub-Saharan Africa in the top 20 per capita foreign aid recipients. 
 Table 3.3 shows countries (of over 2 million people) with the highest per capita 
foreign assistance from 1999 to 2008. Surprisingly, Iraq and Afghanistan do not head 
this list. This list is led by Western allies and neighbors, such as Chile, Serbia, Bosnia, 
Israel, Slovenia, Uruguay, Albania and Azerbaijan. It appears that the two most 
compelling factors for obtaining higher per capita foreign assistance are location and 
 proneness towards violent conflict. Countries with chief reasons for this strategy may be 
international trade and domestic security. Developing the neighboring regions would 
imply less migration and threat of violence for a donor country. Furthermore, it is easier 
for a donor nation to become involved in trade treaties with prospering neighbors with 
good economic conditions. A peaceful country also provides a conducive environment 
for investment. 
3.2.4 Comparison Between Fragile and Failed States 
 According to the United Nations, the least developed nations exhibit the lowest 
indicators of socioeconomic development with the lowest Human Development Index 
ratings (United Nations Database 2010). The countries in the bottom tier of this group 
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are all conflict prone, impoverished and politically unstable. Each of the 47 countries 
listed as least developed countries (LDCs) have been identified as “fragile states” by 
social scientists (OECD 2007). Without rapid and well-designed development strategies, 
these nations turn into “failed states.” According to Max Weber (Weber 1918), a 
successful state would exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force 
within its borders. If the monopoly is hindered through the dominant presence of 
warlords, paramilitary groups, terrorism or other mediums, the very existence of the state 
becomes uncertain and the state becomes a failed state. It appears that most failed states 
fail to perform the basic functions of states (Zartman 1995) because of violent conflict. 
The determination and stigma of a “failed state” can be controversial, because of the 
vague definition and geopolitical consequences (Stewart 2007). However, “failed 
states,” in general, have four distinct characteristics: (a) prolonged status as fragile 
states; (b) sustained violence and conflict; (c) uneven economic development and severe 
economic decline; (d) intervention of other states and (e) violation of human rights. 
The initial group of 47 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) measured by United 
Nations is divided into two categories. The 12 countries (from Figure 3.4) that are the 
poorest and have had extreme conflict at recent times were grouped as “poorest conflict-
laden.” The central governments of these nations lost the “monopoly of control” of these 
states due to extreme violence, which, of course, constituted them as “failed states” 
(Ignatieff 2002). The 12 countries indentified were Burundi, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, Haiti, Kenya, Sierra Leon, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda, Myanmar and Central 
African Republic. 
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of per capita aid disbursement for 35 LDCs and other 
twelve LDCs that are poorer and more conflict prone. Source: World Bank, OECD.  
 
 
  The other 35 states are poor and conflict-laden as well, but their socio-economic 
condition and conflict scenario is better than the first group. Figure 3.6 compares the per 
capita aid received by these two groups between 1960-2001. The figure demonstrates 
that the most impoverished conflict-prone countries received significantly less per capita 
assistance than the other LDCs. The marginal per capita benefit of $7 for countries with 
a per capita income of $700 is economically, statistically and socially significant. It is 
suggested that the absence of proper conflict forecasting and foreign policies pushed 
these 12 conflict-prone poor countries to the brink of becoming failed states. 
After 2001, the unrest turned into radical conflict and violence in these 12 
countries. Conflict infiltrated through national and international borders, and they 
attracted more attention from the donor community. Figure 3.7 shows that the per capita 
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aid for those 12 nations increased radically and surpassed the remaining LDCs in 2004. 
With increasing violence and volatility, aid per capita has been increasing in those 
countries without actually decreasing the conflict. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Recent comparison of LDCs and the twelve most conflict-prone poor 
countries. Source: World Bank, OECD. 
 
 The poorest of the poor that go through unrest do not receive adequate assistance 
when it is needed and deserved. However, when conflict and violence cause a state to 
fail, it starts receiving increasing levels of foreign aid. 
3.3.5 Comparison Between Least Developed and Low Middle Income Countries 
Next, the least developed countries (LDC) and low middle-income countries 
(LMIC) are compared. According to the United Nations, the LMIC’s average GNI per 
capita is at least 1200 US dollars ($1,200) higher than the LDCs. Figure 3.8 shows the 
comparison among the LDCs and Low Middle Income Countries (LMIC). Deservingly, 
the LDCs obtain more per capita aid than the LMICs. 
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Figure 3.8: Comparison between LDC and LMIC. Source: World Bank, OECD. 
  
However, to further verify these observations, the figure was re-estimated without 
India and China. The reasoning behind omitting India and China in this comparison is: 
• The problem with India and China is wealth management, not scarcity of 
resources. Hence, per capita foreign aid is not a primary issue for development of 
these nations. 
• Essentially, China and India receive assistance from first world (donor) countries 
through labor migration and outsourcing. The dollar amount of these endeavors 
translates into much higher revenue than foreign assistance. 
• China and India have been collaborating in many entrepreneurial ventures with 
the developed world. These activities spur more economic development and 
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financial investment and they are of far greater value to both nations than the 
value of foreign assistance. 
• China and India comprise more than one-third of the world’s total population and 
more than half of the total GDP generated by the developing countries. Due to 
their high population, these economies are bound to receive lower per capita 
assistance. 
  
 
Figure 3.9: Per capita comparison LIMCs (without India and China) and LDCs. 
Source: World Bank, OECD. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the comparison between the per capita aid for LDCs and LMICs 
without China and India. The figure suggests that after ignoring China and India, LDCs 
do not receive significantly higher amounts of per capita aid than LIMCs. The LIMC’s 
per capita yearly income reaches as high as $1705, whereas for LDCs, it is a meager 
$700. The marginal benefit of a dollar is much higher in an LDC than in an LMIC. The 
evidence thus suggests that the impoverished are being deprived of due development 
attention and assistance strategies. 
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3.2.6 Comparison Between Low Middle-Income and Upper Middle-Income 
Countries 
Upper middle-income countries consist of semi-developed countries, such as 
Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines and South Korea (until recently). These countries are self-
sufficient and have advanced levels of trade with the developed world. More 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Comparison between LMIC and UPIC. Source: World Bank, OECD. 
 
 
importantly, they attract substantial foreign direct investment. Relatively high levels of 
foreign aid (compared to the aid provided LDC and LMICs) would not affect these 
economies much because of their own large GDP. Recent research has shown that 
foreign assistance in the upper middle-income countries has not been particularly 
beneficial. Most of these countries prospered more when their official direct foreign 
assistance was curtailed7. Figure 3.10 compares LMICs and UMICs. The figure shows 
that LMICs obtain marginally more per capita aid than the UMICs. The LMICs receive 
per capita foreign assistance of 3 US dollars more the UMICs. 
                                                 
7 William Easterly…Bureaucracy of foreign aid. 
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3.2.7 Comparison of Per Capita Aid of Conflict-Prone Countries and Associated 
Groups 
An examination of countries that have undergone prolonged conflict in recent 
times will be beneficial to evaluate the effect conflict on foreign assistance. Lebanon, a 
7000 year-old civilization in the Mediterranean, was a prospering country until the 
1980s. Civil wars and conflict have radically affected the growth of its economy and 
social outlook. Even after the spread of extreme violence, Lebanon is considered 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Comparison of Lebanon and UMIC nations. Source: World Bank, 
OECD. 
 
 
an upper middle-income country (UMIC). It has a per capita GDP of 15,000 USD (IMF 
2010 Report). However, Figure 3.11 shows that Lebanon received much more per capita 
aid than the UMICs. Lebanon gets several hundred times more per capita aid than the 
group it belongs to (UMIC), because it is considered a conflict-prone nation. However, 
its aid receipts are not constant and they apparently depend on the amount of conflict the 
nation experiences. After its civil war broke out, Lebanon began receiving more 
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attention from the donor community. Before the conflict, Lebanon received marginal 
amounts of aid. Assistance to the nation was provided only after violent conflict created 
severe socio-political instability. The assistance appears to have failed in mitigating the 
conflict in Lebanon, as the nation still is experiencing conflict. Conflict in Lebanon 
increased foreign assistance; however, increases in aid did not serve as a panacea for 
violence. 
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show per capita aid received by Pakistan and Iraq. Both 
countries are highly prone to conflict; however, they are not classified as LDCs. The 
figures compare the aid disbursed to Iraq and Pakistan with LMICs. Pakistan 
consistently received more aid than LMICs. However, careful examination reveals that 
the per capita aid of Pakistan has a much higher variance than the per capita aid of 
LMICs. Pakistan received more aid whenever conflict escalated, and the assistance 
declined thereafter until subsequent outbreaks of conflict. Since achieving nationhood, 
Pakistan has never been without violent conflict, possibly aggravated by inconsistencies 
in the application of foreign aid. Foreign assistance to Iraq is even more inconsistent. 
Figure 3.13 shows that apart from a period in the late 1970s, Iraq did not receive much 
per capita aid. But after that and around the Gulf War, it suddenly received a lot of 
attention and its official aid increased more than 20 times. As a result of the war with 
Iran, Iraq amassed an armed force consisting of more than a million people. But the 
country also incurred huge debts and did not invest in agricultural and industrial 
development. Iraq’s attempts to annex Kuwait and possibly Saudi Arabia were linked to 
this debt problem and the need to gain control of greater oil reserves. The situation might 
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have been avoided if Iraq was provided with attention and foreign assistance before the 
Gulf War. Foreign aid disbursed after the Gulf War did not eradicate conflict, but 
nevertheless, foreign assistance decreased drastically in the late ’90s. Iraq has 
experienced massive conflict after 1999 and its foreign aid sharply increased again. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Comparison between per capita aid of LMICs and Pakistan. Source: 
World Bank, OECD. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Comparison between per capita aid of Iraq and LMICs. Source: 
World Bank, OECD. 
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Figure 3.14 shows that, from 2002, Iraq’s per capita aid increased precipitously. 
However, recently, foreign assistance to Iraq has been decreasing and will likely 
decrease further because of new donor policies that have indicated a decrease in future 
assistance. Iraq is not completely conflict free at the present time. Radical reductions in 
aid to Iraq may culminate in more conflict. 
  
Figure 3.14: Iraq’s per capita aid compared with LMIC 1999-2008. Source: World 
Bank, OECD. 
 
 
Sudan and Tanzania are both LDCs in Africa. Historically, Sudan has been more 
violent and conflict prone than Tanzania. If anything, according to the IMF reports, 
Sudan’s per capita income is higher than that of Tanzania. Figure 3.15 shows that on 
average Sudan received more per capita aid than Tanzania even though essentially the 
countries have similar conditions and belong in the same region. Tanzania’s per capita 
aid has been monotonic and has mostly increased through the years. On the contrary, 
Sudan’s per capita receipts for aid have a higher variance, with sharp decreases and 
increases, depending on the amount of conflict. Unfortunately, Sudan remains a conflict-
prone nation, sporadically receiving more aid when conflict flares. 
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Figure 3.15: Per capita aid comparison between Sudan and Tanzania. Source: 
World Bank, OECD. 
 
 
It is conspicuous that poor conflict-prone countries do not receive consistent per 
capita aid in accordance with their needs. Conflict-prone countries attract more per 
capita aid compared to countries that have the same geo- and socio-economic profiles. 
However, their receipt of aid has a higher variance and positive correlation between 
levels of conflict and amount of foreign assistance. It is apparent that foreign assistance 
has been unable to eradicate conflict and violence. 
3.2.8 Foreign Aid on Different Sectors 
The data for foreign aid for the different sectors was acquired from the OECD 
database. The different aid areas are agricultural development, civil society, government 
administration, food aid and food security programs, economic development and 
planning, basic health care, educational development and infrastructure building. 
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Unfortunately, the aggregate sectoral aid country level data is available only from 2002 
to 2007. An extensive description of this data can be found in chapter V. 
3.3 Data on Conflict 
The literature review from chapter II demonstrates that peace and conflict 
indicates that data on conflict and violence can be diverse. Due to the diverse definitions 
of violence and conflict, there are several credible sources that provide different 
accounts and measures related to conflict. The Princeton University Database for 
conflict, wars and terrorism provides an invaluable description of the data sources and 
accounts available. For this particular research, conflict has been divided into two 
specific categories: international conflict and intra-country violence.  
3.3.1 International Conflict 
The Uppsala University (UCDP) database provides a dataset for international 
armed conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2010). According to UCDP, armed 
conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” This database provides time series data 
from 1941 to 2009. It lists 1989 events of international conflict among all nations. For 
the purpose of this research, conflict events are distinguished according to their 
magnitude. The events are scaled numerically according to the magnitude of the 
fatalities. For example, if the event had less than 500 fatalities, then it was assigned one 
numeric value; if there were more than 500 fatalities but less than 10,000, it was 
assigned the next numeric value. Any event that resulted in over 10,000 fatalities was 
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assigned a higher numeric value. The dataset is constructed according to time (year) and 
individual countries. Since the financial assistance data commences from 1960 and most 
of the other indicators were made available from a later date, the international conflict 
data utilized is from 1960 onward. 
Table 3.4: Twenty Most International Conflict-Prone Nations and Regions. Source: 
UPDB.  
 
Country Name Region 
Colombia South America  
Chad Africa 
Angola Africa 
Sudan Africa 
Uganda Africa 
Guatemala South/Central America 
Afghanistan Asia 
Cambodia Africa 
Israel Asia 
Myanmar Asia 
Iraq Asia 
Ethiopia Africa 
India Asia 
Mozambique Africa 
Philippines Asia 
Somalia Africa 
Peru South America  
Algeria Africa 
Burundi Africa 
Yemen, Rep. Asia 
 
 
Table 3.4 provides the names and regions of the top 20 international conflict-
prone countries. According to the database maintained by Uppsala University, Colombia 
is the most conflict prone nation. Since international conflict (according to UCDP) only 
needs one federal and/or state government, most events in Colombia do not comprise 
more than one international party. Many of these events have included the drug cartels 
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and domestic as well as international governments. In the top 20 conflict-prone 
countries, 10 are from Africa, seven from Asia and three from South/Central America. 
Apart from Israel and Iraq, all of the countries in this list have a high poverty head count 
ratio. Most of the countries (all of the countries in Africa) in top 20 have been ravaged 
by civil wars as well. The rest of the countries, such as India, Israel, Yemen, Uganda, 
Somalia and Ethiopia, had reoccurring issues of conflict with their neighbors. The first 
European country to make the list was Turkey at 24, which is actually around the Arab 
Peninsula. Most of the Sub-Saharan countries are in the top tier of this list. Ninety 
percent of South Asia also comes in the top 15% of the list as well. This is quite 
ominous, as South Asia essentially holds about one-fifth of the world’s total population. 
Ninety percent of the nations in the top 20% of the list also have a high poverty index. 
Most of the countries in the bottom tier are from Europe and have a very low rate of 
conflict, with low-income inequality and even a lower rate of poverty. Smaller islands, 
such as Saint Kits, Neiva and the Solomon Islands, also have a very low propensity 
towards conflict. 
3.3.2. Terrorism and Violence Data 
Amassing and interpreting data on intra-country violence was more challenging. 
The most extensive dataset of intra-country violence has been constructed by King and 
Lowe (2003). The King and Lowe data are coded by computer from millions of Reuters 
news reports and provide an account of 10 million events. Though very extensive, the 
dataset do not provide an explicit account of the nature of the events. It is understood 
that the computer algorithm only recognized random news columns citing events of 
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unrest. Hence, presumably this dataset has a significant bias in detecting events in 
developed nations. For example, even a false alarm or minor event in US/UK is reported 
promptly by Reuters, however, murders of peasants in Southern Sudan may very well go 
unnoticed. Hence, for objective conflict research, this data is not very efficient. It is 
noteworthy that the compilers of this dataset have thus far not used this data to predict or 
analyze conflict. 
 The inter-country terrorism and violence data collected and used for the 
comprehensive research was acquired from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
(Global Terrorism Database 2010). GTD is an open-source database including 
information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2008, where they 
have reported over 87,000 incidents from all over the world. The incidents have been 
divided into nine parts. They are: 
• Assassination 
• Bombing  
• Hijacking  
• Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) 
• Hostage Taking (Barricade)  
• Armed Assault  
• Infrastructure Attack 
• Unarmed Assault  
• Unknown  
 Incidents were coded and aggregated for each country for every year. Hence, if a 
country had two incidents each in each of the nine sectors, the total amount of incidents 
for a country for that particular year would be 18. The Appendix provides the aggregate 
amount of incidents for every individual country from highest to lowest. Table 3.5 
provides the top 20 nations with the most reported and documented inter-county conflict 
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and violence. Unlike, the conflict incidents, the top countries on this list are diverse and 
are not limited to impoverished countries. The two main reasons for these phenomena 
may be: I) reports are more readily available to the news media and, as a result, get 
coverage if the incident is in a developed country as opposed to a developing country or, 
II) although developed countries take precautionary measures to avoid conflict, often 
radical organizations from underdeveloped countries target them for violent activities. 
Table 3.5 reveals Columbia again as topping the list as the country with the greatest 
amount of violence, followed by the two neighboring nations of Peru and El Salvador.   
Table 3.5: List of the Highest Conflict-Prone Countries From 1970. Source: GTD. 
Ranking  Country Name Region  
1 Colombia South America 
2 Peru South America 
3 El Salvador South/Central America 
4 India Asia 
5 Ireland Europe 
6 Spain Europe 
7 Iraq Asia 
8 Israel Asia 
9 Turkey Europe 
10 Pakistan Asia 
11 Philippines Asia 
12 Sri Lanka Asia 
13 Chile South America 
14 Guatemala South/Central America 
15 Nicaragua Africa 
16 Lebanon Asia 
17  South Africa Africa 
18  Algeria Africa 
19  Italy Europe 
20  United States North America 
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Almost all of South Asia including India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are at the top of the list 
as well, because of their own mutual problems and political unrest.The top two European 
nations are Ireland and Spain; both may have a high propensity towards inter-country 
violence due to unrest with minority groups and areas having different sovereignty. 
Mediterranean countries, such Israel, Turkey and Lebanon, are in the top twenty as well. 
Nicaragua, South Africa and Algeria represent Africa in the top twenty. Although all the 
continents are well represented in the top twenty, it is suspected that since African 
incidents lack reporting, Africa may well have a downward bias. 
3.3.3 Sudan Violence Data 
Data for violence in Sudan was collected from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking 
System (WITS) database (WITS Database 2011). WITS is the United States’ National 
Counterterrorism Center’s database of terrorist incidents. According to the experts of the 
United States Counter Terrorism Unit, terrorism occurs “when groups or individuals 
acting on political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack civilians and non-
combatants or their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of 
political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence.” This database categorizes 
every incident by “event type.” Similar GTD event types are coded in the database as 
armed attack, arson/firebombing, assassination, assault, barricade/hostage, bombing, 
CBRN, crime, firebombing, hijacking, hoax, kidnapping, near miss/non-attack, other, 
theft, unknown and vandalism. For Sudan, WITS provided monthly data from 2004 to 
November 2010. Since the time span is so small, the magnitude of events is also 
important in determining the effect of the conflict and violent activities. Hence, all the 
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fatalities were added to determine the magnitude of violence for each month. For 
example, suppose the month of May in 2005 had two conflicts, each of which had 30 
people die and 40 people were injured. Then, May would have a cumulative violence 
score of (30*2+40*2) =140. A total of 367 incidents were recorded. Table 3.6 shows the 
summary statistics of the coded data. The mean score of each month’s terrorist/violent 
fatalities is 56, a high amount. The median is 29, highest is 382 and the standard 
deviation of 71 implies that the situation in Sudan is a violent area. 
Table 3.6: Sudan’s Summary Statistics for Violence from March 2004 to November 
2010. Source: WITS. 
Mean 55.67 
StDev 70.93 
Min 0 
Median 29 
Max 382 
Skewness 2.33 
Kurtosis 6.24 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Fatalities by month in Sudan from March 2004 to November 2010. 
Source: WITS. 
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Figure 3.16 shows the time series movement of the “cumulative score” of 
violence in Sudan over time. Eighty-one months of total data were collected from March 
2004 to November 2010. Figure 3.14 provides a time series representation of the data. 
The figure reveals that violence in Sudan is consistent and does not really depict a clear 
increase or decrease through time. Although after recent endeavors from world 
organizations and various nations, conflict appears to have reduced marginally. This 
reduction may also be attributed to the birth of the new nation. 
3.4 Income Inequality (Gini Indices) 
The income inequality data has been collected from the World Income Inequality 
database (UNU-WIDER) procured by United Nations University (Income Inequality 
Database 2008). This database collects and stores information on Gini indices (income 
inequality) from both the developed and developing world (Deininger and Squire 1996). 
This collection program originated as part of the “Global Trend in Inequality and 
Poverty Program.” The uniqueness of this dataset lies in the comprehensive analyses and 
inclusion of all the accepted methods and databases. The WIDER dataset overlaps and 
builds on the academically popular “Deininger and Squire” (2004) inequality dataset 
provided by the World Bank. This database also considers national surveys and other 
validated studies, along with UNICEF databases, to gather their intended inequality data. 
However, there can be three main criticisms of this inequality dataset. Countries and 
national surveys use diverse methods to calculate the Gini indices. For example, most 
developed countries use consumption data to calculate inequality, whereas most 
developing countries use income to estimate Gini indices. Another drawback is that 
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some of the data and estimations of inequality only consider metropolitan areas and 
ignore rural inequality. The third problem is that these indices would have some 
downward bias, as data for developed nations has been better reported compared to 
underdeveloped countries. 
The UNI-WIDER income inequality data is the most comprehensive and 
provides the highest number of data points with considerable accuracy. A 0 Gini means 
complete equality, while a Gini of 100 would imply a completely unequal distribution. 
The summary statistics of the data is shown in Table 3.7. The total number of data points 
is 5313, which is quite comprehensive. The standard deviation is 11 and the mean for all 
countries is 38. 
This Gini level is significantly lower than the estimated Gini of the world, which is 
estimated to be between 56 and 66 (Sutcliffe 2007). This lower median Gini can  was 
calculated in Mali in 1992. Figure 3.17 provides the underlying Gaussian kernel 
probability distribution function (PDF) of the Gini indices. Due to the lower income 
inequalities of the developed nations and their majority presence in the dataset, the PDF 
is skewed towards the left. 
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics of GINI Distribution. Source: UN-WIDER. 
 
Mean 38.1 
StDev 11.02 
95 % LCI 37.75 
95 % UCI 38.43 
CV 28.93 
Min 12.1 
Median 36.5 
Max 78.6 
Skewness 0.39 
Kurtosis -0.50 
Count 5313 
  
largely be attributed to the smaller European and Asian economies, with low income 
inequality. The EU Gini has been estimated to be at 31 (Eurofound 2009). The minimum 
Gini of 12 has been reported by China in 1982, while the highest income inequality of 
78.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17: The probability distribution function of Gini Indices. Source: UN- 
WIDER. 
 
79 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: Summary Statistics of Gini Distribution of the Developing Countries.  
Source: UN-WIDER. 
 
Mean 44.2 
StDev 10.1 
95 % LCI 43.79 
95 % UCI 44.65 
CV 22.83 
Min 12.1 
Median 44.3 
Max 77.6 
Skewness 0.037 
Kurtosis -0.48 
Sum 124406.5 
Count 2813 
 
Since this research concerns conflict-prone developing nations, the developing 
nations were examined separately and presented in Table 3.8. The mean increased 
considerably by 6.1 points to 44.2. The standard deviation does not change significantly. 
The Minimum and maximum data points standard deviation does not change 
significantly. The Minimum and maximum data points remain the same, implying that 
the greatest income inequality occurs in the developing world.  
 
  
 
Figure 3.18: The probability distribution function of Gini indices of developing 
nations from 1960-2009. Source: UN-WIDER.  
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Table 3.9: Countries with the highest Gini indices. Source: UN-WIDER. 
Rank  Country 
 
Region 
1 Zambia Africa  
2 Burkina Faso Africa  
3 Mauritania Africa 
4 Namibia Africa 
5 Zimbabwe Africa 
6 Mali Africa 
7 Gambia Africa 
8 Tanzania Africa 
9 Guinea Africa 
10 Kenya Africa 
 
Figure 3.18 shows the PDF function of Gini of developing nations. Gini indices follow a 
normal distribution. More importantly, the distribution is not skewed to the left anymore 
because of the absence of the developed nations. Hence, the PDF has shifted more 
towards the right. A comparison of the data in Tables 3.9 with that in Table 3.3 suggests 
that conflict-prone underdeveloped countries with low per capita income have the 
highest income inequality. All of these countries with high Gini indices are from Africa. 
Thus far, the data has shown that this continent is arguably the most conflict 
impoverished and unequal. 
3.5 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Data 
The GDP data has been collected from the World Bank’s website (World Bank 
Database 2011). For this research, aggregate data from 1960-2010 were considered. 
Table 3.10 depicts the top five countries with the highest and lowest amount of average   
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Table 3.10: Top and bottom countries in terms of average GDP from 1960.  
Source: World Bank.  
 
Ranking  Country Region  
1 United States North America  
2 Japan Asia  
3 Germany Europe  
4 France Europe  
5 United Kingdom Europe 
212 St. Kitts and Nevis Central America 
213 Tonga Africa 
214 Sao Tome and Principe Africa  
215 Palau Africa 
216 Marshall Islands North America  
217 Kiribati Central America  
 
GDP from 1960. The United States and Japan occupy the first two places. While most of 
the Western European countries’ lie in the top fifty, they also occupy the next three 
places. The lowest ranked countries are mostly small islands. Most of the African  
countries lie in the bottom tier of this group. (South) Asian nations that are extremely 
poor rank higher on this list due to their huge population and size. 
3.6 Gross National Income Per Capita 
Gross national income (GNI) per capita provides a better measure of the well 
being of citizens’ of a country. Hence, data on GNI for all the countries were collected 
from the World Bank. Data accumulated from 1960-2008 show that European and North 
American nations have the highest GNI per capita. Table 3.11 shows the top and bottom 
five GNI per capita nations. In the top five, only the United States is the non-European 
country, as Scandinavian countries dominate the list. Apart from Nepal, all the 
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Table 3.11: Highest and Lowest Per Capita GNI From 1960 to 2008. Source: World 
Bank. 
 
Rank  Country  Region  
Per capita 
average USD 
1 Luxembourg Europe  26043 
2 Switzerland Europe  25445 
3 United States North America  24586 
4 Norway Europe  24444 
5 Denmark Europe  24292 
188 Ethiopia Africa  191 
189 Nepal Asia  171 
190 Malawi Africa  149 
191 Burundi Africa  139 
192 Somalia Africa  113 
 
other countries in the bottom five are from Africa. Most of the bottom twenty countries, 
such as Burundi, Malawi, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad and Zimbabwe, are conflict prone 
nations. 
3.7 Infant Mortality Under Five 
Data for infant mortality under age five has been collected from the World Bank. 
This mortality rate provides the probability per 1000 that an infant would not survive 
until the age of five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Although collected 
through the World Bank, these estimates are primarily developed by UN Inter-agency 
Groups, such as UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DES and UNPD for Child Mortality 
Estimation. Unfortunately, the data is not consistent and there appears to be lower data 
points for the developing nations. Figure 3.19 shows that the European areas have the 
lowest mortality rate in the world. 
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Figure 3.19: Area wide trend of infant mortality. Source: World Bank.  
 
 
Less than five children out of 1000 die before reaching the age of five in the Euro 
zones. For the entire world, the number has decreased from around 70 to around 60 in 
the last four years. However, the situation appears to be bleak for the Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Least Developed countries. It is portrayed that every year, more than 125 
children die out of every 1000 in these regions.  
3.8 Life Expectancy at Birth 
Life expectancy at birth estimates the number of years an infant would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of his or her birth remained constant. The life 
expectancy data is inconsistent and are not available for all countries. The World Bank’s 
collection of the life expectancy data is the most comprehensive, as it entails data from: 
(1) United Nations Population Division, 2009, (2) Census reports and other statistical 
publications from individual nations, (3) Eurostat’s Demographic Statistics, (4) 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community and (5) U.S. Census Bureau: International 
Database. 
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A higher life expectancy implies better living standards, education, knowledge, 
access to medication and all other basic needs. Table 3.12 provides the top six and 
bottom seven countries according to their average life expectancies. The figure also 
shows the average expectancy age and region of countries in the ranking. The top six 
countries are all from Europe, whereas six of the bottom seven countries are from 
Africa. Afghanistan has the lowest life expectancy, with 38 years, and San Marino has 
the highest, with 81 years. This significant difference points to the stark differences in 
livelihoods and standards of living between the two countries. All the countries in the 
bottom seven have high poverty rates, along with frequent conflicts. The literacy levels 
in these specific countries are especially low as well. To depict differences in life 
expectancy levels between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, Figure 3.20 provides a time 
series region-wise Figurical illustration from 1990. The figure shows that, on average,  
Europe’s life expectancy is 30 years higher than Sub-Saharan Africa’s. Low income and 
least developed countries have 20-year lower average life expectancies when compared 
to the entire world. 
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Table 3.12: Countries with the highest and lowest life expectancy. Source: World 
Bank. 
 
Ranking Country  Age  Region  
1 San Marino 81.8 Europe  
2 Liechtenstein 81.6 Europe  
3 Faeroe Islands 79.2 Europe  
4 Isle of Man 77.2 Europe  
5 Iceland 76.9 Europe  
6 Sweden 76.8 Europe  
208 Rwanda 42.4 Africa  
209 Niger 41.8 Africa  
210 Mali 41.5 Africa  
211 Guinea-Bissau 41.5 Africa  
212 Angola 40.5 Africa  
213 Sierra Leone 39.88 Africa  
214 Afghanistan 38.93 Asia 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Life expectancy by region. Source: World Bank. 
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3.9 Literacy Rate 
According to the World Bank, the world literacy rate in 2009 was 93%. “Adult 
literacy rate” refers to the percentage of people over age 15 who can read and write a 
short, simple statement on their everyday life. Although the World Bank intends to 
provide this data from the 1960s, the first data point initiates from 1976. Reportedly, the 
World Bank has collected this data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. Table 3.13 provides a list of 
countries that have the lowest literacy rates. The list closely resembles the life 
expectancy rate list, with Afghanistan having the lowest average literacy rate and nine of 
the ten bottom countries coming from Africa. More importantly, most of these Sub- 
 
Table 3.13: Bottom Ten Countries with the Lowest Average Literacy Rates. Source: 
World Bank. 
 
Ranking Country Name Region  Average 
1 Afghanistan Asia 18.15 
2 Burkina Faso Africa 18.20 
3 Niger Africa 19.03 
4 Mali Africa 19.66 
5 Chad Africa 24.63 
6 Benin Africa 30.00 
7 Ethiopia Africa 30.91 
8 Guinea Africa 34.46 
9 Guinea-Bissau Africa 37.83 
10 Sierra Leone Africa 37.87 
  
 
Saharan African countries with low literacy rates are conflict-prone impoverished 
nations. 
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Table 3.14: Top Ten Countries with the Highest Average Literacy Rates. Source: 
World Bank. 
 
Ranking Country Name Region  Average 
1 
Korea, Dem. 
Rep. Asia 99.9 
2 Estonia Europe 99.7 
3 Georgia Europe 99.6 
4 Latvia Europe 99.6 
5 Slovenia Europe 99.6 
6 Ukraine Europe 99.5 
7 Lithuania Europe 99.2 
8 Armenia Europe 99.2 
9 Poland Europe 99.2 
10 Tonga Africa 99.1 
  
Considering that the average literacy for the whole world is 93%, the bottom tier 
countries have relatively low literacy rates. Table 3.14 illustrates countries with the 
highest average literacy rate over the years. South Korea, with an average literacy rate of 
99.99%, is considered the most literate nation in the world. All the other countries in the 
top nine are from Europe, with stable economies and good access to education. Most of 
the top ten countries have nearly 100% literacy rates compared to Afghanistan’s 18% 
literacy rate. These observations clearly imply specific correlations with literacy, poverty 
and conflict. 
3.10 Immunization Rate 
Immunization rates collected from the World Bank measure the percentage of 
children age 12-23 months who received vaccinations before 12 months or at any time 
before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized against diphtheria, 
pertussis (or whooping cough) and tetanus (DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine. 
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The data has been provided to the World Bank by the World Health Organization and 
UNICEF. Although it has some missing data points, the data commences from 1961. 
Table 3.15 lists the top ten countries with the highest immunization rates, their regions 
and actual rates. They are small European nations with a reasonably stable economy. All 
of these countries have an immunization rate higher than 96%. On the other hand, seven 
of the bottom ten countries in terms of immunization rate are from Africa. As Table 3.16 
shows, all of these countries are conflict-prone, corrupt and impoverished with very low 
access to better lives and livelihood. The average mean immunization rates for the 
bottom ten countries are around thirty percentage points; sixty-six percentage points   
 
 
Table 3.15: Top Ten Countries with the Highest Immunization Rates. Source: 
World Bank, WHO. 
 
Ranking Country  
Immunization rate per 100 
persons Region  
1 Hungary 99 Europe  
2 Slovak Republic 99 Europe  
3 Monaco 98.9 Europe  
4 Sweden 98.8 Europe  
5 Czech Republic 97.9 Europe  
6 Iceland 97.9 Europe  
7 Finland 96.9 Europe  
8 Netherlands 96.8 Europe  
9 Poland 96.8 Europe  
10 San Marino 96.8 Europe  
 
  
lower than the top ones. Low immunization rates are indicators of reduced access to 
knowledge, medicine, education, health care, property entitlement, wealth and human 
rights. 
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Table 3.16: Twenty Countries with the Lowest Immunization Rates from 1960-
2009. Source: World Bank, WHO. 
 
Ranking Country Name 
Immunization rate 
per 100 persons Region 
1 Chad 18 Africa 
2 Somalia 24 Africa 
3 Niger 26 Africa 
4 Nigeria 33 Africa 
5 Angola 33 Africa 
6 Afghanistan 35 Asia 
7 Lao PDR 35 Asia 
8 Congo, Dem. Rep. 35 Africa 
9 Haiti 39 Central America 
10 Guinea 40 Africa 
 
  
Figure 3.21 provides a time trend illustration of immunization rated in different 
regions. Europe and high income areas have significantly higher immunization rates than 
the LDCs and African nations. Immunization rates of African and LDC countries have 
been increasing in the past two decades. 
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Figure 3.21: Time trend immunization rates of different regions. Source: World 
Bank, WHO. 
 
  
3.11 Poverty 
 
The World Bank provides two estimations of poverty. Both measure poverty 
through a dollar amount per day. The first one draws the poverty line under $1.25 a day, 
while the second starts at under $2 a day. Tables 3.17and 3.18 list the countries 
belonging in the bottom tier of the poverty list. Both tables affirm that the dollar 
comparisons are quite consistent and similar. All of the countries belonging in the 
bottom ten are from Africa. There are other measures of poverty as well; however, since 
this study incorporates a comprehensive analysis of all countries, a universal dollar 
measure appears to be the most appropriate. The World Bank prepared these indices   
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Table 3.17: List of the Most impoverished ($1.25 a day). Source: World Bank.  
Ranking Country Name Average Region  
1 Burundi 41.29 Africa  
2 Liberia 40.78 Africa  
3 Malawi 39.13 Africa  
4 
Central African 
Republic 38.99 Africa  
5 Swaziland 38.56 Africa  
6 Madagascar 38.37 Africa  
7 Tanzania 34.87 Africa  
8 Mozambique 34.18 Africa  
9 Rwanda 32.94 Africa  
10 Sierra Leone 32.55 Africa  
  
 
from poverty assessments of countries in which it has active programs and from 
collaboration with national institutions other development agencies and civil society, 
 
Table 3.18: List of the most impoverished ($2 a day). Source: World Bank. 
Ranking Country Name Average Region  
1 Burundi 59.81 Africa 
2 Liberia 59.51 Africa 
3 Malawi 57.02 Africa 
4 Madagascar 55.79 Africa 
5 Tanzania 54.01 Africa 
6 Swaziland 53.745 Africa 
7 
Central African 
Republic 53.61 Africa 
8 Mozambique 51.95 Africa 
9 Rwanda 51.57 Africa 
10 Zambia 47.16 Africa 
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including poor people’s organizations. These measures are well respected and 
universally used. The data extends from 1978 through 2008. The dataset has many 
missing data points. Although this data is widely used, it presents some stark 
inconsistencies compared to the other variables. For example, according to the World 
Bank, Tunisia has claimed to have a 5% poverty headcount in 1990 and 3% in 2010. For 
a country that ranks 134th in the world, with an average GNI of $1134 per capita, an only 
3% poverty headcount appears to be highly improbable. Pakistan, one of the most 
politically, financially and socially unstable nations in the world, has been documented 
to have decreased its poverty headcount by 26% in the last 20 years. Bosnia, one of the 
most impoverished and conflict prone European nations, is listed as having 5% of its 
total population under the poverty line. Guyana, one of the most impoverished nations in 
the world, only has a 6% poverty headcount index, according to the World Bank dataset. 
With a GNI per capita of only $694 a year, this Island has a similar profile to the Congo. 
The Congo has an average headcount poverty index of more than 42%. 
3.12 Sudan Commodity Data  
A total of 82 data points of monthly estimations on prices from 2006 to 2010 was 
collected, consisting of the three most important food commodities of Sudan. The data 
was initially prepared by the Sudanese Ministry of Agriculture and later verified by the 
United Nations World Food Program.  
3.12.1 Sorghum 
The major crop and main staple food in Sudan, Sorghum (Feterita), accounted for 
26% of the total dietary energy supply (DES) of the Sudanese population. On average, in 
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2004-08, per capita consumption (as food) of Sorghum (Feterita) was 88 kg/yr. Sudan is 
close to being self-sufficient in sorghum production. 
3.12.2 Millet 
Millet accounted for 5% of the total dietary energy supply (DES) in 2003-05. On 
average in 2004-08, the per capita consumption (as food) of Millet was 15 kg/yr. Sudan 
is self sufficient in millet production. 
3.12.3 Wheat 
Wheat is the second most important staple food in Sudan and it is mostly 
imported. Wheat and wheat products accounted for 15% of the total dietary energy 
supply (DES) in 2003-05. On average in 2004-08, the per capita consumption (as food) 
of wheat and wheat products was 47 kg/yr. The self-sufficiency ratio of wheat and wheat 
products is 28%. 
3.13 Qualitative Data on Iraq 
 
The qualitative data on Iraq is the result of a joint effort undertaken by the US 
Army Tenth Mountain Division and Team Borlaug in the eight provinces of Babil, 
Wasit, Diwaniya, Karbala, Najaf, Maysan, Muthana and Dhi Kar. At the request of the 
US military in Iraq, the Norman Borlaug Institute at Texas A&M University undertook 
assessment, planning and implementation of agricultural development in Iraq. From June 
2008 to September 2009, four multi-disciplinary teams totaling 29 agricultural 
specialists spent 154 person months in 14 Iraqi provinces, excluding Kurdistan. They 
were facilitated by respective multi-national forces. The teams spent about five days per 
week observing farm and agribusiness operations interviewing farmers, community 
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leaders and agribusiness persons and planning and implementing projects. Funded by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) under the direction of the DoD Task Force for Business 
and Stability Operations (TFBSO), the teams were embedded with military units at 
forward operating bases (FOBs). The work was conducted in cooperation with 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and USDA/FAS, and occasionally with 
USAID projects operating in-country.   
3.14 Conclusion 
This is a comprehensive dataset that can support unique analyses of conflict, 
poverty and development assistance that has heretofore not been possible. Chapters IV, 
V and VII use the dataset and test the theories and notions proposed in the document.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
CONFLICT, AID AND POVERTY: CAUSE, EFFECT AND PREDICTION 
4.1 Introduction 
In 2010, President Obama modified the United States approach to international 
diplomacy and development. He officially ended the “War on Terror,” stressing new 
partnerships and multilateral democracy. Nevertheless, the thought underlying US policy 
on conflict, poverty and development assistance remains the same. In his 2010 Hyde 
Park Herald article, the current US President stated, “This lack of empathy isn’t… 
unique to a particular culture, religion, or ethnicity.” It grows “out of a climate of 
poverty and ignorance, helplessness and despair.” In his March 2002 Monterrey speech, 
President Bush had stated, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to 
terror” (Cited in Krueger et al. 2003, p 199). Leading academics, such as Sachs (2005), 
Tyson (2001) and Sokolsky and McMillan (2002), have also advocated poverty 
reduction and socio-economic development in order to reduce violent conflict. 
Millennium Development Goals and new United Nation’s Development programs have 
been designed to eradicate conflict through socio-economic development. The United 
Nations Assembly (2005) asserted, “as conducive to the spread of terrorism, the 
strategy’s plan of action stresses the importance of achieving the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), resolving conflicts and promoting dialogue and tolerance 
between civilizations.” The millennium challenge account takes the same stance on 
international development. However, academics (Krueger 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 
2000, Goodhand 2001 and Piazza 2004) have been critical of the policies that envision 
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poverty and well being as the root cause of violence. The more conventional approach to 
mitigate violence is inspired by Truman’s Point Four Program and President Carter’s 
Camp David accords (Lenczowsk 1990). Both were designed to ensure security and 
stymie conflict. According to these agreements, violence and/or terrorism can be 
mitigated by providing the conflict-prone regions with significant monetary assistance. 
Recently, non-military foreign assistance is disbursed under the mandates and 
presumptions that conflict-prone nations would be able to design counter terrorism 
programs, generate employment, youth education programs and other mechanisms that 
would directly reduce acts of violence. Foreign assistance history indicates that most 
top-aid receiving nations (including Israel and Egypt) are conflict prone. More recently, 
development plans and spending in Iraq and Afghanistan depict a plethora of monetary 
assistance to mitigate terrorism (Moss et al. 2005). The idea appears to be that violent 
conflict may also cause chronic poverty. 
The discussions and propositions of this chapter intend to contribute to the 
existing scholarly work on foreign assistance, conflict and socio-economic development. 
A theoretical model is proposed that would provide an understanding of the actions 
embarked on by the donors and recipients in the aid market under current mandates. 
Following that, an empirical analysis is presented through directed acyclic graphs 
(DAG) that describe the causal relationships between poverty, foreign assistance and 
socio-economic indicators.  
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4.2 Contemporary Thoughts and Research 
 
None of the current academic research demonstrates a direct causal relationship 
between poverty, inequality, foreign aid and conflict. However, among proponents, the 
general consensus appears to be that the relationship between foreign assistance, poverty 
and terrorism is complex, cyclically causal and positively related. A recent study 
(Kibriya, Price et al. 2010) shows that impoverished nations do not garner attention and 
assistance until they experience extreme conflict. The idea of relative poverty and 
inequality causing deprivation comes from Karl Marx or Alexis de Tocqueville. 
Amartya Sen (1997) suggests a causal relationship between inequality and conflict. He 
acknowledges the presence of inequality in a conflict-prone rebel society. However, Sen 
perceives that inequality and rebellion have a dual relationship, both being the cause and 
effect. Political scientist Gurr (1970) claims that conflict brews from the expectations of 
a social group. He (Gurr et al. 2001) claims that collective violence is the result of 
deprivation or at least the feeling of being neglected. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002), 
along with Stewart (2000), discover a positive relationship between the occurrence of 
civil war and income inequality. Both of these researchers study a relatively isolated 
society with no or little international intervention. Additionally, the period investigated 
by Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) lacks robustness, as it does not consist of a long time 
series. Stewart (2000), in her case study of Uganda, illustrates her concept of horizontal 
inequality and social unrest. Neilson et al. (2010) has claimed that foreign aid shocks are 
the causes of violent conflict. They argue that a sudden decrease in foreign assistance 
inadvertently creates a disorder in the balance of power and creates conflict. Neilson et 
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al. (2010) portray a model in which the power of rebel groups increases during aid 
shocks. A case study of Mexico shows (Maystadt 2008) that rebel groups get stronger 
and more boisterous after an increase in aid raises income inequality. As mentioned 
earlier, former President G.W. Bush advocated a more direct relationship between 
poverty and terrorism. In his post 9/11 New York Times op-ed, he asserted that, although 
poverty does not create terrorists, a combination of poverty, oppression and corruption 
leads toward vulnerability to terrorist attacks (cited in Krueger et al. 2003). Azam and 
Delacroix (2006) suggest that political instability and the supply of terrorist events are 
jointly determined. They also claim the existence of omitted variable bias in research 
concerning foreign aid and conflict. From a macro standpoint, several researchers have 
suggested that GDP, national income and/or foreign assistance is negatively correlated 
with terrorist activities (Bloomberg et al. 2004, Li 2005, Crain and Crain 2006, 
Basuuchoudhary et al. 2007). 
 There has been a strong opposition in academia to considering terrorism as the 
root cause of poverty and/or inequality (Kruger et al. 2003, Abadie 2006, Azam 1995, 
Azam et al. 2002, 2004, Rusell et al. 1983). Kruger et al. (2003) examined data from 
events and people from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and discovered no relationship 
between terrorism and poverty. Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) analyzed 
terrorism data from international events and were unable to find any evidence of poverty 
in violence. Evidently, poverty does not even increase the risk of conflict in developing 
economies (Collier et al. 2004). Abadie (2006) suggests not inequality but political 
freedom may be the root cause of terrorism. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) uses forecasting 
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methods to claim that poverty cannot be a predictor for conflict. Rusell (1983) analyzed 
data on terrorists, which demonstrated that they are not uneducated and poor. However, 
recently, Azam et al. (2004, 2003 and 2006) have advocated education or lack thereof as 
a significant variable in the increase of conflict. 
4.3 Foreign Aid and Conflict 
One of the main critiques of the existing research on this issue is that most of the 
studies consider only international terrorism data. One of the critical assumptions of 
these examinations appears to be that foreign aid is only provided to prevent 
international terrorism. However, according to the United Nations, World Bank or even 
USAID, assistance is provided to regions to eradicate poverty and domestic terrorism. 
Recent UN, World Bank and MCA mandates have been quite vocal in advocating 
transparency and accountability for host countries. The World Bank mandate claimed 
“greater national ownership of development programs ...” (World Bank 2001). These 
organizations have allocated more power to the host countries and decided to provide 
additional assistance to countries with good governance. Dollar and Burnside (2001) 
supported this policy, claiming that foreign assistance is successful only in countries 
with good policies. However, still the donors’ interest level in mitigating terrorism 
remains clear (Berthelemy 2006, Berthelemy and Tichit 2004, Fleck and Kilby 2006, 
Frey 2007, Russell et al. 1983). Both of these researchers show that donors are guided by 
self-interest, potential commercial relationships and imports and exports. Recent 
applications by researchers and policy makers have also implied that foreign assistance 
is provided to counter terrorism (Azam et al. 2006).   
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 The rest of this chapter discusses the scope, underlying mechanism of foreign aid 
concerning terrorism and an empirical causal model of conflict. The theoretical model 
explores the market and incentives for foreign assistance in the conflict-laden areas. 
Instead of examining isolated events of (international) terrorist events, violent events 
from all over the world are considered, along with total foreign aid and socio-economic 
indicators.  
4.4 The Model  
 
An interaction between donors and aid-receiving conflict-prone developing 
countries is proposed in the following model. The donor is assumed to be a multilateral 
organization, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank or a bilateral donor 
agency such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The 
aid-receiving country is assumed to be a developing country that has a recent history of 
violence or conflict. Previous theoretical models of conflict (Azam et al. 2003, 2010) 
consider one donor entity and several recipient countries. This model considers a single 
donor and recipient country. Most contemporary models also presume that aid is 
provided to stop terrorist attacks towards the donor countries (entities). This proposition 
assumes that aid is disbursed to the recipient countries to decrease intra-country and 
international violence. It has already been well documented in the literature that civil 
wars and intra-country conflicts instigate crime, diseases, food insecurity, terrorism and 
poverty. More importantly, even intra-country conflict and civil war have spillover 
effects, which hinder the progress of neighboring nations (Collier 2007). Hence, for all 
practical purposes, a donor entity intends to reduce intra-country conflict in order to 
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reduce poverty and ensure prosperity. Further, only by reducing intra-country conflict, 
can donors decrease international terrorism.  
Due to previously discussed mandates, many donor entities let the receivers 
decide and design specific plans for aid execution. Furthermore, new sanctions and 
policies (Paris Declaration of the United Nations) designed by aid entities established 
assistance strategies that provide more responsibility to recipient countries. Hence, to be 
realistic, it is assumed that the recipient nation chooses and designs the programs to 
counter violence and terrorism. The donor entities decide the amount of aid and specify 
the broader purpose, scope and implication of the assistance. Hence, a domestic social 
planner often has the authority to use the contributions of donor entities in various 
economic sectors (including using it for his own welfare) that may not affect violence.  
  The framework is defined using the following specification. Denote V as the 
donor’s welfare function and W is the recipient nation’s welfare function. The donor’s 
welfare function V is defined by the level of violence and (T) is the total amount of aid 
delivered. Because the donor’s goal is to decrease violence, the donor’s welfare V (T) is 
decreasing with respect to violence. The recipient’s welfare function (W) is defined by 
the total amount of aid it obtains and the level of violence and conflict in the country. 
The recipient (government) wants to increase the total amount of aid received; its 
welfare is convex and increasing with respect to obtained aid. The recipient 
(government) also incurs financial, political and social losses due to increased violence 
and terrorism. Hence, the recipient’s (government) welfare decreases with respect to 
violence and terrorism. Assume that the receiver incurs an increasing and convex cost 
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C(T) to reduce violence and terrorism. The donor chooses the amount of aid to be 
disbursed to the recipient country. The recipient chooses the amount of effort to be 
exerted to reduce violence and terrorism. The donor organization chooses the amount of 
aid with the aim of maximizing:  
Donor’s Objective Function:    
Where                                                                                                        (4.1)                                                                    
 
T = T* is chosen by the Receiver  
The recipient (government) chooses the level of effort and program design to counter 
violent activities.                                                                                                 (4.2) 
Recipient’s Objective Function:                                                                                                   
 
 
 
Where A = A* is chosen by the Donor 
The signs of the first four derivatives have been discussed earlier and are fairly 
intuitive. Simply, the recipient’s welfare strictly increases as aid increases, and it 
decreases as terrorism decreases. The third effect suggests that as aid and terrorism 
increase, the welfare for a recipient government also increases. In the previous section, it 
has been shown that an increase in severe violence enhances foreign attention and aid; 
hence, when aid and violence both increase, a recipient’s (government) welfare 
(revenue) will increase. Of course, in Afghanistan or Iraq’s case, extreme circumstances 
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of violence by the recipient country’s government and other associated organizations 
were deemed to be a threat to Western democracies and civilization. The threat 
transpired into foreign military intervention and the incumbent governments were 
overthrown. The model assumption differs from Azam et al.’s (2003, 2010) assumption 
that foreign aid is disbursed to reduce attacks on Western democracies from a conflict-
prone nation. The assumptions of the present propositions are that that foreign aid is 
distributed to reduce a nation’s internal conflict and violence.  
The aid contract and policies are supposed to specify the amount of effort exerted 
by the recipient country. Under current conditions, the recipient (government) has to 
design and delegate specific programs that would reduce the terrorism. Due to its 
ownership and influence in administering assistance money, the recipient government 
may not choose to spend all the money to control violence. The host government or its 
officials may simply choose to keep aid funds in the state treasury and incur benefit from 
the money. Since this assistance is not the tax payers’ money, the host government does 
not have to answer to the citizens. The timeline of the actions of the recipient 
government is rather simple. 1. The donor offers the aid to the recipient country. 2. 
Simultaneously, the recipient government undertakes projects that would eradicate 
conflict; the donor cannot observe all the actions or projects undertaken by the host 
government 3. Due to actions of the donor and receiver, the aid projects are executed. 
The intention of the model is to discover the effects of foreign aid on conflict and 
violence from the perspective of recipient and donor entity. The best response functions 
can be derived from the first order conditions.  
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The first order conditions are: 
For the donor:                                                                                                       (4.3) 
  
This FOC yields T*=T(A*) {Reaction Function}  
For the recipient:  
                                                                                                                              (4.4) 
From the donors first order condition, the recipient’s best response function is 
derived.  
                                                                                             (4.5)  
 
Equation 4.5 implies that the donor provides foreign assistance to reduce 
terrorism and conflict. As terrorism decreases, the donor disburses more aid. The result 
is intuitive and actually supports the policies of wealthy nations and the international 
organizations. As the literature and policy review suggests, policy makers are continuing 
to adopt this strategy more widely and confidently.  
From the recipients first order condition, the donor’s best response function can 
be obtained.  
                                                                                                                               (4.6) 
 
The recipient decreases effort to reduce the cost of controlling terrorism, thereby 
exerting less effort to lessen terrorism to obtain more foreign assistance. Intuition 
suggests that if the recipient (government) does not have any terrorism or conflict in the 
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host country, then it will lose all foreign assistance. This model would have the same 
implications on any other variable, such as poverty or education, if it was considered in 
place of terrorism and conflict.  
The underlying argument of this proposition is that, since the donor(s) want to 
eradicate terrorism and violence, they provide aid to reduce violence to a conflict-prone 
nation (with increasing levels of aid as terrorism decreases). In the absence of the 
donor’s direct supervision and execution by the donor, the recipient country exerts less 
effort to accomplish the perceived objectives. One of the critical yet silent assumptions 
of this model is that the host government is affected by a certain level of incompetency 
or corruption. This assumption is supported by the Freedom House Index database, 
which shows that almost all of the developing (conflict-prone) nations lie in the last tier 
of corruption, democracy, freedom of the press and political stability indices. Moreover, 
through this optimal strategy, the host government will always create a demand for 
foreign assistance in its country. The reaction functions are illustrated in Figure 4.1. In 
the first graph, the reaction functions for both the donor and recipients are drawn.   
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Through these reaction functions, an equilibrium level of assistance is 
determined for the different levels of violent activities. The second graphical illustration 
provides the idea of if and how under the current policy stratagems foreign aid 
influences terrorist activities. The donor reaction function is built on the good intentions 
of providing a host government with appropriate instruments to eradicate violence. The 
recipient reacts to donors’ policies simultaneously and exerts effort for the development 
and reduction of violent activities. The decreases in terrorist events increase the host 
country government’s welfare. However, the actions and policies needed to reduce 
conflict comes with a cost, which decreases the host countries’ welfare. If the associated 
cost is low, the effect will be positive; but on the contrary, if the cost is high, then the 
effect will be negative. Hence, the graphs suggest that under the current policies, the 
effect of foreign aid on terrorism/conflict is ambiguous. The reaction functions are 
illustrated in the figures in the next page: 
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Figure 4.1: The reaction functions show that the effect of terrorism on foreign aid is 
ambiguous. 
 
 
4.5 Causality, Philosophical Discussions and Notions 
Inductive causation and directed acyclic graphs did not come into prominence in 
economic sciences until recently. Bessler et al. have used them for forecasting and 
applied econometric analysis in agriculture. However, inductive causation has not yet 
been used in the political science or development literature. The results of this analytical 
method are shown by directional arrows between variables in a chart and are used to 
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explain the underlying causality among a set of variables. The arrows bear negative or 
positive signs to show whether the effect of a variable is to reduce or increase the value 
of another variable in the direction of the arrow. The directions of causality, the strength 
of the effects and the sign of the effect (positive or negative) are estimated by a system 
of regression equations. The method is called “directed acyclic graphs” (DAGs).  
Directed acyclic graphs are especially useful when there is an endogeneity or 
identity problem among variables. This occurs for example when variables appear to be 
interrelated but an independent variable cannot be identified. In most situations, the main 
research question lies in the interactions and causal flow of the variables, rather than 
identifying an independent variable. For example, modern macroeconomic theory 
suggests that inflation and employment are negatively related. However, existing 
theories do not state the causal structure necessary for policy enactment. If one intends to 
discover the causal relationships between employment, inflation and GNP growth, 
choosing the wrong exogenous variable may lead to a spurious analysis. Moreover, for 
policy enactment and economic development, discovering a causal relationship will be 
more germane rather than explaining inflation through GNP.  
DAGs are beneficial, as they define the notion of causality through manipulation, 
so that if X causes Y, one can change Y by manipulating X. Granger’s (1980) 
“causality” predicts, while DAGs provide causal flows. Moreover, the primary criticism 
of “Granger Causality” remains in its failure to detect latent variables, which can be 
done through a directed graph analysis. The empirical algorithm and explanation of 
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causal flow is derived from the “screening-off” phenomena. Pearl (2000) depicts a more 
rigorous depiction of this concept through d-separation (Pearl, 2000). 
Arrows (X→Y, X is causing Y) are used to specify the causal from the 
variations. A line (X – Y) without an arrow implies that the variables in question are 
connected through information flow, but a specific causal flow cannot be established 
between them. Lines with arrowheads are used to represent such flows; the graph A→B 
indicates that the variable A causes B. A line connecting two variables, say C – D 
indicates that C and D are connected by information flow but we cannot tell if C causes 
D or vice versa.  
A “causal fork” refers to a system where two variables are dictated by the same 
“causal” variable (Pearl 2000). For three variables, foreign aid, GDP and inequality, a 
scenario can be considered where foreign aid is a common cause of GDP and inequality, 
implying GDP←aid→inequality. In this proposition, the unconditional association 
between GDP and inequality will be non-zero, as both GDP and inequality have a 
common cause in aid. The common cause aid is “screening off” the association between 
GDP and inequality. In statistical terms, linear correlation between aid GDP and 
inequality will be non-zero. However, conditioned upon foreign aid, the partial 
correlation of GDP and inequality will be zero.  
The “screening off” condition may also exist for three variables represented 
through a “causal chain.” An empirical causal chain may show that poverty causes 
grievances, which generates conflict; Poverty →Grievance →Conflict. Even though 
poverty is the root cause in this scenario, grievance is acting as a “screen off” variable to 
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disguise poverty’s effect on the “sink,” represented by conflict. In this pseudo-
representation, the linear correlation between poverty and conflict will be non-zero. 
However, if one conditions on the middle variable grievance, partial correlation between 
poverty and aid will be zero.  
An inverted causal fork occurs when two variables affect one particular variable 
(Pearl 2000 and 1995). Let us consider a simulated DAG structure, Conflict →Aid 
←Poverty. Here, aid is a common effect of conflict and poverty. In this example, 
conflict and poverty will have no linear association; however, if we condition upon aid, 
the partial correlation between poverty and conflict, given aid, will be non-zero. Thus, 
aid being an effect, can also “screen-off” associations between its common causes. 
This notion of “screening-off,” associated with common effects, causal chains 
and common causes, has been explored by mathematicians, computer scientists and 
philosophers in modern times. But the empirical theory and proposition needed for 
research in social science has only been developed recently by Pearl and his associates 
(Pearl, Causality, Cambridge UK 2000) and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (Causation, 
Prediction and Search Cambridge, MIT Press 2000) and Bessler and Akleman (AJAE 
1998) have used these theoretical propositions to enrich empirical research methods on 
finance and information economics. The analyses in this dissertation will be the first 
attempt to formally use DAGs in political and development economics. 
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Figure 4.2: Example of a Bayesian Network. 
 
Pearl’s (2000) message passing algorithm is intuitive and straightforward. Figure 
4.2 shows a Bayesian network in which there are four variables, each of which can only 
be assigned two possible values (X Є {x1,x2}). The probabilities of only the first values 
are shown in the figure to avoid clutter. For the above example, since causal information, 
in terms of parents exist for each of the n variables studied above, hence the factorization 
simplifies: 
)|(),...,,(
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j
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=
=
                                           ( 4.7) 
X          P(x)=0.7 
(Poverty) 
Y       P(y1| 
x1)=0.2 
          
P(y1|x2)=0.3 
 (Conflict)        
Z    (Failing 
State)  
P(z1|y1)=0.9 
P(z1|y2)=0.5 
W        P(w1|x1)=0.4 
            P(w1|x2)=0.5 
(Illiteracy)   
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In this example, the notion of conditional independence can also be illustrated. Poverty 
and a failing state are conditionally independent, given conflict. Learning the value of 
poverty does not provide additional information about a failing state once conflict is 
known. Thus, conflict “screens off” poverty from a failing state. Mathematically,  
P(poverty, failing state| conflict ) = 0 but P(poverty, failing state) > 0.  
Suppose that the value of X from Figure 4.2 is known to be x1 and the values of 
the other variables are unknown. The values of W, Y, Z will be discovered through the 
downward transmission of messages. Since the Markov condition requires that each 
variable is independent of its non-decedents, given its parents, information propagates 
down the network in this scenario from the parent to child. The process would provide 
necessary information for the children to update their conditional probabilities. Node X 
provides a message to node W and Y, who update their conditional probabilities. Then 
node Y passes a message to node Z, so that it can update its conditional probability. This 
is illustrated by the following depictions:  
P(w1|x1)=0.4 
 P(y1|x1)=0.2 
 P(z1|x1)=P(z1|y1,x1)P(y1|x1)+P(z1|y2,x1)P(y2|x1)  
 =P(z1|y1)P(y1|x1)+P(z1|y2)P(y2|x2) by the Markov condition  
 =.9(.2)+.5(.8)=.58  
As has been already suggested, there may be a case of latent variables that affect 
poverty and/or conflict. Greed and grievance are theoretically defined as having affected 
poverty and causing conflict (Collier 2000, Keen 1998). However, it may be impossible 
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to come up with an observable perfect proxy for greed or grievance. Two ways of 
countering the problem are proposed. Suppose we have a causal structure like Figure 
4.3. 
  
Figure 4.3:  Unobservable variable greed is causing both poverty and inequality 
due to a backdoor path. 
 
 
Greed is screening off the effect of poverty and inequality towards conflict. 
Hence, if we have a causal structure as in Figure 4.3, it would not be possible to estimate 
the effect of poverty and inequality on conflict.  
  
Greed  
Povert
y
  
Inequality 
  
Conflict  
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Figure 4.4: Introducing an instrumental variable, literacy. 
 
The instrumental variable “literacy” which has no relation with greed, can be 
introduced to address this quandary. Figure 4.4 shows that adding this variable opens up 
a front door path, which will enables examination of the effect of poverty on conflict.  
 In Figure 4.5, it is shown how a proposed model can allow for latent variables. 
Poverty − aid indicates either: 1. poverty causes aid; 2. aid causes poverty or both are 
caused by a latent common cause. The same interpretation applies to the aid and greed 
edge. The aid →conflict indicates either: 1. aid causes conflict or 2. both are caused by a 
latent common cause, but in no case does conflict cause aid. In the FCI algorithm, there 
is room to identify latent variables such as grievances.  
  
Greed  
Poverty
  
Inequality 
  
Conflict  
Literacy  
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Figure 4.5: Causal pattern of conflict through poverty, greed and aid via the FCI 
(Fast Causal Inference) algorithm. 
 
 
4. 6 Variables for Empirical Analysis 
As the theoretical thought and introduction suggest, the most important variables 
in this study are terrorism and non-military financial assistance. The intention is to 
establish causal chains or structure between these variables either directly or through 
other socio-economic indicators. Ideally, poverty would be the first socio-economic 
indicator to consider and linked with violence and foreign assistance. However, data for 
poverty generates inconsistencies and skepticism for the following reasons. The 
worldwide common estimate of poverty of “a dollar a day” is biased. A dollar in rural 
Bihar, India, has much more strength than a dollar in New York City. Since we are 
Poverty  
Aid   
Governance   
Conflict  
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considering a panel data set of all countries around the world, the available datasets 
would not be consistent in the estimates. More inconsistencies with the poverty data 
have been discussed in chapter III. Because of the controversial nature of the poverty 
data and the pertinence of “inequalities” to conflict, “inequality” is deemed to be a better 
measure. Some researchers have already associated economic inequality with conflict 
(Cramer 2003, Sriskandarajah 2003, Korf 2006, Dixon 2009, Ferreira 2005). Infant 
mortality rates are also considered; infant mortality rate represents the number of 
newborns dying under a year of age divided by the number of live births during the year. 
This is reported as the number of live newborns dying under one year of age per 1,000 
live births.  
4.7 Empirical Analysis 
 
The empirical analysis is initiated by considering the basic three variables. In 
Figure 4.6, the relationship between terrorism, inequality and foreign assistance is 
examined. Inequality can also be considered as the proxy variable for greed and 
grievances. Collier et al. (2000, 1998) has already verified that income inequality can be 
considered a proxy variable for grievances. We consider inequality as a proxy for 
deprivation and grievances. By employing a Fast Causal Inference Algorithm (FCI) 
structure, it has been discovered that aid does not have any causal flow towards causing 
or reducing conflict. On the contrary, terrorism and violent events cause the 
disbursement of foreign aid. However, no causal relationship or structure between 
inequality and violence is discovered. 
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Income inequality, however, is a root cause for aid. The FCI algorithm also 
shows the existence of latent variables in the causal structures of inequality, aid and 
terrorism. Inequality may cause higher levels of poverty, corrupt governance, 
grievances, political instability, lack of education in the population, low gross capital 
formulation and stagnant economic prosperity. All these variables may have causal 
relationships with inequality, which also causes foreign assistance. Terrorist activities  
  
Figure 4.6: FCI algorithm portraying the causal structures of terrorism, inequality 
and foreign assistance. 
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can also be related to all these variables. The rule of governance, greed and social peace 
may also be latent variables related to conflict. The Figure 4.6 shows that these latent 
variables, along with terrorism, are the root cause of aid. It has been found that foreign 
aid does not affect inequality nor any of the latent variables associated with inequality. 
 To investigate the relationship further, a Greedy Efficient Search (GES)  
algorithm is employed in Figure 4.7. It has been found that terrorism or violence is 
positively related with foreign assistance. An increase in violent conflict causes foreign 
donors to become more involved in a country’s development. Non-military aid 
expenditure increases due to terrorist events. Income inequality affects foreign assistance 
negatively; when inequality increases, foreign assistance decreases. This discovery 
verifies the donor organization’s mandates of providing foreign assistance to countries 
with good policies. The causal arrow shows that the information flow is towards foreign 
assistance. From Figure 4.7, it can be concluded that countries obtain a minimum 
threshold level of equality to acquire more foreign assistance. From Figure 4.6, it can be 
concluded that countries obtain a minimum threshold level of equality to acquire more 
foreign assistance. However, foreign assistance itself does not help in mitigating unequal 
income distribution.   
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Figure 4.7: GES algorithm depicting the causal structures of terrorism, Inequality 
and foreign assistance. The numbers beside the variables are the associated 
coefficients. The sign and number of the estimated beta is provided in between the 
arrows. 
 
 
 
 Classical economists have claimed that income inequality is beneficial for economic 
prosperity (Kaldor 1955, Keynes 1920, Kuznets 1955). However, neo-classical 
economists have since asserted that in an imperfect credit system, income inequality 
results in under investment, aggregate income and human capital development (Abadie 
and Rodrik 1994, Banerjee 2003, 2006, Banerjee and Newman 1993). Further recent 
research has also claimed that income inequality may also create political instability 
(Galor et al. 2006, 2008, 2009, 2004, Alesina and Weder 2000, Oded and Zeira 1993 and 
1988). Foreign assistance strategist and scholar Easterly (2007) has reaffirmed income 
equality hinders the economic progress and education for the citizens of a society.  
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The above empirical results, along with the conclusions of the other researchers 
cited, suggest that the current foreign aid policies and implementation systems are fragile 
and counterintuitive. Developing nations with higher inequality consistently show 
slower economic growth and prosperity. Intuitively, regions with higher inequality need 
more attention from development agencies. However, due to mandates by agencies and 
developed countries, nations with higher inequalities are deemed unfit to receive aid. 
Discovery regarding greed and deprivation (inequality) is rather alarming, because it 
appears that donors are avoiding the regions that have more deprived people. The 
possible argument behind this attitude may be that donors do not desire to provide their 
money in areas where the assistance has less probability of reaching the poor. 
Unfortunately, foreign assistance as it is implemented now, does not have any 
causal affect on inequality as well. Unlike, some other researchers (Azam et al. 2003, 
Lischer 2003) the DAGs here do not show any direct causal relationship that can suggest 
foreign aid can increase terrorist events. On the contrary, the results support the 
theoretical model that the effect on foreign assistance in reducing terrorist activity is 
ambiguous. 
 To explore more of this issue, the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) is 
added to the equation and the results are illustrated in Figure 4.8. GDP growth is 
considered instead of absolute GDP, because the intention is to learn whether a region’s 
growth is effected by the aforementioned variables. The discovery here agrees with 
Kuznet’s (1955) findings, that economic growth causes income disparity. And, income 
disparity causes a lower amount of foreign assistance for the developing nations. 
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 Figure 4.8: GES algorithm depicting the causal structures of terrorism, inequality, 
foreign assistance and GDP growth. 
 
 
It appears that foreign aid is provided to countries with lower economic growth 
albeit without the intentions of the donors. However, aid does not appear to have any 
causal relationship with increasing a country’s GDP growth. Easterly (2007) showed that 
even for a prosperous and generous aid-receiving country, such as South Korea, aid had 
a negative relationship with GDP growth. This prognosis does not entirely support 
Easterly’s findings; however, his statement that aid does not assist in a nation’s 
economic growth is not rejected.  
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Terrorism and violence is a stand alone variable that raises the amount of foreign 
assistance but has no causal relationship with GDP growth and/or inequality. This 
discovery also supports other researchers (Abadie 2004, Mesquita 2005, Krueger 2003, 
Piazza 2004) that poverty is not a root cause of terrorism.  
 To further investigate the relationship between poverty (measure of well being), 
aid and terrorist events, variables such as life expectancy, infant mortality and rate of 
immunization are introduced into the existing model. Reducing infant mortality is one of 
the cardinal strategies in millennium development goals. Child mortality has been 
generally agreed upon as a suitable proxy variable for poverty. Many social science 
researchers have already used and verified infant mortality as a genuine proxy for 
poverty (Center for International Earth Science Information Network 2005, Pridemore 
2007). Life expectancy is also used in various Human Development Indices that 
measures well-being, and it is also considered to be a proxy for poverty. Childhood 
immunizations can reveal economic and social knowledge as well as government 
initiative in rural areas. It can also assist in understanding the education levels of the 
underprivileged. Education (knowledge) has already been claimed to be one of the key 
variables affecting terrorism (Krueger 2003; Azam et al. 2005). In Figure 4.9, the DAG 
representation of these six variables is shown using a GES algorithm. 
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Figure 4.9: GES algorithm showing the causal structures of terrorism, inequality, 
foreign assistance, infant mortality, life expectancy and children immunization 
rates. 
 
 
The results depict an inverted causal fork, where life expectancy (well being) and 
immunization are the root causes of infant mortality. These two variables represent 
government initiative and access to medication and knowledge. Also, an increase in life 
expectancy in households increases the availability of family members’ time and 
experience to be applied to infant care. A decrease in life expectancy and immunization 
rates increases infant mortality. Terrorism has a negative influence on immunization 
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rates, implying that an increase in terrorist activities would result in the reduction of 
knowledge and government initiatives and a reduction in citizens’ access to government 
health facilities. However, immunization is acting as a sink and is screening off its 
association with infant mortality. Terrorist activities appear to be a root cause of poverty 
and suffering of the underprivileged. Since the associated sign with infant mortality is 
negative, we can conclude that terrorism increases poverty (infant mortality). However, 
we do not discover any relationship that suggests poverty, government initiatives, 
inequality or any socio-economic indicator influences terrorist activities. Hence, the 
results refute the proposition that a lack of knowledge, poverty and government initiative 
causes terrorism. Income inequality is again found to be related to foreign assistance. 
These findings partially support the Collier et al. (1998, 2000) Bigombe 2000 
hypotheses that grievances do not increase or affect the probability of conflict. 
According to these results, disparity in earnings, which can cause grievances and 
deprivation, is not the root cause of violent terrorist activities. 
4.8 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Researchers and policy makers are divided in their opinion about the causes and 
effects of violence and terrorism, foreign aid and well being. The assumptions of the 
theoretical model of this chapter are based on the mandates and policies of the donor 
countries. The general model shows that, due to mandates and certain perception, the 
effect of foreign assistance on terrorism would be ambiguous. The theoretical 
propositions do not impugn the intentions of the donor countries and agencies, which is 
to provide assistance to decrease both in-country and international violence and terrorist 
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activities. However, due to the disbursement mechanisms and host-country conditions, 
aid results in a decrease in effort by recipient countries to reduce violence and terrorism. 
The empirical models support this finding and provide other valuable insights. Terrorism 
and violence negatively affect the measures of living standards and well being; however, 
no causal relationship is established between income inequality and terrorism. 
Furthermore, financial assistance increases the levels of terrorism, but a rise in violent 
activities does not reduce assistance from donor entities. It is concluded that foreign 
assistance policies need to re-evaluated. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CAN WORLD PEACE BE BUILT ON EMPTY STOMACHS? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
During the last 10 years, the total amount of funds (both defense and 
development) spent in Afghanistan was 1300 billion USD (OECD 2010 and Belasco 
2006). The total amount of agricultural funding allocated in this period in Afghanistan 
was 1.2 billion USD. It is apparent that the donor countries stratagem of promoting 
peace in Afghanistan does not include rapid agricultural reform and prosperity. Foreign 
assistance and spending policies have been criticized by many development economists, 
such as Easterly (2004, 2007), Moyo (2009), Azam (2004, 2006), Svensson (2000) and 
Sachs (2006). While the jury is still out on the efficiencies of foreign assistance and 
intervention as a whole, criticism and advocacy for the all the major types of assistance 
have been an ongoing debate, too. Defense spending and assistance for governance lead 
the way in financial contributions towards the developing world. Analysis performed in 
this chapter show that heath care, education and agricultural development are relatively 
underfunded. It appears that the trend in the aid world is to reduce aid in these sectors 
and increase aid in other sectors, such as government administration and economic 
development. Agricultural and food security assistance comprises less than 2% of the 
total aid allocated to developing countries. This is an extremely low amount, considering 
that most of the developing countries have agrarian economies with a high proportion of 
hungry citizens. Data collected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the 
Uppsala University database demonstrate that conflict has risen about 20% in the last 
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year. The number of hungry people in the world has also reached a historic high at 1.02 
billion people, a 100 million increase from 2009 (FAO 2010). Hence, it can be safely 
concluded that at least some components of foreign assistance are not accomplishing 
their intended objectives.  
Most scholars and policy analysts agree that foreign intervention, both military 
and civilian, is provided to accomplish five main objectives: eradicating poverty and 
enhancing livelihoods of the impoverished, developing countries so that they can 
achieve equal terms of trade, creating a political hegemony, maintaining a sound 
diplomatic relationship and ensuring international peace and harmony. The last two 
objectives are directly related to the mitigation of conflict and violence. Officially, the 
practice of foreign development commenced with the Marshall Plan. The quintessential 
idea of the plan was to rescue several European countries from the influence and 
hegemony of Communism, as well as ensuring no major war/conflict scenarios in 
Europe. At the present time, diplomatic and political scenarios have become far more 
complex, yet one of the central ideas remains keeping the developing nations out of 
conflict.  
A comparative quantitative analysis comprising all economic sectors and their 
effects on conflict could provide an understanding of the efficiencies of assistance given 
to each different sector. The intention of this chapter is to contribute to the foreign and 
policy reform debates and assert the need for agricultural assistance in conflict-prone 
nations. Three primary hypotheses are explored in this chapter. First, official 
development assistance is much less than spending through the armed forces. Second, 
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assistance for agricultural development and food security has been grossly underfunded. 
Third, the successful implementation and allocation of agriculture and food security 
assistance can reduce conflict. 
5.2 Review of Sectoral Aid 
Morgenthau (1962) was one of the first Western philosophers to evaluate foreign 
assistance and intervention after the Marshall Plan. He was apprehensive about foreign 
assistance and its repercussions. Morgenthau claims there are six types of foreign aid: 
Humanitarian assistance, subsistence aid, military aid, bribery costs, prestige aid and aid 
for economic development. He claims only humanitarian assistance, such as medical and 
agricultural aid, may benefit host countries. He also cautions policy makers about 
spending too many resources on government administration and civil society 
enhancement in an effort to promote Western political values in developing countries. 
Some recent politicians, lawmakers and development specialists have emphasized the 
need for good governance and civil society for rebuilding in conflict-prone nations. 
Collier (2007) claimed more attention should be devoted to building good governance in 
smaller, fragile nations. Burnside and Dollar (2000) discovered that aid is only 
successful in countries with good policies and governance. Most of the responses to 
rebuilt conflict zones have been to invest in defense expenditures and governance. Even 
scholars, such as Collier (2007), have argued that military intervention may be necessary 
to countries that are conflict-prone and have very weak governance. A good governing 
body can assist in building a better society. Since benign military intervention is directly 
associated with governance, aid for government administration has been increasing. 
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Support from scholars has also been a deciding factor in strengthening the increases in 
aid given for government administration and civil society. 
Azam et al. (2003, 2010, 2007) has been very persuasive in advocating for 
increased foreign aid for education. They have conjectured that an increase in foreign aid 
would decrease terrorist attacks. However, they have also professed that military 
intervention would not decrease the threat of terrorist. Following Morgenthau, they also 
imply that aid for government administrations to adopt a Western philosophy of politics 
may not be very beneficial in blunting threats from radical and impoverished societies. 
Sachs (2005), along with the MDGs (millennium development goals), has emphasized 
aid for basic health care. Foreign aid for economic socio-development has also been 
promoted by policy makers and scholars, alike. Kanbur (2007) and Easterly (2007) have 
stressed that it is imperative that the impoverished countries of Africa attain sustainable 
economic development and debt relief.  
Compared to the sectors mentioned above, agricultural development and food 
security have been under harsher scrutiny (Feyzioglu 1998). Both disbursement and 
implementation processes have been severely criticized. Food security aid has been 
labeled as “dumping” by several scholars, and has furthermore been deemed 
unnecessary. Additionally, scholars, such as Moyo (2009), criticize aid for agriculture 
and food security. She, like other philosophers, claim that the benevolent act of 
distributing food in developing nations from the developed ones can have detrimental 
effects. Moyo proposes several reforms in food aid and country purchase programs. In 
the last few years, several failures in agricultural aid have been documented in relevant 
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literature. Keen (1994) projects the political and bureaucratic inefficiencies of food 
security aid and relief in Sudan. While Keen’s work illustrates the incapability of the 
food aid process, he also describes the devastating famine in Southern Sudan due to 
conflict and political instabilities. Waal (1989, 1994) and Stewart (1993) also criticized 
the methods of food and agricultural assistance, claiming that they may prolong conflict 
and increase inequality. Barrett (2001) claims that food aid and security (monetization) 
programs are not beneficial to enhancing the food safety and security of an impoverished 
region.  
  The criticism of food and agricultural aid in a conflict-prone impoverished region 
is counterintuitive. The denunciation is chiefly directed towards the implementation 
process, rather than to food and agricultural policies (Soysa et al. 1999). The support and 
evidence for agricultural development and food security has also been documented. 
Soysa et al. (1999) claim that agricultural development is the most important facet for 
development, as it reduces poverty and mitigates violence. According to their research, 
poor agricultural conditions hinder socio-economic progression and sustainable peace. 
Agricultural development can impart peace, especially in those societies suffering severe 
food shortages and those that are vulnerable to conflict (Messer et al. 1998). Keen 
(1994) also accepts the idea that agricultural aid can successfully mitigate hunger, 
thereby mitigating conflict. 
5.3 Data Sources and Variables 
 
The primary variables of interest in this chapter are intra- and inter-country 
conflict and violence. Data on international conflict from 1947-2007 is available through 
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the Uppsala University database. This data is labeled as international conflict, because in 
each of the violent events, at least two parties are involved. The data was coded, 
considering the intensity of the conflicts. A higher fatality rate was assigned a larger 
score. The intra-country violence data was collected and coded from the University of 
Maryland, Global Terrorism Database. They report incidents of assassination, hostage-
taking, armed and unarmed assault, bombing, explosion, attack on infrastructure and 
hijacking in all countries from 1970 to 2007. The total number of incidents every year in 
each country was recorded in the sorted data set. Sectoral aid data for agricultural 
development, civil society, government administration, food aid and food security 
programs, economic development and planning, basic health care and educational 
development and infrastructure building was collected from the OECD database. 
Unfortunately, the aggregate sectoral aid data at the country level is available only from 
2002. Yearly data for each aid receiving country was recorded. The aggregate foreign 
assistance data that reflects the combination of loans, grants, foreign direct investment 
and assistance were collected from 1960 through the OECD database. The poverty data 
was generated through World Bank’s “povcal” software created by Chen and Ravallion. 
The income inequality data consists of a merger of datasets provided by the United 
Nations and the World Bank. Infant mortality rates are a merger of databases from the 
World Bank, the United Nations and the World Health Organization. Data on gross 
capital formulation, immunization rates and life expectancy was collected from the 
World Bank’s development indicators database. 
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5.4 Data Analysis 
 
The analysis is initiated with the help of graphical illustrations and discussions 
on disbursed sectoral foreign aid. Figure 5.1 depicts the total foreign assistance 
disbursed for economic infrastructure, government and civil society, education, health, 
agricultural forestry and fishing and food aid and security from 1971 to 2001. Economic 
infrastructure and development have been consistently allocated the highest amount of 
money. Starting in 1987, the amount of assistance for agriculture, forestry and fishing 
has declined rapidly, even though most of the nations receiving aid have agrarian 
economies. 
  
 
  
Figure 5.1: Time trends of total assistance from all donors disbursed by sector, 
1970-2009. Source: World Bank, OECD. 
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Ever since aid for rural development decreased (from the late 1980s through the 
early 1990s) both international- and intra-country conflict have markedly increased. 
Judging by the large investment in aid for government administration shown in Figure 
5.1 above, it appears that aid for government administration is deemed an important way 
to eradicate violence and conflict and enhance the socio-economic status of the 
impoverished in the underdeveloped world. Funds for government administration and 
civil society have been increasing since 1999. This shift can largely be attributed to the 
realization by policy makers that foreign aid can only be beneficial for countries with 
good governance. Hence, foreign aid allocators decided to spend significant amounts of 
funds to create good governance in conflict-prone nations.  
Scholars (Azam et al. 2004, 2003) have also argued that assistance for education 
would essentially convey the knowledge of the futilities of war, violence and conflict. 
Increased aid for education can also lead to better livelihoods of the poor. In accordance 
with those recommendations, aid for education has also significantly increased over 
time. Aid for health care has been neglected compared to the other sectors, though it has 
gradually increased since the turn of the millennium. Millennium development goals 
have strongly supported health care assistance. Economic infrastructure and services 
have obtained the greatest share of assistance. Middle and upper income countries with 
“good governance,” such as Brazil and the Philippines, receive most of their assistance 
in the form of economic infrastructure and services. Aid for food security and food 
safety historically has been the most neglected and the lowest form of aid. 
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Country-wise data for foreign assistance allocated has only been available since 
the year 2002. USA’s Department of Defense (DOD) expenses in conflict-prone 
Afghanistan is shown in Figure 5.2. This figure shows that the USDOD alone spends 
several hundred–fold, far more than the total money spent by all donors for development 
assistance for Afghanistan. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
report from 2001 to 2011, the DOD has allocated $336 billion for Afghanistan (Belasco 
2011). It is estimated that for the last ten years, the DOD alone has spent more than $92 
million a day in Afghanistan. Yet, the average volume of international aid provided by 
all donors since 2001 was calculated to be only $7.9 million per day. 
  
 
 
 Figure 5.2: Time trend graph of foreign assistance and DOD spending in 
Afghanistan. Source: World Bank, OECD DOD. 
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Waldman (2008) reports that DOD spending comprises only one-third of the total 
military expense on Afghanistan. Although US President Barack Obama declared in 
2010 the “War on Terror is over,” Figure 5.2 shows that until 2009, USDOD spending 
was increasing exponentially; whereas, official development assistance (ODA) was 
increasing rather slowly and monotonically. Aid to all non-military sectors is 
insignificant compared to the expenditure of USDOD spending. In 2008, the DOD stated 
“shaping the civil situation” is equally significant to their mission as is “winning battles” 
on foreign soil (US Military Manual 2008, cited from the International Herald Tribune). 
Recent efforts by the USDOD for development in Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan imply 
this philosophy. In each of these missions, scientists, social workers and medical doctors 
have worked with the Armed Forces. The percentage of US foreign assistance disbursed 
by the Pentagon increased from 6% in 2002 to 22% in 2005 (Center for Global 
Development 2008). The USDOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations 
(TFBSO) has been created to “reduce violence, enhance stability, and restore economic 
normalcy” in conflict-prone areas with the assistance of military aid. The necessity of 
enhancing non-military assistance appears to be universally agreed upon.  
Figure 5.3 reveals that the total ODA is less than 10% of the financial 
commitments of the DOD to Afghanistan. Contrary to the general belief that aid 
provided to Afghanistan is adequate compared to other conflict-laden, impoverished 
entities, Waldman (2008) reports that since 2001, Afghanistan received $57 per capita 
aid, while Bosnia and East Timor, after their intervention, received $679 and $233 per 
capita, respectively. The OECD data shows that since 1999, Afghanistan has received 
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per capita aid of $92, whereas conflict-laden Serbia and Bosnia received per capita aid of 
$323 and $313, respectively. Even strategically located non-conflict prone nations, such 
as Chile and Turkey, received per capita aid of $204 and $124, respectively, over the 
same period.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Percentage of DOD and ODA spending for development assistance in 
Afghanistan from 2001 to 2007. Source: World Bank, OECD, DOD.  
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Figure 5.4: Sectoral aid trends in Afghanistan from 2002-2007. Source: World 
Bank, OECD DOD. 
 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the trend of sectoral aid in Afghanistan from 2002 to 
2007. Aid for government and civil society administration has consistently been 
increasing and receives far more attention than any other sector. Since governance and 
civil society have been identified as very weak in Afghanistan, donors are inclined to 
invest more funds to strengthen civil society. In a comprehensive report, Oxfam 
International policy advisor Waldman (2008) claimed that Afghanistan is underfunded 
by international agencies and governments. He also claims that neither is the allocated 
aid to Afghanistan achieving its perceived goals. Weak governance, inadequate 
government human capacity, lack of infrastructure and widespread corruption in 
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Afghanistan have been argued to be the prime reasons for this inadequacy (Waltman 
2008). 
  
 
Figure 5.5: Aid to Afghanistan by sector, 2002-2009. Source: World Bank, OECD. 
 
Both economic infrastructure and government administration aid have received 
extra attention, while all other major sectors of aid were relatively neglected. Food aid 
and food security assistance have been marginal and decreasing. After a sustained period 
of non-investment in agriculture and hunger in Afghanistan, agricultural aid has recently 
increased. According to the World Food Program, 85% of the total household income in 
Afghanistan was spent on food (reported by Chelala 2008). In 2008, the Afghan Ministry 
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of Health also issued an official warning that more the 1.6 million children under the age 
of five and thousands of women could die in 2009 as a result of the lack of food and 
medical care (Chelala 2008). Even after this expressed apprehension, predicated 
calamities, assistance for health care, food security and agriculture have not increased 
nearly as much as assistance for government or civil affairs. Aid for education has been 
neglected as well.  
  Figure 5.5 shows that the total aid for health care, agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
food safety and security comprises only about 10% of the total money allocated for 
Afghanistan, while government and civil affairs aid and aid for economic infrastructure 
have been allocated 40% of total funds. A similar analysis of Iraq provides a more 
extreme picture. According to the Congressional Research Services (CRS), the total 
funds that have been allocated for Iraq from the DOD (United States) have exceeded 
$800 billion (reported from Belasco 2011). Belasco also reports that DOD funding has 
also been used to build infrastructure, stability operations, business development and 
governance. In Figure 5.6, it is shown that DOD funding has declined in recent times, 
but so has the total development assistance provided to Iraq. Non-military sectoral aid 
levels are seen to be miniscule compared to funds allocated by the DOD for military and 
non-military assistance. While much interest is expressed in Iraq by the foreign 
assistance community, Iraq’s per capita Official Development Assistance of $159 (since 
1999) is less than other developing nations in either conflict or non-conflict zones. The 
OECD and World Bank databases show that Slovenia, Uruguay and Azerbaijan received 
$198, $192 and $164, respectively, per capita aid every year since 1999. All of these 
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nations are less conflict-prone than Iraq and are advantageously located for donors. It is 
further learned that from 1999, Iraq’s per capita aid ranks 47th among all developing 
economies. As might be expected, small islands and nations with very low populations 
show higher per capita aid than larger countries. Even after considering economies with 
more than 2 million populations, Iraq ranked 12th. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Time trend graph comparing aid and defense spending in Iraq since 
2002. Source: World Bank, OECD DOD. 
 
After 2008, DOD spending has decreased quite significantly. Also, the total aid 
provided to Iraq has decreased significantly. Figure 5.7 shows the trends of disbursed 
 
141 
 
 
 
ODA in most important sectors in Iraq. The total money allocated for government 
administration and civil society, along with economic infrastructure, has led the foreign 
assistance category since the multi-national force entered. After 2005, both of these 
sectors received less aid, but still with government adminstration, they have allocated 
over $1 billion in 2009. Apart from these two sectors, the others have been relatively 
neglected. Compared to the huge amount of funds invested by the DOD and other 
agencies, aid for agriculture and food security is quite low. A United Nations report 
published in 2005 claimed that malnutrition among children had doubled to 8% since the 
US lead invasion (Reported by BBC 2005). In their reports and statements, the World 
Food Program (WFP) constantly asked for funding, stating that Iraq had a “dismal 
shortage” of food, with over three million starving people. A published WFP food 
security survey claimed that over 27% of all children are chronically malnourished, even 
after receiving food through the government’s Public Distribution System (UN Food 
Programme Report, 2005). 
  
 
142 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.7: Sectorial aid trends in Iraq from 2002. Source: World Bank, OECD. 
 
  
Calum Gardner, the WFP country director in Iraq stated, “The hungry in Iraq 
should be at the top of donors’ lists; instead, they seem to be at the bottom” (Source: UN 
report 2005). Figure 5.8 shows that from 2002, food security and agricultural 
development did not receive even 1% of the cumulative non-military aid disbursed in 
Iraq. Trend-wise, health care and education aid in Iraq has also been decreasing. 
Although receiving more than agriculture, these sectors are only allocated 2% and 1%, 
respectively, of the total ODA.  
 
143 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Foreign assistance by sector in Iraq since 2002. Source: World Bank,  
OECD. 
 
5.5 Regression Analysis 
The analysis in chapter IV showed that, in aggregate, foreign assistance cannot 
be shown to reduce conflict. Using the more limited dataset for aid by sector from 2002 
to 2007 across all developing countries, combined with conflict and violence data, a 
better understanding of development assistance is possible. In an analysis, international 
conflict and intra-country violence are treated as the dependent variables. Conflict is     
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Table 5.1: Pooled Least Square Estimation of Conflict on Foreign Assistance. The 
Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 10% Level; Single Asterisks Imply 
Significance at the 5% Level.  
 
Dependent Variable: CONFLICT 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Cross sections  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
 All other 
assistance 
1.17E-10* 7.01E-11 1.665921 0.0965 
EDUCATION -0.003278 0.005789 -0.566179 0.5716 
HEALTH 0.005916* 0.003058 1.934592 0.0537 
ECONOMICS 0.009141** 0.004162 2.196443 0.0286 
GOVERNMENT -0.000870 0.000720 -1.208109 0.2277 
CIVIL -0.003811 0.003559 -1.070701 0.2849 
AGRICULTURE -0.027403** 0.009292 -2.949020 0.0034 
FOOD 0.004522 0.002524 1.791461 0.0740 
Constant 0.188906 0.062651 3.015217 0.0027 
R-squared 0.164920  Mean 
dependent var 
0.324455  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.148384  S.D. 
dependent var 
0.676447  
Log likelihood -386.8616  Hannan-
Quinn criter. 
1.951683  
F-statistic 9.973246  Durbin-
Watson stat 
0.688826  
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measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the lowest in terms of death and catastrophe 
and 7 being the highest. The conflict events  were coded from 1960. The violence data 
comprises the number of events in a country over the period of a year. The independent 
variables consist of aid for Government Administration, Civil Society Strengthening, 
Basic Health Care, Agricultural Development, Food Security/Safety, Education Policy, 
and Economic Development, along with an aggregate estimate for assistance in all other 
sectors. Table 5.1 shows the effects of foreign assistance to different sectors on conflict, 
using an unbalanced pooled of the least square analysis cross-section with no affects.  
Controlling for all other types of major assistance, agricultural development has a 
statistically significant negative relationship with international conflict at a 1% 
significance level. It is concluded that agricultural assistance successfully mitigates 
international conflict. Aid for all other sectors, basic health care and economic 
development is positively related to international conflict. The results suggest that 
underlying implementation and disbursement policies for those two sectors needs a 
thorough re-evaluation. Government administration and civil society strengthening have 
a negative relationship with international conflict, though they are not statistically 
significant. Aid for Education has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on 
international conflict. Food security and all other kinds of foreign assistance have a 
positive, yet insignificant effect, on international conflict. The Durban Watson statistic 
of .688 associated with Table 5.1 shows the absence of auto-correlation. 
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Table 5.2: GLS Estimation of Conflict on Foreign Assistance. The Double Asterisk 
Implies Significance at the 10% Level; Single Asterisks Imply Significance at the 
5% Level.  
 
Dependent Variable: CONFLICT 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 0.258971 0.063571 4.073723 0.0001 
All other 
Assistance 
4.18E-11 4.95E-11 0.844540 0.3989 
EDUCATION 0.000406 0.004247 0.095637 0.9239 
HEALTH 0.005492** 0.002244 2.447349 0.0148 
ECONOMICS 0.002888 0.002459 1.174614 0.2408 
GOVERNMENT 0.000174 0.000519 0.334931 0.7379 
CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
-0.005544** 0.003187 -1.739373 0.0827 
AGRICULTURE -0.012774** 0.006165 -2.072031 0.0389 
FOOD 0.004407** 0.001957 2.251643 0.0249 
Weighted Statistics  
R-squared 0.081938  Mean 
dependent var 
0.126952  
F-statistic 4.507207  Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.343781  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000029    
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.133261  Mean 
dependent var 
0.324455  
Sum squared 
resid 
163.4002  Durbin-Watson 
stat 
0.590530  
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To verify and validate the results, Table 5.2 presents an examination of cross-
sectional data with random effects. Random effect GLS estimation is useful for checking 
the robustness of the findings. The primary hypothesis and result still holds, as it has 
been discovered that agricultural aid has a significant negative effect on conflict. Aid for 
civil society is again found to be significant and negative at the 10% level, showing that 
conflict-prone nations indeed need to have a good civil infrastructure. Aid for basic 
health care is again deemed to be inadequate and ill planned. The associated signs with 
government administration aid changes to positive, however, it still remains 
insignificant. 
The intention of this research is to examine the effects of the different types of 
foreign assistance on international conflict. Hence, it can be argued that to capture the 
real outcome, one might study the lagged values of foreign assistance in different 
sectors. For example, lagged values of agricultural aid may reflect the real change 
caused by undertaking agricultural development projects. Table 5.3 provides the results, 
considering the one-year lagged values of foreign assistance. Though some of the 
coefficient and significance levels changes, the basic prognosis remains the same. 
Controlling for all other types of assistance, agricultural aid is significant and negatively 
related to international conflict. Assistance for strengthening civil society does not show 
significant negative results. Aid for government administration, though, shows a 
significantly negative relationship to international conflict. Through these analyses, it is 
concluded that agricultural aid is the only type of foreign assistance that mitigates 
conflict consistently. 
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Table 5.3: Pooled Least Square Estimation of Conflict on Lagged Foreign 
Assistance. The Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 10% Level; Single 
Asterisks Imply Significance at the 5% Level.  
 
Dependent Variable: CONFLICT 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1961 2007 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
OTHER 
ASSISTANCE(-1) 
1.85E-10 5.72E-11 3.229926 0.0013 
EDUCATION(-1) -0.006245 0.005599 -1.115433 0.2653 
HEALTH(-1) 0.005216* 0.003060 1.704221 0.0891 
ECONOMICS(-1) 0.009344** 0.003174 2.943798 0.0034 
GOVERNMENT(-1) -0.001479** 0.000622 -2.378195 0.0179 
CIVIL SOCIETY(-1) -0.001142 0.003492 -0.327100 0.7438 
AGRICULTURE(-1) -0.015024** 0.007352 -2.043641 0.0416 
FOOD (-1) 0.006472** 0.001872 3.456624 0.0006 
R-squared 0.094660 Mean dependent 
var 
0.330049  
Adjusted R-squared 0.078737 S.D. dependent 
var 
0.677274  
Log likelihood -397.1912 Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
2.027260  
Durbin-Watson stat 0.658282     
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Table 5.4: Pooled Least Square Estimation of Inter-Country Violence on Foreign 
Assistance. The Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 10% Level; Single 
Asterisks Imply Significance at the 5% Level.  
 
Dependent Variable: VIOLENCE 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Cross sections  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EDUCATION 0.410613 1.291211 0.318006 0.7509 
HEALTH 2.311572** 0.563244 4.104031 0.0001 
ECONOMICS -0.028829 0.390711 -0.073787 0.9413 
GOVERNMENT 0.302965 ** 0.035768 8.470338 0.0000 
CIVIL -0.524036 0.708909 -0.739215 0.4608 
AGRICULTURE -0.414234 1.210481 -0.342206 0.7326 
FOOD -0.572391* 0.317181 -1.804620 0.0729 
R-squared 0.521898  Mean 
dependent var 
38.01124  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.502211  S.D. dependent 
var 
116.2906  
S.E. of 
regression 
82.04785  Akaike info 
criterion 
11.69638  
Sum squared 
resid 
1144414.  Schwarz 
criterion 
11.83939  
Log likelihood -1032.978  Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
11.75438  
F-statistic 26.51035  Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.480624  
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The effects of foreign aid on intra-country violence are commenced with a panel 
data pooled least square analysis. The results of Table 5.4 show that direct food security 
and safety assistance is statistically significant negative effect on inter country violence. 
Government administration and health care is again found to be positive and 
significantly related with violence at a 1% level, implying that aid for basic health and 
government administration needs substantial revision. Though not statistically 
significant, aid for agricultural development is again found to have a negative effect on 
the eradication of violence. The data was examined for auto-correlation, and as the 
Durban-Watson statistic implies, that quandary can be ignored. 
To examine the robustness of the results, a random effect GLS estimate is 
employed in Table 5.5. The GLS estimate also supports the primary result that aid food 
security decreases country violence. The secondary results of futile government 
administration and basic health care aid also hold. 
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Table 5.5: GLS Estimation of Inter-Country Violence on Foreign Assistance. The 
Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 10% Level; Single Asterisks Imply 
Significance at the 5% Level. 
 
Dependent Variable: VIOLENCE 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 0.410613 1.291211 0.318006 0.7509 
All other 
Assistance 
2.311572** 0.563244 4.104031 0.0001 
EDUCATION -0.028829 0.390711 -0.073787 0.9413 
HEALTH 0.302965** 0.035768 8.470338 0.0000 
ECONOMICS -0.524036 0.708909 -0.739215 0.4608 
GOVERNMENT -0.414234 1.210481 -0.342206 0.7326 
CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
-0.572391* 0.317181 -1.804620 0.0729 
AGRICULTURE 14.05083 10.85064 1.294931 0.1971 
FOOD 0.410613 1.291211 0.318006 0.7509 
Weighted Statistics  
R-squared 0.521898  Mean 
dependent var 
38.01124  
F-statistic 26.51035  Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.480624  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000029    
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.521898  Mean 
dependent var 
38.01124  
Sum squared 
resid 
1144414. Durban-Watson 1.480624  
 
 
 
152 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Pooled Least Square Estimation of Inter-Country Violence on Lagged 
Foreign Assistance. The Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 10% Level; 
Single Asterisks Imply Significance at the 5% Level.   
 
Dependent Variable: VIOLENCE 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1961 2007 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
OTHER 
ASSISTANCE(-1) 
1.94E-08* 8.42E-09 2.306003 0.0226 
EDUCATION(-1) 3.243406 1.156014 2.805681 0.0057 
HEALTH(-1) 2.477059** 0.427092 5.799821 0.0000 
ECONOMICS(-1) -0.350384 0.391008 -0.896105 0.3718 
GOVERNMENT(-
1) 
0.178469** 0.087177 2.047194 0.0425 
CIVIL 
SOCIETY(-1) 
-0.753560* 0.405607 -1.857859 0.0653 
AGRICULTURE(-
1) 
-1.084772 0.970047 -1.118267 0.2654 
FOOD (-1) -0.552574* 0.281951 -1.959819 0.0520 
R-squared 0.721089 Mean dependent 
var 
41.26712  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.706941 S.D. dependent 
var 
122.7054  
Log likelihood -815.6812 Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
11.34973  
Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.421621     
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As in international conflict, the futility of government administration and basic 
health care aid may be attributed to lag time effects. Aid policies may take time to show 
their desired result. Hence, in Table 5.6, lagged values that study the effects of the 
different types of assistance intra-country violence are considered. Food security 
assistance is again revealed to be statistically significant and positive in reducing 
violence at a 5% level. Aid for civil society is also found to be significant and has a 
negative effect on violence. Aid for government administration and assistance for 
combined smaller sectors is shown to have a significant yet positive effect on intra-
country violence. Aid for civil society is also deemed to be significant and positive at 
decreasing violence at a10% significance level. The Durban Watson statistic in this 
instance is 1.4, which is satisfactory.  
It would be useful to examine the relationships between poverty and foreign 
assistance for agriculture and food security. However, as revealed in chapter III, the data 
provided on poverty by the World Bank is inconsistent and biased. Hence, a suitable 
proxy variable would be needed to estimate the effects of foreign assistance on poverty. 
In Table 5.7, the relationship between poverty and infant mortality, accounting for gross 
capital formulation, income inequality, life expectancy and immunization rates, is 
projected. It has been discovered that infant mortality is highly statistically significant 
with poverty over time, making infant mortality an appropriate proxy for poverty. A 
pooled, unbalanced analysis on infant mortality from 1960 to 2007 for 89 countries 
estimates its relationship with different sectors of aid. Table 5.8 results show that only 
agricultural development is statistically and economically significant in reducing infant 
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mortality. Aid for education, civil society and government administration has a negative 
yet insignificant relationship with infant mortality. It has also been observed that total 
aid, grant, loan and foreign direct investment in all other sectors increases infant 
mortality. 
 
Table 5.7: Pooled Least Square Estimation of Poverty on Mortality and Other 
Development Indicators. The Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 1% Level; 
Single Asterisks Imply Significance at the 5% Level.  
 
Dependent Variable: POVERTY 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1961 2007 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
MORTALITY 0.324478** 0.027524 11.78872 0.0000 
GROSS CAP 
FORM 
0.544561 0.175597 3.101199 0.0023 
INEQUALITY 0.129400 0.117862 1.097895 0.2741 
LIFE EXP -0.425940 0.139419 -3.055106 0.0027 
IMMUNIZATION 0.125102 0.086794 1.441370 0.1516 
MORTALITY 0.324478** 0.027524 11.78872 0.0000 
GROSS CAP 
FORM 
0.544561 0.175597 3.101199 0.0023 
INEQUALITY 0.129400 0.117862 1.097895 0.2741 
R-squared 0.556155    
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Table 5.8: Pooled Least Square Estimation of Mortality on Foreign Assistance. The 
Double Asterisk Implies Significance at the 1% Level; Single Asterisks Imply 
Significance at the 5% Level.  
 
 
Dependent Variable: MORTALITY  
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1961 2007 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
LOG( ALL 
OTHER 
ASSISTANCE) 
4.280785* 0.341781 12.52494 0.0000 
EDUCATION 
POLICY 
-0.170179 0.621642 -0.273758 0.7846 
CIVIL SOCIETY -0.784915 0.490321 -1.600819 0.1111 
AGR 
DEVELOPMENT 
-1.883157** 1.118306 -1.683937 0.0939 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMIN 
-0.066760* 0.036271 -1.840604 0.0673 
HEALTH CARE 0.765565 0.316863 2.416075 0.0167 
ECONOMICS 
DEVELOPMET 
0.382490 0.356675 1.072377 0.2849 
FOOD 
SECURITY  
0.423411 0.230568 1.836386 0.0679 
R-squared 0.53854    
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
It is not suggested that aid for basic health care, education or economic 
development increases conflict and violence. Rather, the results may be showing that aid 
for these areas is not properly directed and executed. For example, if aid to these sectors 
largely benefits the group of more urban and affluent members of society, welfare 
disparities increase, possibly creating conditions conducive to violence. Since the overall 
grants, loans, aid and investments provided to non-agricultural sectors in impoverished 
conflict-prone nations appears not to serve the purpose of lessening violence, the focus 
of the aid policy and distribution mechanism needs re-evaluation. Severe conflict-prone 
nations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly need more aid. In order to reduce conflict, 
more resources need to be allocated to agricultural development and food security in 
conflict-prone poor countries. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE COST OF CONFLICT 
 
“Sudan remains one of the World Food Programme’s (WFP) most complex operations, 
and large-scale humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas will continue to be 
needed in 2011. While some progress has been made in the overall security and 
stability situation since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
2005, the widespread destruction and population displacement caused by decades of 
war, further exacerbated by recent poor harvests, high food prices and ongoing 
conflict, leave much of Sudan engulfed in a humanitarian crisis” – World Food 
Program 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have established the need for agricultural development and 
food aid in conflict prone nations. The empirical estimations of the directed acyclic graphs 
also provided that conflict is a standalone variable to be judged and treated separately from 
other socio-economic indicators. Hence, policies ought to be proposed to integrate food 
security and conflict mitigation together. These policies have to be region and commodity 
specific, as the needs of societies differ from one another. Considering the previous 
discoveries and current conditions, a model of “cost of conflict” and appropriate food aid 
disbursement policy is proposed in this chapter. 
According to an estimate by FAO/WFP, 0.9 million people are currently severely 
food insecure and 2.4 million are moderately food insecure in Sudan (United Nations 
Mission). Southern Sudan faces threats to food security due to (1) historical and ongoing 
conflict, (2) extremely low level of basic infrastructure, (3) internally displaced 
populations and d) extreme environmental conditions (WFP country profile: Sudan). The 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the 21-year north-south civil war in 
Sudan is going to put further pressure on existing limited resources. Under these 
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circumstances, humanitarian organizations, such as WFP, intend to provide commodity 
markets for poor farmers, many of whom are returning refugees from war, to build their 
livelihoods and achieve food security. The primary goal in Sudan and Southern Sudan is 
to ensure food security and help mitigate the inter-country violence.  
WFP support plans include food for education (school feeding and take-home 
rations), food for work and food for recovery programs, work with communities to carry 
out much-needed infrastructure projects, such as feeder roads, dams, schools, health 
clinics, wells and water collection ponds, training programs and support for vocational 
training for adults. In order to successfully implement these support programs, WFP 
needs to procure a significant quantity of staple food crops. Typically, food may be 
procured either locally or it can be imported from other countries that have surplus. 
Commodities for food aid may be procured from different sources. US food aid depends 
on commodity procurement in the US and a powerful political coalition of US farm 
groups, shippers and relief agencies that support in-kind food aid donation (Haggblade 
and Tschirley 2007). Alternatively, local and regional procurement of food aid in Africa 
has attracted growing interest for several reasons. 1) it is expected to be less costly; 2) it 
can be delivered much faster and 3) it can help keep markets strong for local farmers 
when external food aid is tribute. WFP’s Financial Rule state, “When conditions are 
equal, preference will be given to purchasing from developing countries”(World Food 
Program, 2010). 
In 2009, under LRP initiative, WFP bought almost US$1 billion worth of food 
commodities, 82% of which was purchased from developing countries. Total purchases 
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in 2010 were 3.2 million metric tons, costing US$1.25 billion (World Food Program 
2010). WFP’s experience suggests that LRP may lead to significant savings in terms of 
both commodity costs and delivery times. For instance, on average, maize procured in 
Africa costs 30% to 50% less than white maize imported from the US and arrives one to 
two months faster than imports from the US (Haggblade and Tschirley 2007).  
 The procurement rule of WFP is guided by the “Principle of cost efficiency and 
minimum cost,” whereby food is procured locally if local prices are less than Import 
Parity Price (IPP), (Purchase For Progress 2010). When LRP meets the cost efficiency 
principle, it makes economic sense to procure food locally. On the other hand, if it is 
more costly to procure locally, then donor organizations like WFP face a moral 
dilemma: Should they meet the planned development objectives by importing from 
abroad at an IPP lower than the regional price? Or, should they continue procuring 
locally even at a price higher than IPP? If the latter route is followed, it is hard to justify 
in economic terms if one is looking only at price differentials. Although local 
procurement may involve higher costs in the short run, one might argue that the long-
term benefits of doing so could be substantial. This is particularly true for a region like 
Sudan, where the long-term building of markets is a prerequisite for farmers. Stable 
demand for crops from an entrusted organization like WFP could provide incentives for 
the agents (citizens) to come back to farming. When they know that there is going to be 
a secure market outlet for their produce, LRP can provide motivation to return to 
agricultural production. This strategy, if appropriately implemented, would make 
farming more lucrative than engaging in violent activities for the rebellion groups. The 
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main contribution is twofold: 1) it develops a stylized model of food aid and security 
programs in conflict-laden Sudan and 2) In accordance with the Sudanese socio-political 
situation, the model helps optimize strategies for eradication of conflict. 
6.2 Purchases for Progress 
Purchase for Progress (P4P) is an integral part of WFP’s local and regional 
procurement program. P4P enables WFP to experiment with new mechanisms to 
purchase food locally. Through this program, WFP has realized a cost savings of 
US$22.6 million with respect to import parity price (IPP), (World Food Program 2011). 
The objective is to leverage WFP’s demand for food commodities to develop market 
opportunities for smallholder, low-income farmers. The underlying idea behind the P4P 
initiative is as follows: A secure market would encourage smallholder farmers to 
increase and improve the quality of production, resulting in higher incomes (WFP: 
Purchase for Progress). In order to implement P4P, different approaches are being 
piloted and tested, depending on the local conditions in each country. 
 In the case of Southern Sudan, the goal of P4P is to strengthen the (re)emergence 
of farmers’ organizations after the prolonged civil war. The idea is that once the farmer 
organizations (FO’s) are able to access a stable market, they will encourage agricultural 
production by their members, thereby revitalizing local markets and contributing to the 
region’s economic integration and stabilization (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan). 
Committed demand from WFP is assumed to encourage production and it is envisioned 
that over time, they should be able to participate in competitive tendering on commercial 
markets (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan). 
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In 2010, P4P started working with farmers’ organizations in Central and Western 
Equatoria (known as the Greenbelt), in the semi-tropical zone of the southwestern part of 
the country. Through P4P, WFP intends to buy sorghum and maize from participating 
households. Contracts have been signed with 4100 farmers to procure 1500 metric tons 
of food over two years (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan). The primary goal is to 
provide new and stable market opportunities to the targeted population. This project 
gives an incentive to farmers and other stakeholders to increase production by offering a 
market outlet.  
6.3 Problem with LRP/P4P   
Local and regional procurement of food aid commodities is not a panacea. WFP 
has, in fact, encountered problems in identifying reliable suppliers of food aid 
commodities, limited infrastructure causing delay in delivery, etc. (WFP, 2007). Also, 
the basic premise of LRP is that food would be sourced locally when it is cheaper than 
sending in-kind food aid from outside countries. The cost efficiency principle may not 
be met in a post-conflict country like Sudan, where prices are likely to be higher than 
IPP. 
There are other significant barriers to the viability of LRP. Conflict is one such 
important obstacle. The problems with implementation of the P4P program in Sudan are 
also scrutinized in this chapter. While organizations like WFP are willing to invest in 
development programs, such as the P4P, they are also constrained by uncertainties 
emanating from country-specific idiosyncrasies. In particular, at the planning stage, there 
is too much uncertainty regarding the price that must be paid to farmers to produce the 
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food crop, the cost of production in the region, the infrastructural problems and so on. 
One way to manage this uncertainty is to resort to contract mechanisms, whereby a 
certain amount of a crop is purchased at a guaranteed price. 
Unfortunately, limited productivity and high production and marketing costs 
render local commodities uncompetitive in Southern Sudan compared to imported 
staples (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan). Low productivity in Southern Sudan 
may be attributed to supply side impediments like absence of transport infrastructure or 
access to proper inputs. Most of the smallholders do not have access to markets. Lack of 
proper extension services, quality seeds, agrochemicals and knowledge of the best 
agronomic practices also leads to low productivity in this region. Prices in the domestic 
market are also high, because historically, it has remained a conflict-prone region. The 
prolonged civil war has damaged market networks, logistics infrastructure and trade in 
general (The HGB Foundation). Following the referendum in January 2011, while 
Southern Sudan is now moving towards independence, nearly two decades of conflict 
have adversely affected the infrastructure and economic foundations of the country. The 
production of food has been hampered by fighting and displacement, as well as by 
unpredictable rainfall in recent years (World Food Program Country Profile: Sudan). In 
fact, the Emergency Food Security Assessment Report (2010) suggests that in South 
Kordofan, the probabilities of high food prices and conflict are both high (characterized 
by maximum of 5). Not only are these shocks recurrent, they are expected to occur 
throughout the year, with a high scale of severity (Emergency Food Security Assessment 
Report 2010). 
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The above discussion on the economic situation of Sudan highlights the severity 
of the problem of conflict, the interplay between conflict and high food prices and the 
resultant problem faced by organizations like WFP while designing assistance programs. 
With this background, research questions are formulated as follows. 
6.4 Problem Statement 
It is difficult to estimate the cost of conflict and hence it remains a challenging 
research topic for economists, public and donor organizations like WFP. Microeconomic 
case studies are likely to be more useful than the popularly used macroeconomic studies 
for the following reasons. Existing work tends to express the economic consequences of 
conflict in terms of its effect on GDP in a conflict-affected country. While 
macroeconomic studies do provide valuable insights on the aggregate effect of conflicts 
in a country, these studies tend to mask the effects on particular segments of the society. 
In particular, a macroeconomic study cannot provide answers to practical questions, such 
as: what is the monetary cost of reducing conflict in a particular region and what would 
be the cost of bringing the conflicting agents back to a peacetime equilibrium? The goal 
of this research is to propose a methodology to estimate the cost of conflict using a 
microeconomic setting. This approach would be particularly useful for organizations 
willing to invest in a country and asking the question, “How much extra money do we 
need to pay in order to reduce conflict in this region by increasing food security?” The 
constraints include the amount of financial resources and the best possible alternatives 
available to donor organizations. Macroeconomic studies, by design, cannot answer this 
practical question.  
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6.5 Literature Review 
Existing studies, such as Collier (1994), Staines (2004) and Ra and Singh (2005), 
tend to express the economic consequences of conflict as a proportion of GDP. There 
have been some recent studies on the effectiveness of local and regional procurement 
programs (for instance, Clay and Riley (2005), Mwanaumo et al. (2005) and Haagblade 
(2006)). While Clay and Riley (2005) describe the cost-effectiveness of LRP, they do 
not address the risks associated with LRP. Some researchers criticize the LRP and claim 
that it may have an adverse impact on prices in local markets. LRP can potentially 
increase the demand for food and drive up food prices for consumers. There have been 
instances in Uganda and Ethiopia where LRP led to increased prices of staple foods. 
However, reports such as Mwanaumo et al. (2005) suggest that any food aid operation 
entails risk. In-kind food aid may reduce production and trade incentives in receiving 
countries. It could also induce dependency on outside countries, which could have 
negative long-term implications. Elaborate food aid programs may also hinder the 
progress of small local farmers and create obstacles for new domestic markets.  
Mwanaumo et al. (2005) mention the possibility that (a) LRP may push local 
prices above import parity prices and/or historical prices, (b) suppliers may default on 
tenders and (c) locally or regionally procured food may fail to meet minimum safety 
standards. WFP tries to manage contract default and food safety risks though pre-
qualification of traders and by using contract conditions that penalize traders for default 
(Mwanaumo et al. 2005). 
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Chalmers (2006) found that targeted programs of conflict prevention are 
significantly cheaper than the cure; it is easier and more cost-effective to prevent 
conflicts before an outbreak of violence. He points out that conflict prevention involves 
upfront spending commitments by different organizations. It would be highly useful 
therefore to estimate the cost of reducing conflict. This chapter proposes a method to 
estimate the cost of preventing conflict.  
There are challenges with LRP/P4P at the implementation stage. One such 
problem is setting commodity prices to be offered to smallholders at planting time under 
forward contracts, then paying them at the time of procurement following harvest. To 
WFP, the challenge of forward contracting is to offer and pay a fair price without 
distorting or disrupting markets. Other implementation challenges are to prevent contract 
defaults and ensure that quality standards are met. Two related issues explored in this 
study are what price should be paid to the suppliers, and how should contracts be 
designed so that defaults by agents are avoided. By answering these two questions, a 
method to estimate the cost of reducing conflict is also developed.  
6.6 Model Development 
WFP/P4Ps aim is to maximize the net benefit from procurement through 
LRP/P4P by minimizing the cost of the program. P4P is an integral part of WFP’s local 
and regional procurement program (WFP: Purchase for Progress). Under the P4P 
program, WFP is testing several novel ways to procure staple food crops locally and 
promote marketing opportunities for low-income smallholder farmers. Food may be 
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purchased using any of the following methods. The first alternative is a competitive 
process, whereby suppliers compete to sell WFP a commodity.  
The second approach is direct contracting, under which at the time of harvest, 
WFP negotiates a contract to buy a commodity directly from farmers’ organizations. The 
price is pegged to the prevailing wholesale market price for high quality crops. With 
direct contracting, a competitive tender with a minimum of three bidders is not required. 
Using a warehouse receipt system, smallholder farmers deposit crops that meet pre-
determined quality criteria in a certified warehouse. In return, they are issued a receipt 
for about 60% of the market value of the commodities. The receipt can be exchanged for 
cash at a local financial institution. The final balance is paid once the commodities are 
sold. 
The third approach is forward contracting, under which WFP agrees to purchase 
a specified quantity and quality of commodity from the farmers’ organization at some 
time in the future at a minimum guaranteed price. In the case of forward contracts, the 
suppliers receive an agreed price or a price set according to a specified pricing formula 
(WFP: Purchase for Progress). Forward contracts are also being used to build up local 
food processing capacity. For instance, fortified blended flours, biscuits and vegetable 
oils are being produced using forward contracts. This is achieved by linking smallholder 
farmers directly to processing facilities so that they can supply the staple commodities 
required as raw materials. In view of recent developments and policies in Sudan, forward 
contracting appears to be the most pertinent.  
The sequence of actions between the players is as follows: 
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1. WFP offers a contract to a Farmer Organization (FO) to deliver a specified 
quantity and quality of a commodity at some time in the future at a minimum 
guaranteed price.  
2. Contracts are signed between the P4P and FO. 
3. After signing the contract, a certain segment of the agents decide not to switch to 
farming. They continue engaging in conflict. The remaining segment of agents 
switch from conflict to farming to participate in the P4P program.  
4. If an agent decides to switch from conflict to farming, s/he incurs a switching 
cost, exerts effort and invests in assets to produce the crop for WFP. 
5. After yield is realized, the principal buys the crop from the FO at the guaranteed 
contract price.  
Suppose the economy comprises n agents, who are possibly engaged in some form of 
conflict. The P4P program aims to reduce conflict and ensure food security in the region. 
The goal can be accomplished in various ways. One way is to bring the conflicting 
agents into mainstream activities, including agricultural production. The idea is to create 
a stable and sufficient demand for the crop produced by the agents, so that they would 
find it optimal to return to the mainstream activities and relinquish engagement in 
conflict.  
In order to provide a demand for the produce, P4P prepares contracts for the 
agents such that q units of output will be purchased from them at a guaranteed price of p 
dollars per unit of production. Let the marginal cost of production to be c dollars. Thus, 
the profit of a typical agent signing the contract is given by: 
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( )qcp −=π           (6.1) 
The Participation Constraint or Individual Rationality Constraint (IRC) for each agent is: 
us +≥π           (6.2) 
Inequality (2) tells us the price that should be paid to a typical agent so that s/he 
relinquishes conflict and accepts the P4P contract. If the agent accepts and signs the P4P 
contract, the benefit would be the profits earned through selling crops. The cost of 
signing the contract involves two distinct components. The value s represents the cost 
incurred by an agent in order to switch from conflict to farming, as it is assumed that the 
agents are paid a monetary amount to be employed in conflict. The other component of 
cost, u, can be interpreted as the cost of leaving the group of people who are currently 
engaged in conflict. It may be the case that agents joined in conflict have bonded closely. 
Leaving the “peer group” to join the P4P program would be costly for the agent. The 
peer group may exert a severe penalty on the agent who intends to leave the group and 
join the P4P program. This penalty can significantly deter the agents from signing the 
contract, thereby leading to a failure of the envisaged program. Thus, the participation 
constraint implies that P4P program must ensure that the benefit from switching to 
farming activities must exceed the cost of switching plus the utility from alternative 
“employment,” which, in this case, is conflict.  
We assume that the switching cost s varies randomly across agents and is 
uniformly distributed over [ ]max,0 s . This captures the intrinsic heterogeneity among the 
agents in terms of their ability to switch from conflict to alternative employment, viz. 
farming. Agents with switching cost *],0[ ss∈ would switch to farming. Equivalently, 
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agents whose switching costs are too high, i.e. ]*,( maxsss∈ , would not switch. From (2) 
we compute the threshold required for an agent to switch: 
us −= π*           (6.3)
 The probability that an agent will give up conflict and sign the P4P contract is 
derived as follows: 
( ) ( )
max
*
0
*
)(*PrPr
s
s
dssfssobswitchwillagentob
s
==≤= ∫     (6.4) 
Equivalently, the probability that an agent will continue to be engaged in conflict can be 
computed as: 
( ) ( )
max
*
1*)(Pr1*PrPr
s
s
ssobssobswitchnotwillagentob −=≤−=≥=   (6.5) 
Thus, the expected number of agents who would switch to farming under P4P program 
is: 
( )
max
*
Pr
s
s
nswitchwillagentobn ⋅=×       (6.6) 
The expected number of agents who would not switch to farming and continue with 
conflict is: 
( ) 





−⋅=×
max
*
1Pr
s
s
nswitchnotwillagentobn      (6.7) 
6.7 Definition: Counterfactual Supply 
The term counterfactual can be defined as the supply of crop under the P4P 
program as the quantity that could have been produced locally if there was reduced 
conflict. The peacetime or counterfactual supply may be derived as: 
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q
s
s
nQ tualcounterfac ⋅⋅=
max
*
        (6.8) 
The principal (in this case, the WFP) wants to procure tualcounterfacQ through the P4P 
contract mechanism. From each of the participating agents, the principal would collect 
contracted quantity q and pay the contract price p. Let the value of each unit of procured 
crop be v (>p). Typically, WFP purchases quantities of staple crops to distribute through 
food assistance programs. It is assumed that the parameter v represents the value of crop 
used in the humanitarian programs. Thus the objective function of the principal is: 
( ) q
s
s
npvQpv
mac
tualcounterfac ⋅⋅⋅−=×−
*
)(       (6.9) 
Equation 9 represents the net benefit of crops procured from the agents who sign the 
contract and participate in the P4P program. Maximizing the above expression subject to 
the IRC of the agents (2) yields the optimal contract price: 
q
ucv
p
22
* +
+
=          (6.10) 
Comparative static results with respect to the exogenous parameters yield valuable 
insights for the principal (P4P Organizers). 
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      (6.11) 
The first of the derivatives implies that if the value of the procured crop increases, then 
the principal would want to pay a higher equilibrium price to the farmers. This could be 
the case, for example, if the desired form of assistance is a school lunch program. It is 
often argued by the farmers that their cost of production is too high, which is expected in 
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a region with a history of conflict. Hence, almost intuitively, the second derivative 
shows that, if the cost of production increases, so will the equilibrium contract price. 
Otherwise, the agents would not find it optimal to switch to farming if they are not paid 
sufficiently to cover for their costs.  
Similarly, the third derivative means that, if the benefit from engaging in conflict 
is high, then in order to induce the agents to give up conflict, the principal would have to 
pay a higher price to reduce conflict. As u increases, the optimum price would have to 
increase as well. Finally, the last of the derivatives shows that if the principal is willing 
to purchase a higher quantity of crops, then the equilibrium contract price would be set 
at a lower level. The farmers would be able to sell a larger crop and the income from 
selling that crop should be sufficient to meet their participation constraint specified in 
(2). Moreover, as P4P devotes more money in the program, the quantity of the crops will 
increase, which in turn would lower the equilibrium price of the produce. In this highly 
stylized set up, the local procurement cost under the P4P scheme to be borne by the 
principal is: 
( ) qsFnpQp tualcounterfac ⋅⋅⋅=× ***        (6.12) 
As an alternative to local procurement, the same amount of crop could have been 
imported at the Import Parity Price, or IPP (pW ). In that case, the cost of procurement 
through imports would be:  
( ) qsFnpQp WtualcounterfacW ⋅⋅⋅=× *         (6.13) 
Thus, the difference in procurement costs under the two alternatives is P*-Pw 
( ) qsFnpp W ⋅⋅⋅−=∆ *)(*         (6.14) 
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If the equilibrium contract price p* exceeds the Import Parity Price PW, then the 
difference would be positive. Evidently, the principal must incur an extra bill of 
$ ( )Wpp −*  per unit of crop procured from the farmers. Thus, the farmers must be paid 
prices high enough so that farming becomes attractive compared to alternative activities, 
such as engaging in conflict. ∆ may consequently be regarded as a “cost of conflict.” It 
captures the extra monetary cost that the principal must be willing to pay in order to 
implement the P4P program in a conflict region.  
We note that the equilibrium income of each of the participating farmers is:  
( ) q
q
ucv
qcp ⋅





+
−
=⋅−=
22
**π        (6.15) 
Consequently, the threshold switching cost is computed as:  
22
)*(*
u
q
cv
uqcps −⋅
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
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
 −=−⋅−=        (6.16) 
Since by assumption, ],0[~ maxsUs , the parameters must satisfy the following 
inequality: 
q
u
vc
q
us
v −≤≤
+
− max
2
        (6.17) 
Equivalently, it can be rearranged as:  
( ) ( ) qcvusqcv ⋅−≤≤−⋅− max2        (6.18) 
Inequality (17) implies that for the implementation of the P4P program, the production 
cost of the agents must be bounded. In other words, for the P4P program to be 
successful, the cost of production of the domestic producers must not be too high. It also 
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shows that the total value of the program ought to be higher than the total intrinsic utility 
of joining in conflict. Hence, initially, WFP has to devote at least a certain amount of 
financial resources towards the P4P program. This result leads to supply side policy 
implications. While WFP provides a sufficient demand for the crop and is willing to pay 
a guaranteed price to the farmers, there should be supply side interventions as well. 
Typically, costs of production are too high in regions with a history of conflict. 
Appropriate measures, like subsidies, building infrastructure should be taken in order to 
reduce the cost of production. Additionally, to build up the local markets, the WFP 
should also invest in education and technology transfer.  
Inequality (18) implies that the outside option of the agent must also be bounded. 
If not, the envisaged P4P program might fail to induce a large number of agents to 
switch to farming. Thus, if the agents obtain too high a benefit from engaging in conflict, 
it is likely that the IRC (2) would be violated, consequently, they would refrain from 
joining the P4P program.  
6.8 Discussion 
The situation in Sudan described in the introduction of this paper suggests that, at the 
planning stage, there can be much uncertainty in implementing a program like P4P. The 
method outlined in this paper can, however, be used to estimate the cost of implementing 
the program, especially in conflict-prone areas. The principal or donor organization 
needs to obtain the pieces of information on n (targeted population), c (cost of 
production), p W (Import Parity Price) and p* (optimal contract price) in order to get an 
estimate of the cost of conflict. However, the stylized model provides a switching cost, 
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possible profits, and above all, the possible cost of conflict. The cost of conflict is 
expressed through price disparities, intrinsic utility of joining agents engaged in 
violence, the number of agents and distribution of the utility functions. Even qualitative 
and market study data from Sudan can provide information on the feasibilities of the P4P 
project. The model also shows that it is imperative for WFP to invest in education, 
technology and other strategies that would increase production. An expression of 
switching costs was also computed, which expresses the cost as value, cost and utility. 
The comparative static results provide insights that should be the basis for strategies of 
the P4P programs.  
6.9 Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Assessing the relative effectiveness of the three alternative mechanisms (viz. forward 
contracts, direct contracts and competitive tender) is a natural extension of this chapter. 
Also, it was assumed in the model that the cost of production is same for all the agents. 
In reality, this may or may not be true. Future research may be directed to examine the 
effect of agents with different efficiency levels. Also, a significant problem with the P4P 
program is the default of farmers on contracts. Weak legal systems could limit WFP’s 
ability to enforce contracts and impose penalties. Often it has been found that after 
signing the contract, the farmers are unable to meet contractual terms regarding quantity 
and/or quality. Thus, the vendor may deliver only part of the contracted amount to WFP 
(partial default) or not deliver at all (total default). Even though agents are paid only 
according to what is actually delivered, contract defaults are a concern for WFP (2011). 
In the case of default, WFP has to replace the defaulted quantity with alternative 
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commodities to avoid pipeline breaks for the beneficiaries of food assistance programs. 
Thus, contract defaults can lead to higher transaction costs. In fact, out of the 150,000 
metric tons of food contracted since September 2008, about 14% was defaulted and 28% 
was delivered with delay (Purchase for Progress Update February 2011). The February 
2011 update suggests that reasons for defaults tend to be similar across countries. 
Defaults can be generally attributed either to WFP’s own internal business processes that 
need to be smallholder friendly, or to the P4P vendors’ own weaknesses (weak 
bulking/aggregation capacity; financial weakness; lack of key post-harvest handling 
infrastructure and storage; weak governance structures or trust issues). It was found that 
the two factors often reinforce each other. There could be several reasons behind the 
default. Two of them are price fluctuations over the contract lifetime and quality 
shortfall issues. In fact, a significant problem that has been a concern for donor 
organizations is side-selling. Under this circumstance, after signing the contract, some of 
the agents may decide to sell the produce to local traders instead of WFP. This may 
happen and has often been the case when local prices exceed the agreed contract price. 
Some farmers may decide to default on the contract and sell their crop to the local 
organization at a higher price. This moral hazard problem can dampen the investment 
initiative of donor organizations and may be a serious impediment to the success of the 
P4P program. The effect of asymmetric information due to moral hazard is an interesting 
case and remains a future research area. 
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CHAPTER VII 
  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMODITY PRICES AND VIOLENCE: A 
BAYESIAN BOOTSTRAP METHOD OF POLICY ANALYSIS  
 
7.1 Introduction  
  Recently, the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry of Southern Sudan stated that 
1.3 million Sudanese people will have an insufficient food supply this year. Due to this 
food shortage, inflation increased to 57.1% in August 2011 (Sudan Tribune, September 
2011). During the last two years, the prices of staple cereals have nearly doubled.8 The 
World Food Program echoed the concerns of the ministry as it suspected severe food 
shortages in both Southern and Northern Sudan (WFP report 2011). According to both 
of these organizations, rising cereal prices and violent activities are two cardinal reasons 
for the scarcity of food in Sudan. The underlying assumption being that conflict is 
directly related with commodity prices. This chapter proposes to shed light on this 
conjecture through a probabilistic causality approach. It contributes to the existing body 
of literature in three fundamental ways: 1. Explores the direct causal relationship of 
commodity prices and violence in Sudan through Markov Chains. 2. Accounts for prior 
knowledge in policy enactments and discovers the implications of food prices on conflict 
through inductive causation. 3. Proposes agricultural development policies for conflict 
prone Sudan.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Source: Sudan Ministry of Agriculture.  
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7.2 Methods 
Inductive causation and Bayesian search models have been more commonly used 
in biostatistical research (Friedman 2004, Dhar et al. 2004, Joshua et al. 2011). Recently, 
philosophers and computer scientists (Sprites et al. 2000, Pearl 2000) have been utilizing 
these concepts of causality using probability distributions employing directed acyclic 
graphs (DAG). In economic sciences, specifically with price discovery models, Bessler 
et al. (2002) have used DAG models to discover price information of Millet in Mali. The 
purpose of this analysis is to take the price discovery approach further to find causal 
relationships between commodity prices and violent activities.  
 A Bayesian network, is a joint distribution over a set X = {X1 ……Xn} of 
random variables and represented as a product of conditional probabilities. Such a 
network associates each variable Xi with a conditional probability P(Xi|Ei). Here, E is 
assigned as the set of variables that are the parents of Xi. The causal implication being 
the parents would directly influence the choice of the value for Xi. The graphical 
representation of this notion will be provided by the aforementioned directed acyclic 
graphs (DAG), where edges are directed from parents to children. The DAG method is 
essentially a product decomposition system that ensures a coherent probability 
distribution9. The conditional independence in product form would be:  
 P ( X1 ……Xn) = Πi P( Xi|Ei)                                                                                (7.1) 
The intention is to discover the causal interactions of commodity prices and 
conflict. Hence, an appropriate method would emphasize the importance of 
                                                 
99 A rigorous discussion concerning directed acyclic graphs can be found in chapter 3. 
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understanding the process that generated the data as opposed to considering the joint 
distributions of the price and conflict mechanism. A probabilistic graphical method is 
appropriate because it will provide pictorial illustrations of parents (causes) and children 
(effects) of violence and prices. 
However, for the second part of the research, one of the underlying assumptions 
of the DAG model would be relaxed, due to policy restrictions. The restriction is based 
on a “prior knowledge” recognition that aid bureaucrats only react to a conflict scenario 
after the outbreak (increase) of terrorist/violent events10. In relevant economic literature, 
Bessler et al. (1988, 1986) used Bayesian priors in “real world settings” with time series 
models. This scenario is more pragmatic and parsimonious, as the restriction entails 
conflict as being the “cause.” 
Due to the relative smaller size of the data set, the causal results may lack 
confidence. Additionally, the underlying notion of such an approach is that the variables 
would have a joint normal distribution. However, in the “real world scenario,” rejecting 
a true hypothesis can be far more detrimental. During times of severe conflict and 
instability, immediate enactment of policies is needed. The objective in this situation is 
to recommend a cereal that probabilistically affects or causes violence the most. A 
bootstrapped Bayesian validation can provide the results with robustness. Efron (1979) 
discussed the bootstrap technique to generate sampling distribution of statistics. The 
central idea case resampling is that the distribution of the replicates around the observed 
data is a valid approximation of the distribution of observed data sets on the true, 
                                                 
10 Chapters 2,4 and 6 provide more justification on this postulation. 
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unknown process that generates the data sets. In the policy analysis section, each data set 
is pseudo replicated 100 times. The same causal inference method is used for each of the 
replicated sets to discover the causal patterns between commodity prices and violence.  
7.3 Data 
The monthly data for violence on Sudan has been coded from the Worldwide 
Incident Tracking System database (WTS). The monthly data has been organized by 
aggregating the total fatalities every month for 88 months. The commodity price data for 
this study was originally collected from the Sudanese Ministry of Agriculture (SMA) 
and verified by the World Food program (WFP) database. The commodity prices consist 
of monthly average prices from 2006 to 2010. The three most important commodities for 
Sudan were selected, they are: millet, sorghum and wheat. Sudan has the potential of 
being self-sufficient in sorghum and millet production. Sorghum is the staple food cereal 
of Sudan. According to SMA and WFP, Sorghum (Feterita) provides 26% of the total 
dietary energy supply (DES) for the Sudanese population. It is estimated that the per 
capita human consumption of sorghum (Feterita) is about 88 kg/yr. Millet is the second 
most grown cereal in Sudan. It accounts for 5% of the total dietary needs of the 
Sudanese population, as the average per capita human millet consumption is estimated at 
15 kg/year. While it is not self-sufficient in production, wheat is actually the second 
highest consumed cereal of Sudan. Sudan produces only 28% of its total need of wheat. 
The total average consumption per capita of wheat in Sudan is 47 kg/yr. 11 
  
                                                 
11 Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan. 
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7.4 Analysis and Results 
The analysis commences with a Greedy Efficient Search (GES) algorithm 
consisting of the commodity prices and fatalities. Figure 7.1 shows the results of the 
GES algorithm in DAG format. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that 
violence and change in commodity prices occur simultaneously. The figure illustrates 
that information originates from millet prices and affects terrorist activities as well as 
other commodity prices. Without usage of prior beliefs, it can be deduced that 
commodity prices effect/create violence in Sudanese society. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: GES algorithm portraying the causal structures of wheat prices 
(wheat), sorghum prices (sorghum), millet prices (millet) and terror (fatalities from 
violent activities). The sign and number of the estimated beta is provided in 
between the arrows.  
 
  
Millet prices show a negative causal relationship with terrorism, implying that a 
decrease in millet prices would ignite conflict. Millet prices also portray a negative 
effect on sorghum and wheat prices. This counter intuitive result may have two 
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explanations. First, Millet famers engage in conflict when they do not obtain their 
expected prices for their produce. Second, since Wheat and Sorghum have a negative 
relationship with Millet, may be conflict increases millet production and its price.      
Putting knowledge upon terrorist events would be appropriate for policy analysis as most 
of the development policies are undertaken after times of violent conflict.  
 
  
  
Figure 7.2: GES algorithm knowledge upon fatalities, portraying the causal 
structures of wheat prices (wheat), sorghum prices (sorghum), millet prices (millet) 
and terror (fatalities from violent activities). The sign and number of the estimated 
beta is provided in between the arrows. 
 
 
 As described in the method section, Figure 7.2 conditions puts “prior 
knowledge” on terrorist activities and uses the GES algorithm to discover causal 
relationships among the four variables. The figure shows that conflict directly affects 
and increases the price of sorghum, the main staple food of Sudan. In turn, sorghum 
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prices increase domestically grown millet prices. Although due to conflict, the prices of 
domestically grown cereals increase, while the price of wheat appears to decrease. The 
reactionary nature of donor countries may be the chief reason for this counterintuitive 
result. Wheat donation is the most popular food security measure during increased 
unrest. Exacerbated violence increases the supply of wheat in the Sudanese economy. 
The extra wheat in the market reduces the price of wheat. 
7.5 Policy Analysis  
 The collected data is then bootstrapped for 100 iterations using a case 
resampling procedure. With the four variables in question, there are six different edges 
for every set. The 64 scenarios (to the power 3) for every set provide 192 possible 
models. DAG analyses of simulated scenarios ought to be able to determine the 
robustness of the probabilistic causal relationships between the commodity prices and 
terrorist activities. Table 7.1 provides the results of the GES algorithm after 100 times of 
bootstrapping. 
 
Table 7.1: Results After Bootstrapping and Running the GES Algorithm on Each of  
the 100 Scenarios.  
 
  Conflict Wheat Price Sorghum Price Millet Price 
Conflict 0.00 0.02 0.05  0.16 
Wheat Price 0.06 0.00 0.50 0.50 
Sorghum Price 0.10  0.47 0.00 0.49 
Millet Price 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.00 
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Table 7.2: Results After Bootstrapping and Running the GES Algorithm on Each of  
the 100 Scenarios, Putting Knowledge on Conflict. 
 
  Wheat Price Sorghum Price Millet Price 
Conflict 0.05 0.59 0.29 
Wheat Price 0.00 0.54 0.54 
Sorghum Price 0.55 0.00 0.45 
Millet Price 0.46 0.55 0.00 
 
 
 The rows are the independent variables and the columns are the dependent 
variables. The results show that millet has a direct affect on conflict 52% of the time and 
conflict has an edge with millet 16% of the time. While sorghum and wheat prices 
directly affect terror activities, they do so only 10% and 6% of the time, respectively. 
This result validates the discoveries of the DAG of Figure 7.1. It is also revealed that 
wheat prices have very low probabilities (.06+.02=.08) of being related with conflict. 
Millet prices have edges with violent activities 68% of the time, while sorghum prices 
have edges with violence 16% of the time. Therefore, it can be concluded that domestic 
staple food prices are more influential in causing violence. 
 Table 7.2 provides the results of the bootstrapped GES algorithms conditioned on 
conflict. As in Figure 7.2, this assumption has restricted possible edges from terrorist 
activities. With only three variables in question, there are two different edges for every 
set. The three scenarios (to the power 3) for every set provide 54 possible models. The 
matrix illustrates that terrorist activities affect domestically grown cereals 88% of time. 
While there is only a 5% probability that wheat prices will be influenced by increased 
violence. These revelations validates the findings of Figure 7.2, implying that assuming 
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conflict occurs first, it has a higher probability of affecting non-imported cereals. 
Violence has a very low probability to affect wheat prices. Hence, if at all, subsidy 
should be provided for homegrown cereals to mitigate violence. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The novel approach of this chapter can provide valuable information during 
times of uncertainty and unrest. It was established that commodity prices have a direct 
causal relationship with inter-country violence/terrorism. However, information may be 
generated through a cereal other than the most consumed one in Sudan’s case millet. All 
the commodity prices had a negative relationship with terrorist activities; implying 
increasing food prices create violence in the society. Assuming that violence occurs first, 
it has been discovered that conflict has direct causal effects on sorghum prices, which 
passes the information to millet and wheat prices. While sorghum and millet prices 
increase due to enhanced violent activities, wheat prices decrease. During increased 
conflict, wheat is obtained as food aid from the donors. The reactionary foreign aid 
community provides more wheat to conflict ravaged Sudan amidst higher violence and 
decreases its average market price. The results and analysis of this and the previous 
chapter exhibit that more emphasis ought to be provided on home grown cereals. The 
DAG results are validated by the bootstrapped models. They also illustrate that domestic 
cereals have a higher probability of being a cause or effect of violent conflict. Hence, the 
optimum policy to mitigate violence in Sudan would be to enhance subsidy for sorghum 
and millet. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
  
All happy families resemble each other, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way  
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 
8.1 Introduction 
Relationships between foreign assistance, conflict and socio economic 
development are explored in this dissertation. Foreign intervention and conflict have 
different implications for different regions, cultures, economies and societies. To 
understand the efficacy of foreign intervention it is useful to evaluate development in the 
context of different sectors and nations. Chapters of this dissertation separately examine 
different facets of foreign intervention in diverse less-developed nations and conflict 
scenarios. Agricultural assistance, food security and relevant policies are provided a 
higher emphasis because hunger is considered to be an important aspect of mitigating 
conflict in areas which are extremely impoverished.  
The research begins with a literature review that presents contradictory views, 
policies and research conclusions regarding conflict, foreign assistance and socio 
economic development. An evaluation and critique of contemporary research and policy 
provides the scope for the further examination that is undertaken in this dissertation. The 
review is followed by a description of the kinds, sources and availability of data related 
to foreign assistance, conflict and socio-economic development. A brief description of 
the data enables an immediate validation of the literature and policy review, assists in 
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developing hypotheses and provides an idea of possible discrepancies. The data review 
also demonstrates the possibilities of unique research regarding foreign development and 
conflict. Collected data also provides information about the socio-economic conditions 
and needs of various regions.  
An applied theoretical model of the foreign assistance market considering the 
best responses of both the donor and recipient entities is developed. The assumptions of 
the model are derived from the literature review. Donor-recipient relationships and the 
possible rationale of their actions is represented mathematically. The validation of the 
theoretical proposition comes through an empirical model consisting of aggregate 
foreign assistance, conflict and socio-economic development. The machine learning 
algorithm estimates the relationships of the variables and discovers causal structures. 
After the illustration of aggregate foreign assistance and its causes and effects, the 
sectoral foreign aid for conflict prone nations is investigated. Through graphical 
illustrations and analysis of different conflict zones sectoral assistance allocation is 
explored. A regression analysis shows the effects sectoral aid on international conflict 
and inter-country violence. 
Since it was found that agricultural assistance and food security programs can 
successfully mitigate conflict in impoverished nations, the balance of the research 
focuses on appropriate agricultural aid policies. A theoretical model is proposed to 
estimate the cost of conflict by donor entities. The agricultural subsidy would be paid to 
the farmers who will join the labor force renouncing violence. An inductive causation 
method is proposed to discover the causal relationships between commodity prices and 
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violence. After establishing the causal affects, a Bayesian bootstrap method is used to 
analyze different policy implications of food security programs. 
8.2 Summary of Chapters  
The literature review provides critiques and comparisons of philosophies and 
research on foreign aid, development and conflict. Most foreign aid researchers 
recommend improvements in policies but differ in their conclusions and propositions. 
The review of the contemporary policies and literature divided the current development 
exponents into three categories.  
“Optimists” propose continuation existing mandates, but propose modified 
approaches and new organization and strategies to alleviate poverty and eradicate 
conflict. The reforms are generally non-radical and reflect extensions of old ideas. 
Optimists rely on evaluations of foreign development projects to provide accounts of 
successes. “Realists” on the other hand evaluate past projects to propose improvements 
on future endeavors. Most realists believe that the foreign aid disbursement process 
needs to undergo fundamental reform to make foreign assistance more efficient. Realists 
such as Dollar, Kanbur, Collier, Alesena, Kraay, Anderson et al. express their skepticism 
at the allocation procedures of foreign assistance. The group led by Dollar et al. claims 
that assistance should be allocated to the countries which have good policies. Others 
recommend allocation reform citing the inefficiencies of assistance in conflict zones. 
Scholars such as Collier, Goodhand et al. stress the need for more attention and 
assistance during times of violence in conflict zones. A group among the realists 
suggests that aid disbursement should be guided by examining the efficiencies of the 
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domestic governments of executing previous aid. The “pessimist” fraction believes that 
foreign assistance is totally futile, corrupted and inconsequential and may be detrimental 
to the progress of a nation. Several instances are presented of foreign interventions that 
have failed to accomplish the desired affects and have made the situation worse in 
impoverished nations. The pessimists typically do not propose novel approaches of 
foreign assistance and intervention. They recommend foreign assistance be discontinued 
entirely, or new mechanisms of international development be designed and introduced.  
The approaches of all of the groups are seen to be ineffective. Even after 
inceptions of new accounts and agencies, the numbers of impoverished and conflict-
affected citizens in the world has increased. Also providing assistance to only countries 
with appropriate infrastructure or with good governance in place essentially requires a 
fragile and poor to first develop, before it receives assistance – a self-contradictory 
notion development assistance. Such an approach surely fails to mitigate violence and 
eradicate poverty in the most needful countries. Good governance and infrastructure 
typically have to be established in impoverished conflict-prone countries. One concludes 
therefore that working “in” conflict prone economies can be a necessary approach to 
development. The condition of conflict prone nations worsens if they are left alone or are 
not provided socio-economic assistance during times of conflict.  
The shortcomings of foreign development projects cannot be argued, however 
discontinuing foreign aid would be detrimental. Pessimists propose to initiate trade with 
developing nations in place of foreign assistance. But since equal terms of trade cannot 
be established with underdeveloped nations the “trade theory” of development may be a 
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formula for further impoverishment. The bureaucratic inefficiencies in foreign 
development projects have been highlighted by the pessimists, they are yet to propose 
any significant alternative. Easterly and others’ pessimistic analysis is commendable but 
nevertheless development does need a structure and designed mechanism. While 
Western political beliefs and democracy may not be immediately implementable in the 
conflict prone nations, many believe that poor nations need to be assisted politically, 
financially and socially to reach a point where democracy and market economies can 
flourish.  
Neo classical political scientists characterize theories of social movements and 
revolutions as having evolved from the structuralist to rationalist, and finally cultural. 
The more traditional view of conflict associates violence and collective action with 
poverty, deprivation and social mobility. Political scientists have long associated social 
and political movements with the desire of economic freedom and social mobility. 
Conflict being rational is both favored and opposed in the contemporary literature. 
However, prominent economists such as Collier (1998) have claimed that rebels will 
only engage in conflict if the benefit from engaging in conflict outweighs the cost of 
organizing the conflict. Conflict situations may also be “organized” by a few rebel 
leaders of a society to gain upper hand in a political power struggle. Such ideas have 
been promoted by contemporary researchers claiming that feeling of deprivation may 
have the possibility to generate more conflict than actual deprivation. Modern American 
philosophers such as Chua (2002), Zakaria (2003) have claimed that democracy in 
impoverished have nations brought upon instability, upheaval and ethnic conflagration. 
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Additionally, conflict philosophers have also claimed that disagreement, inequality, 
failing markets and social status quo has created violence in Africa. Poverty has been 
deemed highly correlated with conflict in African and Asian nations. Along with 
poverty, infant mortality, lack of education, access to medication, food and rights has 
been linked with conflict. It appears that inequality and feeling of being deprived is more 
likely to be cause of conflict rather than actual poverty. Therefore, deprivation theory 
also promotes that greed by a fraction of the society and grievances of the 
underprivileged may be one of the cardinal causes of conflict.  
 The third chapter has been designed to reflect and discuss about the data that are 
available on foreign assistance, conflict, violence and socio-economic indicators. The 
goals accomplished through this chapter are: 1. Indentify and verify the sources of the 
available data. 2. Summarize the available data on foreign assistance, conflict and socio-
economic development. 3. Validate the collected data through summary statistics. 4. 
Provide a primary analysis of the structure and distribution of the data. 5. Calibrate the 
data so that they can be used appropriately in following quantitative analyses. 6. Critique 
the data for inconsistencies.  
 The aggregate financial assistance data provided by the World Bank and OECD 
is thorough and extensive. The accounts consist of aid provided and received by all the 
donors and recipient countries since 1960. Aid accounts over the years depict that 
conflict prone nations, neighbors of the more influential nations and countries that have 
allied interests with the donor entities obtain higher amounts of aid. However, conflict 
prone neighboring countries of donor nations such as, Bosnia, Serbia or Montenegro 
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receive consistently more per capita assistance than Africa countries such as Chad or 
Sudan. As for aggregate aid is concerned traditionally the “second” world countries such 
as Brazil, South Korea and Philippines received the highest amounts of assistance from 
the donor entities. Around 1998 the trend shifted significantly as the poorer conflict 
prone nations started getting more attention.  
The accounts on aid on different sectors are inconclusive, vague and inadequate. 
Even the total aid disbursed in important sectors such as Government Administration, 
Civil Society, Agriculture, Food security, Medication and Education assistance do not 
have any individual account before 2002. Without records of the sectorial assistance it 
would be very difficult to determine the specific patterns of support and their 
consequences.  
 The conflict data has been collected through Uppsala University Database, 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and World Wide Incident Tracking System (WITS). 
The data on international conflict from 1960-2009 has been collected from the Uppsala 
University Database consists upon data on international wars and conflict. The 
international conflict data illustrates that Asian and African countries have the highest 
amount wars and cross border unrests. Data on violent incidents commence from 1970 
and was collected from University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
Because of possible news bias in the underdeveloped nations and violent attacks of 
terrorist groups in the developed ones; the data on violence is normally distributed 
among the rich and the poor. Data on Sudan’s monthly conflict was collected from the 
WITS database.  
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 The data on socio-economic development has been collected from United 
Nations, FAO, WFO and World Bank database. Among the social indicators the poverty 
data is discovered as inconsistent relative to the social development indices. Upon 
further examination it was concluded that this data set has a high possibility of being 
biased. The poverty data is generally collected with the help of the host country 
government officials or NGO’s. The host agencies of the underdeveloped nations have 
an incentive to fabricate the poverty data to show that foreign assistance allocated to 
them are actually working; thereby induce more aid from the donor organizations. The 
underdeveloped countries have been found as more unequal in their wealth and income 
distribution. Economic indicators such as: Gross Domestic Product, Gross National 
Income, GDP Growth show predictable patterns as European and North American 
countries dominate the top tier and African countries rounding off the bottom tier. The 
data reveals vast disparities in economic development and prosperity between the 
developed and developing nations. The average GNI per capita for a developed nation is 
more than 2000 USD, whereas the average GNI per capita for a developing nation is 
around 200 USD. Even after foreign assistance and nation rebuilding policies the 
developed countries have more than quadruple times the growth than the developed 
ones.  
The data on social indicators have a lot of missing data points. This inconsistency 
is understandable as census and estimations for most of the developing nations are few 
and far between. The social indicators such as: infant mortality, immunization per 100 
children, literacy rate provides a bleak picture for low income countries through the 
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years, especially African nations. The bottom tier countries in the social indicators have 
a vast gap with the top tier countries. For example, Afghanistan occupies the last spot in 
both literacy rate and life expectancy. The average life expectancy and literacy rates for 
Afghanistan respectively are 38.93 and 18.95 per 100 people. The respective highs 81.8 
and 99.9, depicts the huge amount of discrepancy between the developed and 
underdeveloped nations.  
  Primary evaluation of the data reflects the need of proper financial assistance 
and successful implementation of projects in the developing nations. The enormous 
differences in both economic and social indicators reveal the need for rapid and instant 
development. Unfortunately, even though foreign assistance has been increasing the 
inadequate indicators appear to have been consistent over time. Therefore it is 
imperative to make development projects successful and to understand the possible 
fallacies of foreign aid. The literature review has already suggested that poor socio-
economic indicators can be a cardinal cause of conflict. A brief analysis of the inter-intra 
national conflict data shows that the most of the conflict prone nations are the 
underdeveloped ones with low socio-economic indicators. The financial assistance data 
suggests that the poorer conflict prone nation need more timely attention. Undeniably, 
conflict prone nations of Africa and Asia obtain a lot of foreign assistance albeit 
inconsistently. Most of the conflict prone nations receive assistance when the violence 
has reached its peak and has already done irreversible damage to the socio-economic 
infrastructure. 
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 Chapter IV commences with an applied theoretical proposition of the aid market. 
It uses the donor mandates and recipient constraints from the literature review to 
formulate the assumptions of the primary model. As chapter III suggested the conflict 
prone nation are likely to obtain relatively more assistance from the donor entities. 
Under the current mandates the donor countries choose the level of foreign assistance to 
reduce conflict and aspire to accomplish their objective with optimum spending. 
Although, the donor entities can monitor the possible reduction of conflict, the recipients 
have the authority to allocate the resources that are provided to them. The recipient 
governments get positive utility from decreasing violence in their respective countries 
however, since they also have the option to spend the resources somewhere else 
(including possible corruption) the cost associated with reducing conflict have a negative 
disutility. The model deduces two simultaneous actions by the actors: the donor 
countries provide foreign assistance to reduce conflict; the recipient governments reduce 
efforts to decrease terrorism to obtain more assistance. Hence, the effect of foreign 
assistance on terrorism under the current policies and mandates is ambiguous. The model 
concludes that without making significant policy alterations of the donor agencies 
terrorism would not decrease even if the recipient governments behave rationally.  
 Following the theoretical proposition an appropriate method of estimating the 
causal relationships among foreign assistance, terrorism and socio-economic 
development is proposed. The method uses probabilistic inference and Bayesian 
networks to discover the possible causal chains between the aforementioned variables. A 
usual regression analysis can very well present spurious results. Due to the symmetric 
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nature of the variables it is not be possible to indentify a particular structure of these 
indicators. The variables in the development arena are determined simultaneously. So, it 
is impossible to identify the independent variable in this scenario. Additionally, the 
intention of this analysis is to identify the possible causal chains and inference among 
the variables. An approach that analyzes considers the simultaneous causal dependencies 
of the variable ought to suffice. The exact relations between socio-economic indicators, 
foreign aid and terrorism may provide useful insights to germane policies. The literature 
has also proposed the possible existence of latent variables such as: greed and 
grievances. Introducing suitable proxies or instrumental variables for these indicators 
may be controversial and lead to biasness. Through this machine learning algorithm the 
presence of latent variables can also be identified. The graphs systematically determine 
the skeleton of the underlying causal relations through arrows whose directionality is 
ordered by the conditional independencies observed.  
 The Fast Causal Algorithm (FCI) approach shows the existence of latent 
variables in the relationships of inequality, foreign assistance and terrorism. Inequality 
and terrorism both have edges directed towards foreign assistance implying that aid is 
provided as a reaction of inequality and violence. The main revelation from the DAG 
estimation is the non-effect; that foreign assistance does not have any causal effect on 
reducing terrorism and inequality. It implies that foreign assistance does not improve 
livelihoods nor does it assist in reducing in-country violence. The robustness of this 
result is confirmed through the Greedy Efficient Search Algorithm (GES). It is further 
discovered that inequality affects foreign assistance negatively; essentially reiterating the 
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donor mandate that foreign aid will be provided to impoverished nations that are 
improving their social indicators. An increase in terrorism enhances the level of foreign 
assistance from the donor entities; with foreign assistance unable to effect conflict. 
 The prognosis was examined further by adding socio-economic indicators such 
as: GDP growth, Infant mortality, Immunization rates and life expectancy in the basic 
model. Consistent with the previous discoveries foreign assistance is found to have no 
causal affect on GDP growth. Inequality is found to have caused by an increase in GDP 
growth, which implies GDP growth does have an adverse effect on foreign assistance. 
Adding the other social indicators does not change the discoveries significantly as 
terrorism/violence does not get influenced (lowered) by foreign assistance. However, it 
is revealed that terrorism negatively effects child immunization and infant mortality. 
These indicators are also moved by life expectancy. In relevant literature these indicators 
have been used as proxies for poverty, knowledge, education, access to medication and 
relative deprivation. From the graphical illustrations of this research depicts that the 
socio-economic indicators are not a root cause of inter country terrorist activities.  
 The results of the empirical analysis of chapter IV verifies the theoretical model 
that the effect of foreign assistance on terrorism is nonexistent or ambiguous. 
Additionally, indicators such as inequality, poverty, infant mortality etc. are not the root 
causes of terrorism. Terrorism is a standalone phenomenon not causally dependent on a 
countries socio-economic condition. Terrorism may be an effect of international and 
domestic politics, policies or may be ignited by the ruling class of the society. Hence, 
just mitigating poverty or improving livelihoods of the underprivileged would not be 
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able to control terrorism. Terrorism itself should be treated as predicament and ought to 
be dealt with separately. It is also discovered that foreign assistance does not have any 
causal implications upon enhancing the livelihoods of the impoverished of the poor 
countries. The assumptions of the theoretical model are also validated as improving 
social indicators are found to have increased foreign assistance in the recipient nations. 
Since, aggregate foreign assistance does not improve the livelihoods of the 
impoverished or mitigate conflict. It would be beneficial to discover if at all aid for 
different sectors individually affect conflict. The analyses of the sectorial assistance 
commences through an allocation comparison. In conflict prone developing nations, 
military assistance obtains the higher amounts of funds than all the other sectors 
combined. In Afghanistan, US military alone contributed 93% of total the resources that 
went from foreign countries/entities. Relevant literature strongly supports to allocate 
resources towards governance and civil society rebuilding. Consistent with that, it is 
discovered that in conflict prone nations more than 50% of the total non military 
resources are spent government administration, civil society and economic infrastructure 
rebuilding. Sectors such as: agricultural development, food security assistance, education 
and health care are the most neglected. Assistance for agriculture and food security has 
been decreasing as policy makers have been stressing the need for more assistance on 
other sectors. For further quantitative analysis examines the effect of sectorial assistance 
on inter-intra national conflict by dividing aggregate foreign assistance into six sectors. 
They are: Basic health, Education policy and administrative management, Government 
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administration, Economic development and Policy Planning, Civil society, Agricultural 
Development, Food Security Programs and assistance for all other sectors.  
As mentioned in the data chapter the conflict data for the quantitative analysis for 
sectoral aid considers two different facets. They are: the isolated acts of inter country 
violence and the international conflict data where at two parties were involved with one 
being the government. Regression analysis reveals that only food security programs have 
both economic and statistical significance in lowering inter country violent activities. 
Food safety and security generally target the impoverished and deprived citizens of a 
particular geographic area. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia hunger has been a cause of 
riots and instability. Hence, providing emergency cereal and food can mitigate regional 
violence at least in the short run. Although agricultural assistance and economic 
infrastructure also have a negative effect in mitigating inter-country violence, the effects 
were not statistically significant. The other sectors were found to have positive effect on 
inter country violence with only assistance for health care being statistically significant. 
Analysis of international conflict shows that only agricultural development has 
economic and statistical significance on decreasing conflict. Aid towards education and 
civil society also have a positive effect on decreasing international conflict, however 
these effects were not statistically significant. Total assistance, grants, loans and foreign 
direct investment again show a negative and statistically significant effect on decreasing 
conflict. Government administration, food aid/security programs, economic development 
and basic health care all have a statistically significant positive effect on the increase of 
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conflict. Aid designated for education policy has a positive yet statistically insignificant 
effect on decreasing international conflict.   
It is not concluded that aid for basic health care, education or economic 
development increases conflict and violence. The results only show that aid for these 
areas are not properly directed and executed. The overall grants, loans, aid and 
investments provided on other sectors in the impoverished conflict laden nations is 
clearly not serving the purpose as well. The aid policy focus and distribution mechanism 
needs a re-evaluation. The donors must be able to identify and forecast conflict laden 
countries from beforehand and aid them before they reach the status of “failed states”. 
Most importantly, more resources have to be allocated towards agricultural development 
and food security programs for the conflict-laden poor countries.  
Since, it was concluded that the aid policy needed re-evaluation; chapter VI 
develops international agricultural development strategies for aid agencies. The 
theoretical model of this chapter proposes to estimate the cost of conflict and thereby 
mitigating violence through market development. The model contemplates current 
World Food Program (WFP) mechanisms of food procurement in Sudan. Through the 
regional procurement program WFP intends to increase the supply and production of 
Sudan’s domestic cereal production. However, due to conflict, weak infrastructure and 
low technical expertise Sudan’s cost of cereal production is higher than the developed 
world. To mitigate conflict and make Sudan self sustainable in food production WFP has 
to incur a “cost of conflict” that would entice the citizens to give up conflict and join the 
agricultural labor force. The model calculates the counterfactual supply, which can be 
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defined as the optimum supply in the absence of conflict in Sudan. The model computes 
a switching cost for labor to divert from conflict, possible profits, and above all, the 
possible cost of conflict. The cost of conflict is expressed through the price disparities, 
intrinsic utility of joining agents engaged in violence, the number of agents and the 
distribution of the utility functions.  
It is postulated, if the value of the production increases then WFP will intend in 
to pay a higher equilibrium price to the farmers. Policies such as school lunch programs 
are proposed to accomplish that goal. On the contrary if the cost of production increases, 
so will the equilibrium contract price. Otherwise, the citizens would not find it optimal 
to switch to farming if they are not paid sufficiently to cover for their costs. Also, the 
model shows that if the benefit from engaging in conflict is high, then in order to induce 
the agents to give up conflict, WFP would have to pay a higher price to reduce conflict. 
For the successful implementation of such a   purchase program, the production cost of 
the agents must be bounded implying the price of the crop should not be too high. The 
model also shows that the total value of the program must be higher than the total 
intrinsic utility of joining in conflict. Therefore, WFP must devote enough resources to 
initiate the program. After, successful mitigation of conflict, the donor can design 
mechanisms to decrease the production cost. Sudan case study has revealed that building 
infrastructure, technology transfer, availability of inputs and subsidies would strengthen 
local markets in the long run.  
Chapter VII is a supplement to chapter VI. One of the primary assumptions of the 
previous theoretical model was that conflict is has a direct causal relationship with 
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commodity prices. Even if WFP procures cereals and assists local markets of Sudan, 
appropriate food cereals have to be identified. Causal chains between commodity prices 
and conflict would assist policy makers to choose appropriate commodities. However, 
the usual process of policy analysis in economic science is more inclined on rejecting a 
false hypothesis. While, this approach may be beneficial for hypothesis testing, for 
policy purposes it may be flawed. Additionally, before enacting conflict mitigation 
policies through food security a donor entity must verify the underlying causalities 
(direction) between different commodities and conflict. This chapter establishes 1) 
causal relation between conflict and commodity prices; 2) proposes a policy analysis 
method with smaller data sets; 3) discovers appropriate commodities that would assist in 
eradicating conflict in Sudan.  
The violence data for Sudan consisted of monthly fatalities from 2004-2010. The 
commodity prices data comprised monthly average prices of the three major 
commodities: Sorghum, Millet and Wheat. The initial method used in this analysis 
resembles the ones that are used in chapter III. Directed acyclic graph analysis through 
GES algorithm shows millet prices are the root cause of violence in Sudan. It appears 
millet prices move both violence and the prices of the other commodities. It is 
discovered that an increase in the commodity prices enhance the levels and intensity of 
conflict. Intuitively, it can be predicted that intensity of violence would be enhanced 
with the rising food prices, especially in a developing nation. To examine if conflict has 
similar effects on commodity prices, a condition upon violence is imposed, such that 
affect of violence can be estimated. Under such presumption, it is discovered that 
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information passes to sorghum prices from violence and subsequently moves through 
millet and wheat prices.  
 Since, the revelation is based on only 92 data points and the underlying 
distribution of the variables do not follow a multivariable normal pattern; the confidence 
levels of these discoveries are rather low. However, during times of severe insecurity, 
decisions have to be enacted even if they do not have “high confidence intervals”. 
Therefore, a Bayesian bootstrapping method is proposed where the scenarios are iterated 
a hundred times and the most common causal directions are chosen as the best policy. 
The results of the bootstrapping method show that millet has the highest probability to 
be related with conflict. It is also discovered that both the homegrown crops sorghum 
and millet are more likely to be affected from conflict than wheat.    
8.3 Conclusion  
The intentions of the donor entities are generally commendable, yet the results 
have not always been desirable. It is evident from the proceedings of this dissertation 
that development policies proposed by the donors are controversial and has room for 
improvement. Violence and injustice can only be mitigated with carefully crafted 
strategies. The current mandates ought to be changed to ensure appropriate usage of 
donor money. Donors should also have a more proactive role in the execution process of 
development policies and projects. Accountability and participation has to be valued 
more than evaluation. However, development policies for different parts of the world 
should be designed according to their particular needs, situation and culture. Utopian 
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Western oriented policies may not always be successful in conflict prone nations with a 
high percentage of underprivileged populations.  
Conflict must be mitigated in the impoverished nations to ensure sustainable 
human conditions. The aid mandates, policies and resource allocation need a re-
evaluation. It has been shown both theoretically and empirically that current aid 
mandates have flaws in their design. Assistance policies should be executed with the 
intentions of affecting conflict directly. Aid bureaucrats also need to propose 
development policies which are proactive rather than reactive. The resource allocation 
process as it stands now rewards the nations which through good policies enhance the 
socio-economic conditions of their citizens. However, the resources allocated through 
foreign assistance do not improve the living conditions of the poor. It is also concluded 
that affluent nations do not allocate enough resources to the sectors that are most 
necessary to mitigate conflict and poverty. Military assistance, government 
administration and civil society strengthening are assigned the highest amount of 
assistance in the conflict prone developing nations. However, it is discovered that 
agricultural and food assistance has the potential of mitigating intra-international 
violence the best.  
Policies for successful agricultural development and food security in conflict 
prone areas are proposed through estimating the cost of conflict. It is shown that by 
incurring an optimal cost of conflict a donor entity can mitigate violence in conflict 
prone areas. This rent can be incurred through payments for farmers who choose to 
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revert back to farming, abjuring conflict. A causal relationship between commodity price 
and conflict has also been established which identifies the appropriate commodities to be 
subsidized.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Per capita aid disbursed from 1960-2009 from highest to lowest. 
 
Country Name 
Per 
Capita 
aid USD 
Northern Mariana Islands 3287.46 
Palau 2725.37 
Mayotte 1524.36 
New Caledonia 1124.40 
French Polynesia 1008.07 
Marshall Islands 942.18 
Tuvalu 881.14 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 839.80 
Turks and Caicos Islands 573.67 
Aruba 307.67 
West Bank and Gaza 297.69 
Netherlands Antilles 284.30 
Dominica 219.86 
Cape Verde 216.82 
Sao Tome and Principe 195.16 
Seychelles 182.56 
Israel 179.28 
Vanuatu 172.39 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 166.12 
Kiribati 165.5479 
Montenegro 164.9206 
Gibraltar 163.9114 
Jordan 161.5491 
Tonga 155.2711 
St. Kitts and Nevis 154.2491 
Djibouti 148.3611 
Samoa 140.9993 
Grenada 138.2145 
Solomon Islands 128.2349 
Bahrain 125.1349 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 119.1761 
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Serbia 112.9708 
Suriname 111.9862 
St. Lucia 103.3261 
Macedonia, FYR 90.70664 
Comoros 85.99498 
Albania 82.54417 
Guyana 81.73393 
Belize 80.60796 
Mauritania 77.68883 
Antigua and Barbuda 73.46 
Maldives 70.60293 
Namibia 70.29088 
Timor-Leste 69.90945 
Nicaragua 66.69728 
Armenia 65.64633 
Guinea-Bissau 65.41711 
Papua New Guinea 65.31401 
Equatorial Guinea 61.71469 
Botswana 61.45941 
Bhutan 61.43579 
Gabon 59.82744 
Malta 58.431 
Georgia 57.30854 
Cayman Islands 52.95951 
Lebanon 50.63205 
Zambia 48.70011 
Eritrea 48.59592 
Congo, Rep. 47.71934 
Gambia, The 47.04109 
Mongolia 46.67421 
Senegal 46.47885 
Kyrgyz Republic 45.93436 
Bolivia 45.1237 
Liberia 44.81075 
Honduras 43.73292 
Iraq 43.28506 
Fiji 42.62151 
Cyprus 41.77933 
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Lesotho 41.67071 
Moldova 39.30736 
Swaziland 38.10905 
Syrian Arab Republic 36.74691 
Somalia 36.12128 
Oman 35.02317 
Mozambique 34.97692 
Rwanda 34.38936 
Jamaica 32.8588 
Lao PDR 32.07389 
El Salvador 31.19189 
Mali 31.13607 
Central African Republic 30.91059 
Slovenia 29.18013 
Tunisia 28.18586 
Mauritius 28.14428 
Benin 27.39674 
Sierra Leone 27.26125 
Burkina Faso 26.40877 
Malawi 26.39731 
Croatia 26.36984 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 25.97682 
Niger 25.80625 
Tanzania 25.6108 
Cameroon 24.86305 
Burundi 23.7918 
Barbados 23.70727 
Costa Rica 23.39979 
Ghana 23.33558 
Cote d'Ivoire 23.21685 
Togo 23.16583 
Tajikistan 23.16478 
Haiti 23.02591 
Guinea 22.83656 
Yemen, Rep. 22.4561 
Madagascar 22.04342 
Chad 21.46276 
Sri Lanka 20.7678 
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Azerbaijan 20.70578 
Morocco 19.9879 
Afghanistan 19.52178 
Uganda 18.80927 
Zimbabwe 18.41228 
Kenya 18.35587 
Sudan 18.07048 
Cambodia 16.66369 
Panama 15.94563 
Guatemala 14.59833 
Angola 14.22398 
Paraguay 13.5876 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 12.73695 
South Africa 12.47299 
Dominican Republic 11.72408 
Nepal 11.4402 
Peru 11.20753 
Ecuador 11.18341 
Ethiopia 11.08976 
Algeria 10.75945 
Kazakhstan 10.69944 
Bangladesh 10.54969 
Vietnam 10.49432 
Ukraine 10.36463 
Pakistan 8.934045 
Belarus 8.447632 
Uruguay 7.68038 
United Arab Emirates 7.509304 
Philippines 7.497566 
Trinidad and Tobago 7.247307 
Bahamas, The 6.934877 
Turkey 6.803346 
Bermuda 6.682933 
Singapore 6.541466 
Turkmenistan 6.357609 
Chile 6.305413 
Malaysia 6.053715 
Colombia 5.821129 
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Uzbekistan 5.699346 
Brunei Darussalam 5.521949 
Indonesia 5.365513 
Thailand 5.03875 
Libya 4.602349 
Nigeria 4.268787 
Korea, Rep. 4.081824 
Myanmar 3.909543 
Cuba 3.72263 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 3.139015 
Qatar 3.098399 
Argentina 2.358403 
India 1.937623 
Hong Kong SAR, China 1.816266 
Macao SAR, China 1.569267 
Venezuela, RB 1.537179 
Brazil 1.513723 
Mexico 1.495312 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.444393 
China 1.39888 
Kuwait 0.868335 
Saudi Arabia 0.809081 
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